


АВТОР
БЕСТСЕЛЛЕРОВ
«ЛЕДОКОЛ» И
«АКВАРИУМ»

ВИКТОР СУВОРОВ ПРОТИВ ВСЕХ

КРИЗИС В СССР
И БОРЬБА ЗА ВЛАСТЬ
В РУКОВОДСТВЕ
СТРАНЫ В ПЕРВОЕ
ПОСЛЕВОЕННОЕ
ДЕСЯТИЛЕТИЕ

приквел
бестселлера
«Кузькина мать»
★★★★★

первая книга трилогии
«Хроника Великого
десятилетия»



Annotation

The new book by the outstanding historian, writer and military analyst Viktor Suvorov is the first part of the trilogy "Chronicle of the Great Decade", written in the best traditions of the best-selling novel "Kuzkin Mother", a grand historical reconstruction of the events of the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s, when the severe post-war crisis forced the leadership of the Soviet Union to seek new ways of development of the country. Putting together known and little-known facts and events of those years into a single mosaic, the author tells about the struggle for power in the leadership of the USSR in the first post-war decade, about the decisions that were made by the leaders of the Soviet Union, and the consequences of these decisions.

This is a book about how Stalin's constant failures in domestic and foreign policy in the postwar years led the country to the gravest crisis, about the struggle of clans within the Soviet leadership and their secret plans, about political intrigue and how the system of governing the country and its satellites was actually organized. The events of that time became a turning point in the development of the Soviet Union and predetermined the subsequent collapse of the USSR and the triumph of capitalist economies and the free market.

"Against All Odds" - a sensational new version of our history, shattering conventional wisdom and myths about the causes of key events of the mid-20th century.

The book contains more than 130 photographs, including rare archive images published in Russia for the first time.

-
- ♦ [Viktor Suvorov Against All](#)
 - ♦ [CONTROL\[1\]](#)
 - ♦
 - ♦
 - ♦ [INTRODUC](#)
 - ♦ [TION](#)
 - ♦ [CHAPTER 1](#)
 - ♦ [CHAPTER 2](#)
 - ♦ [CHAPTER 3](#)

- ♦ [CHAPTER 4](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 5](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 6](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 7](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 8](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 9](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 10](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 11](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 12](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 13](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 14](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 15](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 16](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 17](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 18](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 19](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 20](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 21](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 22](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 23](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 24](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 25](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 26](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 27](#)
- ♦ [CHAPTER 28](#)
- ♦ [CONCLUSION](#)
- ♦ [List of References](#)
- ♦ [notes](#)
 - [1](#)
 - [2](#)
 - [3](#)
 - [4](#)
 - [5](#)
 - [6](#)
 - [7](#)
 - [8](#)
 - [9](#)

- [10](#)
 - [11](#)
 - [12](#)
 - [13](#)
 - [14](#)
 - [15](#)
 - [16](#)
 - [17](#)
-

Victor Suvorov Against All

The crisis in the USSR and the struggle for power in the country's leadership in the first post-war decade.

The first book of the trilogy "Chronicle The Great The prequel to the bestselling Kuzkin's Mother.

OVERVIEW^[1]

Introduction

The Great Decade as part of the official periodization of the history of the USSR and one of the components in the triad of great historical events of the XX century according to the version of Soviet historians, prepared for the tenth anniversary of Khrushchev's rule. - Khrushchev is sent to retirement, and the "great decade" turns into a "period of voluntarism". - The Great Decade as an amazing layer of our history.

Chapter 1

Ivan Serov's unexpected appointment to the highest Chekist position outside Moscow. - The cursed position of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. - Nikita Khrushchev: the forefront of the Red Terror. - Khrushchev and Serov hit it off. - For what Stalin was establishing a common border with Germany.

Chapter 2

"Liberation" of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Red Army. - The Southern Front under Zhukov poses a threat to Germany. - Party, Army and State Security: the three forces ruling the Soviet Union. - The meeting of Khrushchev, Zhukov and Serov in Kiev in June 1940, which further determined the course of history of the USSR. - The fate of Khrushchev, Zhukov and Serov in the following years.

Key point

The non-aggression treaty with Germany actually turns out to be a treaty to attack Poland.

Chapter 3

All the classics of communism associated the path to a bright future with war. - The Second World War overturns all communist theories, failing to fulfill the hopes that Comrade Stalin had placed on it. - Textbook "Historical Materialism"

1951 as evidence of Stalin's commitment to World Revolution. - 1,200 submarines and 100 new front-line bomber divisions: How Stalin prepared for World War III.

Key point

The views of Stalin and his closest associates on the ways of further development of the country sharply diverge.

Chapter 4

The crisis of 1952: Comrade Stalin decides to change the top leadership of the country, and the top leadership of the country decides to change Comrade Stalin. - Convening of the XIX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) against the will of Stalin. - The delegates of the Congress vote for a new charter of the Communist Party and do not realize that they are taking part in a coup d'état. - Stalin's speech at the XIX Congress of the Party turned out to be the last public speech of his life, and the full transcript of the Congress has not yet been published. - Election of new members of the Central Committee of the Party and the Presidium of the Central Committee: the old guard against the leader of the peoples. - Stalin's tactics in the struggle for power and the technology of crushing opponents. -

"The case of doctors": Stalin escalates the conflict. - Former associates strike back.

Key point

The history of Russia as a continuous series of political conspiracies.

Chapter 5

Personnel reshuffles in the Soviet leadership on the day of Stalin's death. - Stalin's death as the logical conclusion of the policy pursued by his inner circle since August 1952. - On the possible causes of death of the leader. - Beria and Malenkov stand at the head of the state, and Khrushchev receives the post of party secretary, and with it the management of personnel distribution and genuine power. - The struggle for power between Stalin's closest associates. - The leaders of the USSR before the need to choose the path of further development of the country: Malenkov and Beria against Khrushchev and Zhukov.

Chapter 6

Why the country's leadership wanted to convince the people that the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks had disappeared in 1934 . -

"Historian - scout of the past": on the importance of intelligence and analytical skills for studying and reconstructing historical events. - The title of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) has never been abolished. - Duplication of power functions in the Soviet Union: party committees and executive committees as organs of power of the party and the state. - Resolutions signed by Stalin in June 1941, as irrefutable evidence of the preparation of the Soviet attack on Germany. - "Brief biography" of Stalin.

Key point

The version of the disappearance of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) in 1934 as an attempt to conceal the circumstances of the struggle for power in the leadership of the USSR in 1952-1953 and to cover up the traces of Stalin's assassination.

Chapter 7

Heavy legacy of Stalin's rule: solvable tasks and insoluble problems. - "Stalin took Russia with a plow and left it with an atomic bomb": exposing a well-established myth. - Kolkhozes and post-war famine in the Soviet Union: the catastrophic consequences of the war overlapped with the catastrophic consequences of the criminal anti-peasant policy of the Soviet regime.

Key point

On the scientific and non-scientific style of writing historical books.

Chapter 8

Stalin's foreign policy defeats after World War II. - Was Churchill's Fulton Speech^[2] the cause of the start of the Cold War? - The real causes of the Cold War. - Khrushchev strengthens the position of his closest supporters in the upper echelons of power. - The eleven gulags of the Soviet Union. - The split in the country's leadership. - Beria's departure from Stalin's practice of governing the country and his struggle against Stalin's cult of personality. - First use of the term "cult of personality." - Foreign and

Beria's and Malenkov's domestic policy. - Uprising in East Berlin on June 17, 1953.

Key point

The Soviet Union's covert war against its allies during the joint war against Nazi Germany as the main cause of the Cold War. - Stalin's February 9, 1946 speech as the quintessence of Cold War principles and a call for a new war against capitalism.

Chapter 9

Beria's visit to East Berlin on June 18, 1953 and the suppression of the uprising. - Beria proposes to abandon the construction of socialism in East Germany. - Beria's return from Germany to Moscow and his arrest. - The defeat of Beria and his clan at the July (1953) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. - The situation of serfs in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union and food production. - Opportunities to improve the state of affairs in the country missed with Beria's removal from power.

Key point

"Blue envelopes" and other ways of bribing Soviet state and party officials by the country's leadership.

Chapter 10

September (1953) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the concentration of power in the country in the hands of Khrushchev. - Development of virgin lands as an attempt to solve the food problem and its consequences. - The collapse of hopes for World Revolution with the advent of nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union would no longer be able to invade other countries without risking a retaliatory nuclear strike. - Malenkov's declaration that there would be no winners in World War III should it break out. - Khrushchev's struggle with Malenkov and his supporters. - New edition of Stalin's textbook.

"Historical materialism" as the basis of the new ideology and policy of Khrushchev. - The history of punitive bodies begins with a clean slate: the creation of the State Security Committee.

Key point

Zhukov intervenes in the battle for power by suggesting that Khrushchev prove in practice that the USSR can win a nuclear war.

Chapter 11

Combat training in the 128th Gumbinnen Rifle Corps of the 28th Army of the Belorussian Military District in the first half of 1954.

- Grandiose transfer of personnel and equipment to the Totsky range.

Chapter 12

Totsky training ground. - Military exercises "Snowball". - Preparation for the exercise. - Common interests of Marshal Zhukov and Lieutenant General Shtemenko.

Actors

Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko, Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff of the Siberian Military District, former Army General, former Chief of the General Staff, former First Deputy Minister of Defense.

Chapter 13

Assault and siege as two ways to capture an enemy stronghold: a brief excursion into the theory of offensive operations. - Development of the practice of offensive operations in the early 20th century. - How the Red Army cracked the enemy's defenses at the final stage of World War II: the secret of success and its shortcomings. - Battle reconnaissance. - Artillery preparation.

Chapter 14

Special echelon and its role in the offensive operations of the Red Army. - History of the creation of penalty companies and battalions. - Permanent and variable composition of the Red Army penalty units.

- The order of manning. - The number of penalty companies and battalions of the Red Army during the war. - How Soviet commanders avoided mentioning penalty units in their memoirs.

Key point

The nuclear bomb as a new ideal tool for providing a clean break in an offensive operation. - Troop Exercise

"Snowball" as a way to test the theoretical assumption of Soviet military commanders about a significant simplification of the organization and conduct of offensive operations in the event of the use of nuclear weapons.

Chapter 15

Plan of the exercise at the Totsk test site on September 14, 1954. - The test site and its surroundings. - Dropping a nuclear bomb. - Nuclear explosion, art preparation and air strikes on the defense of the conditional enemy. - The end of the exercise victory offensive side.

Chapter 16

The flip side of the exercises at the Totsk test site. - Post-war bombers of the USSR and the USA. - Showmanship: what was demonstrated during the exercises at the Totsk test site could not be repeated in a real combat situation. - Problems of nuclear bomb delivery and bombing accuracy. - "Ballet. - The military exercise "Dnepr" in September 1967 as another vivid example of showmanship, the purpose of which was similar to the purpose of the exercises at the Totsk range. - Consequences of the Totsk exercises. - Radiation exposure of exercise participants and radioactive contamination of the area. - Landing of a special group in the epicenter of a nuclear explosion.

Key point

How to justify Zhukov and his mistakes in the organization and conduct of the Totsk exercises. - Similar exercises in the United States.

Chapter 17

Official assessments of the exercises at the Totsk test site. - On the advisability of classifying information related to the exercises and their consequences. - On the zero value of the experience gained during the exercises. - The real purpose of the exercise with the use of nuclear weapons at the Totsk test site in September 1954. - What enemy's defense in case of war did Zhukov intend to break through with nuclear strikes? - Why would Zhukov want to break through the defenses in the territory of the Western

Germany. - Breaching the enemy's defenses with nuclear strikes is applicable only in the case of an attack on the countries of Western Europe for the purpose of their occupation.

Key point

Mass falsification and classification of documents in order to conceal information about the exercises at the Totsk test site and their expediency.

Chapter 18

Why should the Soviet Union liberate Western Europe? - The inevitable defeat of the planned socialist economy of the USSR in competition with the free economies of the developed countries of the West. - Why a socialist state cannot coexist alongside normal countries for a long time. - The "special way" of development of the Soviet Union. - Mass flight of population from socialist countries. - Alternative scenarios for the development of the USSR after the death of Stalin. The course of Khrushchev - Bulganin on the continuation of the construction of communism and its consequences. - The path to communism - the path to nowhere. - Exercises at the Totsk test site as a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the end of the USSR. - Zhukov convinces the leadership of the country in the possibility of "liberation" of Western Europe and thus strengthens Khrushchev's position and helps him defeat Malenkov and his supporters.

Key point

How foreign experts tried to determine the military budget of the Soviet Union, and what came out of it. - Pricing in a socialist economy. - "How much does a ton of steel really cost in the Soviet Union?" - From the beginning, the Soviet Union was doomed to economic backwardness and defeat. - A country at a crossroads: three possible scenarios for the further development of the Soviet Union. - The Choice.

Chapter 19

January (1955) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. - "Let's raise virgin lands!" - Defeat of Malenkov and his removal from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. - The appointment of Zhukov as USSR Minister of Defense. - Once again about the key role of Zhukov and the exercises at Totskoye

the testing ground in the struggle for power in the leadership of the USSR and strengthening of Khrushchev's position. - "Strengthen the success of the exercise!": the plan for a new exercise involving two corps and the landing of paratroopers in the epicenter of the nuclear explosion. - Transfer of the exercise site to the Semipalatinsk test site. - July (1955) plenum of the Central Committee and the decision to convene the XX Congress of the CPSU.

Actors

Konev Ivan Stepanovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the Pre-Carpathian Military District. - Mamsurov Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 38th Army of the Pre-Carpathian Military District.

Chapter 20

The signing of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955. - Why Comrade Stalin did not need the Warsaw Pact. - Training in the USSR of leading personnel for future Soviet republics and union states. - Creation of the Finnish Corps on the basis of the 106th Infantry Division in November 1939. - Creation of the Polish Division in June 1941 and its deployment into a corps and the 1st Polish Army.

- Russian commanders of the Polish division. - How Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky became Marshal of Poland. - Military commanders of the Polish Armed Forces were awarded ranks in the Kremlin. - Why Comrade Khrushchev needed the Warsaw Pact.

Key point

About ability to humiliate neighbors. - Who commanded ours "brothers in arms."

Chapter 21

Restoration of Austrian sovereignty and the international summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955. - A new meeting between Zhukov and Eisenhower: the former remained a big military chief, the latter became President of the United States. - Zhukov's touching concern for the preservation of the planet's atmosphere. - Could the USSR and the USA in 1955 exchange nuclear strikes of equal strength. - Zhukov's bluff and the Soviet Union's nuclear impotence. - US disinformation campaign: tactical success and strategic defeat. - Who and how the arms race was promoted.

Chapter 22

Detonation and destruction of the battleship "Novorossiysk" October 29, 1955 in Sevastopol Bay. - Versions about the causes of the battleship's destruction. - The conclusion of the government commission and the destruction of investigation materials. - Facts that refute the official version. - Assumptions about sabotage of foreign intelligence services and their complete untenability. - Were there nuclear shells on board the "Novorossiysk"? - Development in the USSR of nuclear weapons for the fleet.

Key point

Why mines from World War II found at the site of the explosion of "Novorossiysk" do not confirm the official version of the destruction of the battleship.

Chapter 23

Could the KGB have organized the bombing of the Novorossiysk? - Did the country's leaders have reasons to blow up the only Soviet battleship? - Persons involved in the sinking of the "Novorossiysk" and their fates after the disaster. - Admiral Kuznetsov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy: removed from his post, demoted to vice-admiral and expelled without charges. - Admiral Gorshkov, Kuznetsov's first deputy: appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense. - How the Soviet Navy developed under Gorshkov's leadership.

Key point

Unexpected career rise Gorshkov and the same strange fall Kuznetsov. - Zhukov's revenge.

Chapter 24

After becoming Minister of Defense, Zhukov vigorously strengthens his position and expands the limits of his own power. - Zhukov's initiative to transfer the Border Troops to the Ministry of Defense. - The tasks of the Frontier Troops of the USSR and their place in the system of power structures of the country. - Zhukov's proposals to transfer the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under the control of the Ministry of Defense. - Tasks of the USSR Internal Troops and their place in the system of power structures of the country

countries. - Duplication of the security systems of the leaders. - Zhukov and the Frontier Sentry: How the Minister of Defense Tried to Command Other People's Troops and Violated the Basic Laws of Military Service.

Chapter 25

Consequences of the transfer of KGB and MVD troops under the control of the Ministry of Defense. - Special Departments and Commissars: How the Communist Party controlled the Red Army. - Commissars, pompolites, zampolites, and military councils: the evolution of party control over the army. - Zhukov's proposals to transform the Military Soviets from controlling bodies to advisory ones. - Personnel decide everything: how the Soviet Union built a system of personnel. - Nomenclature. - Zhukov carries out a creeping coup in the country, taking the army out of the control of the ruling party, openly disobeying the decisions of the country's leadership and breaking the control mechanisms created by him.

Chapter 26

How the Soviet leaders managed the socialist planned economy. - Gosplan. - "Scientific" organization of production in the USSR on the example of production of wooden crates and its consequences. - "If you want to build socialism, choose a country that is not miserable." - The inherent evils of the socialist mode of production. - Socialism as a dead-end path of human development. - Prophecy of the designer of over-the-horizon radars Fedoseyev.

Key point

Two choices that the leaders of the Soviet Union had. - The choice of Brezhnev and the choice of Andropov and Gorbachev.

Chapter 27

XX Congress of the CPSU (February 1956). - The Sixth Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy for 1956-1960 and the failure of its implementation. - The project to build the world's most powerful pipeline system and the sale of oil. - Extraordinary XXI Congress of the CPSU (1959) and the new seven-year plan for 1959-1965. - The Soviet Union turns into the world's main food importer. -

"To trade in resources is to trade in the Motherland". - The start of the oil pipeline to Europe miraculously coincided with the expulsion of Khrushchev and the beginning of Brezhnev's reign. - Khrushchev's closed report on Stalin's personality cult at the 20th Congress of the CPSU and Khrushchev's version of our history.

Chapter 28

"To hang (hang it where the people can see it) no less than 100 known kulaks, rich men, bloodsuckers": Leninist norms of party life and collective leadership. - The results of Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU: transfer of people's anger from the criminal system of socialism to a single individual, gaining the support of the party bureaucracy in exchange for guarantees to stop purges among the nomenklatura, anti-Stalinism as a new ideological weapon against possible opponents. - Stalinism as the mildest version of Leninism. - Election of the Communist Party leadership in theory and in practice. - The new composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, elected at the XX Congress: everything is back to normal. - Zhukov is the only one of the leaders who remained in favor after the XX Congress. - After the exposure of the personality cult of Stalin, the victory in the war against Nazism becomes the only bright spot in domestic history, and this victory people associate only with Zhukov. - Zhukov goes on the offensive against Khrushchev. - The predatory grin of Zhukov's coming dictatorship. - Army generals and marshals on the hunt. -

"Georgy Konstantinich, why don't you take the power?"

Conclusion

The socialist system is on the verge of destruction. - At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a mortal wound was inflicted on the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp. - The shooting of demonstrations in Tbilisi and in Poznan in 1956. - Military exercises at the Semipalatinsk test site using nuclear weapons on September 10, 1956. - Uprisings against pro-Soviet regimes in Poland and Hungary.

List of references

Tatiana

Bezdamny u unprecedented cruel marshal Zhukov

not

left behind not a single independent and valuable military thought, did not plan and conducted a single operation, where at least some role was played by military art, outplaying the enemy with military skill. Only the overwhelming advantage in manpower, equipment, ammunition, fuel. Only the death of soldiers many times more than the enemy. He undoubtedly knew how to one thing: mercilessly achieve the fulfillment of any of his orders, regardless of nonsense and blood. But Russia needs a great commander in a won war!

Mikhail Weller

Totalitarianism is more effective than democracy in terms of lies and violence. However, democracy is more effective than totalitarianism in economics, and this ultimately proved fatal for the USSR. The lesson of the collapse of the USSR is that effective economics defeated effective violence.

Yulia Latynina

INTRODUCTION

On September 13, 1953, Nikita Khrushchev took office as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU Central Committee).

September 13, 1963 marked the 10th anniversary of the beginning of his reign. As this date approached, some of the court flatterers had the happy thought to declare that centuries would pass, but that future generations of people all over the planet would remember these years with excitement and gratitude and call them the Great Decade.

The idea was taken up, repeated and reinforced by all Soviet newspapers and magazines. Leaders of the highest rank spoke about the Great Decade from the podiums of party conferences and congresses. In all the movie theaters of the Soviet Union repeated the film "Our Nikita Sergeyevich", first released in 1961. Radio and television announcers broadcast about the Great Decade every day. This term became completely official, along with two others, making up a triad of great historical events of the XX century:

- The Great October Socialist Revolution,
- The Great Patriotic War,
- Great Decade.

This lasted exactly 13 months. On October 13, 1964, as a result of a conspiracy, Khrushchev was thrown from all his posts and sent into retirement.

The great decade at one moment turned into a "period of voluntarism". It was not customary to call the main voluntarist by name. For two decades Khrushchev and the entire period of his rule fell out of our history. Books and articles, movies, poems and songs were no longer written about the Great Decade.

The new ruler of our country Hero of Socialist Labor, who later became Marshal of the Soviet Union and four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich was a

an amazingly talented person. He combined the positions of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council. In addition, he wrote three books, for which he was awarded the Lenin Prize for Literature.

It is interesting that in these three books Brezhnev, talking about the pre-war period, the war, post-war construction and the rise of virgin lands, never once mentions Khrushchev. If we are to believe Brezhnev's "truthful" books, then we will have to admit that there was no Khrushchev in Soviet history.

Although it was Khrushchev who took notice of the young engineer Brezhnev and raised him to the very heights of power.

Although before the war, during the initial period of the war and after the war, Khrushchev was Brezhnev's immediate superior.

Although under the leadership of Lieutenant General Khrushchev, Major General Brezhnev participated in the coup d'état and the arrest of Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria.

Although the rise of virgin lands was Khrushchev's idea, and Brezhnev under his personal control directed the rise of virgin lands.

During the Great Decade, though, Brezhnev was the most loyal Khrushchevite.

Although Brezhnev, together with Khrushchev, took a very active part in the overthrow of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

Although Brezhnev during the Great Decade received his first Gold Star.

The Great Decade is a fascinating stratum of our history. I've long wanted to write a book about the times of Khrushchev's reign, and I've delved so deeply into the subject that I ended up with a new trilogy, the third book of which, "Kuzkin's Mother", has already been published, the first you are holding in your hands, and the second, "Bummer", will be published at the end of 2013.

CHAPTER 1

1

To understand who Nikita Khrushchev and his closest associates were, and what the country and the world were like at that time, we must cast a cursory glance at the events that preceded the Great Decade.

On July 29, 1939, Senior Major of State Security Serov Alexander Ivanovich was appointed Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of State Security - GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR. Senior Major GB was 33 years old. The rank of Senior Major of the State Security corresponded to the army rank of commander - two lozenges in the buttonholes.

The position of deputy chief of the GUGB Serov held for only one month - in August 1939. During that month Serov did something that prompted Stalin to reward him generously.

In the NKVD system, the highest post outside Moscow was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. The master of Ukraine at that time was Nikita . The official title of the master
- First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

August 31, 1939, Stalin picked up the phone and asked whether Comrade Khrushchev does not object to the appointment of Serov Ivan Alexandrovich to the post of Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine? Stalin could not have asked Khrushchev's opinion, but he was a wise man, able, when necessary, to show respect for his subordinates.

Could Khrushchev object? It is unlikely that he would dare to contradict Stalin, especially since he knew nothing about Serov at all, since Serov had only recently joined the NKVD.

What exactly Serov did as deputy chief of the NKVD GUGB in August 1939, Stalin probably did not tell Khrushchev. But if the leader thought it possible and necessary to appoint a soldier of the secret front to the highest Chekist position outside Moscow after only a month of service in the previous, and already very high position, then so be it.

The next day, September 1, 1939, Germany Poland. On September 2, 1939, Serov arrived in Kiev. Straight from the train station - to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to introduce himself to Khrushchev.

2

The position of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine was cursed. However, like all other positions in the NKVD.

The first chief of the NKVD of Ukraine was Vsevolod Apollonovich Balitsky, commissar of the GB 1st rank. He was arrested, and on the day when Balitsky turned 45 years old, he was shot.

Then this position was held by commissar of the GB 2nd rank Israel Moiseevich Leplevsky. He was arrested and shot at the age of 42.

Leplevsky's place was taken by Commissar of the GB 3rd rank Uspensky Alexander Ivanovich. He was 36 years old when he realized that he could not escape arrest and disappeared. Uspensky arranged his disappearance as a suicide, leaving a note on his desk with the words: "Look for the corpse in the Dnieper". But you can't escape the punishing hand of the proletariat. The note was not believed, Uspensky was put on the All-Union wanted list, and six months later he was caught and shot.

There was a clear pattern: each new chief of the NKVD of Ukraine was younger than his predecessor and one rank lower in rank. And the end was the same for all of them, and this was also a pattern.

The post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine remained vacant for almost a year. Vrids - temporary acting officers [\[31\]](#) were in command.

And now a new People's Commissar was appointed to Kiev. In full accordance with the traceable regularity, he was younger than his predecessors and had the rank of senior major of the State Security. If this had continued, very soon the chief of the NKVD of Ukraine could have been appointed a twenty-year-old lieutenant of State Security, who would have been shot immediately after taking office. However, Serov could have been an exception to the rule.

Khrushchev received the new Commissar without a queue, asked about his health, family, plans for the future, asked what the top leadership of the NKVD thought about the German attack on Poland and whether Britain would fulfill its obligations to stand on the side of Poland.

The senior GB major replied confidently: he will.

On September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany.

On September 4, 1939 the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Serov Alexander Ivanovich was promoted to the rank of Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank.

3

On September 17, 1939, Red Army troops entered Poland. Both Khrushchev and Serov had to work hard to make the citizens of the annexed territories happy, to make them love their new homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The recipe was simple and reliable: exterminate the bad, then only the good would remain.

Comrade Khrushchev had a great deal of experience in this matter. In 1937, Comrade Stalin gave the first secretaries of the regions, krais and republics permission to exterminate the enemies who hindered the building of a bright future. He defined a norm for each of them. But this was not enough for the secretaries.

Immediately the Politburo of the Central Committee received requests from all the secretaries - who should shoot or imprison how many people. Curiously, the first in terms of bloodthirstiness was Nikita Khrushchev. Documents have been preserved: in 1937 in Moscow region he managed to find 20 thousand people.

"kulaks" to be shot. How could there be so many of them in the Moscow suburbs, five years after collectivization? He repeated the same thing in Ukraine (Krasnaya Zvezda. September 20, 2006).

It should be borne in mind that in 1953, when Khrushchev became master of the Soviet Union, the first thing he did was to clean up the archives, eradicating any trace of his seething activity in exterminating enemies of the people. What the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda tells us about is only an accidental, inadvertently preserved evidence of Khrushchev's personal contribution to the extermination of his compatriots.

And here's what's interesting. There were 11 republics in the Soviet Union before World War II. In nine republics, the first secretaries of the republican communist parties, who begged Stalin for permission to increase the limits on shootings, then fell under the punishing axe of proletarian justice. They were replaced by new secretaries, who also shot and imprisoned, then asked for an increase in production rates, again shot and imprisoned, and then imprisoned themselves and, in the end, also received a bullet in the back of the head. Only in two Soviet republics did the first secretaries successfully survive 1937 and 1938: Beria in Georgia and Khrushchev in Ukraine.

Khrushchev and Beria were not just frontrunners of the red terror, but also very cunning guys - otherwise both would have shared the fate of the first secretaries of the other republics.

4

If we are talking about the pre-war period, I will add one more light stroke with a soft brush to the portrait of Nikita Khrushchev.

On July 10, 1937, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution on the creation of regional "troikas". Each "troika" consisted of the head of the local NKVD, the prosecutor and the party secretary of the corresponding district, region, krai or republic. All suspicious citizens

The "troikas" were divided into first and second categories. Those who fell into the first category were shot, while those in the second category were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. "The Troikas, without going into details, passed sentences based on lists that could include hundreds of people.

Inquiries were sent from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to all republics, krajs, oblasts and districts: what would be the personal composition of the "troika", what limit of executions do you consider necessary to establish for the beginning? Having received answers from the localities, the Central Committee approved the personal composition of the judges and the initial limit.

In paragraph 12 of the Politburo resolution of July 10, 1937, the composition of one of these "troikas" was defined: "*In the Moscow region, consisting of T. Redens, Maslov, Khrushchev*". The same paragraph approved the first decision of the "troika" for Moscow region on the

execution of 6500 people and expulsion to distant parts of the country of 32805 people (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 1998. C. 747).

Let us understand the personal composition of this "troika". Let us evaluate Comrade Khrushchev's colleagues, together with whom he cleansed Moscow and the Moscow region of spies and pests, counter-revolutionaries, terrorists and saboteurs.

Comrade Stanislav Redens. Here's his war record. In the Cheka since 1918. Investigator of the Moscow Cheka. Personal secretary to Comrade Dzerzhinsky. Chairman of the Odessa Regional Cheka. Chairman of the Crimean gubernational police. Head of the Special Department of the maritime forces of the Black and Azov seas. Assistant to Dzerzhinsky on the leadership of the Supreme Council of National Economy. Chairman

of the Transcaucasian GPU. Chairman of the GPU of Belarus. Chairman of the GPU of Ukraine. Head of the NKVD of the Moscow region. Commissar of the GB 1st rank. Married to Stalin's wife's sister Anna Alliluyeva. One of the organizers of the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev. January 20, 1938 appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan. November 22, 1938 was arrested. He was found guilty of espionage in favor of Polish intelligence, as well as of being a member of a conspiratorial organization in the NKVD system, on its instructions carried out hostile work aimed at beating Party and Soviet cadres, carried out mass unjustified arrests of Soviet citizens, many of whom were shot. Comrade Redens was shot on February 12, 1940.

The second in the "troika" was Konstantin Ippolitovich Maslov, Moscow prosecutor. Arrested on July 3, 1938. He was found guilty of being an active participant in a counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyist saboteur terrorist organization, which existed in the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office and the region, conducting subversive activities, being a member of a militant terrorist group preparing to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet Government. On March 7, 1939 citizen Maslov K. I. was convicted and shot the same day. His deputies Koblents V. I. and Evzerikhin E. N. were shot together with him.

Let us evaluate: Comrades Redens, Maslov and Khrushchev were diligently searching for enemies of the people, exterminating them by the thousands. And now it turned out that Redens was a Polish spy, a conspirator; he illegally arrested Soviet people and shot them! Maslov was a terrorist who was preparing an assassination attempt on the leaders of the world's first socialist state!

Together with the saboteur and spy Redens, together with the terrorist Maslov, comrade Khrushchev worked; he signed the same huge lists with hundreds of names, without penetrating into the essence of the charges and without even having the physical ability to read so many confessions hammered out during interrogations. But Redens and Maslov got a bump, and Khrushchev got a promotion.

You can say anything you want about Khrushchev, but it is clear to anyone: he was not a fool. At least, he was not a fool at that time.

5

The main task of the NKVD was to fight the enemies of the people. Comrade Serov, the new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, who arrived in Kiev on September 2, 1939, was placed at the disposal of the right chief. To the one who was continuously and mercilessly fighting against enemies of the people.

Khrushchev and Serov understood each other. They worked together.

On April 26, 1940, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on the awarding of a large group of Chekists. What exactly they were awarded for was not specified; it was simply reported: "for great merits in strengthening" and so on.

In fact, they were awarded for the execution of thousands of Polish officers. In the list of award-winners were the heads of NKVD directorates:

- Major GB Tokarev D. S.,
- Smolensk region, Captain GB Kupriyanov E.I.,
- of Kharkiv region, Major GB Safonov P. S.

These are the chiefs of the UNKVD of the very regions where mass graves would later be found:

- Kalinin region (shooting of Polish officers, prisoners of the Ostashkov camp, at the NKVD firing range near the village of Mednoye),

- Smolensk region (mass shooting of Polish citizens in the Katyn forest near the village of Katyn),
- Kharkov region (mass executions of Polish generals and officers in the basement of the NKVD Department of the USSR in Kharkov region; the bodies of the murdered were buried in a forest park near the village of Pyatihatki to the north of Kharkov (today the village is part of Kharkov)).

In that list of the foremost leaders of the struggle for the happiness of mankind among the first was the commissar of State Security 3rd rank Serov Ivan Alexandrovich, awarded the highest state award - the Order of Lenin.

6

I once spoke on Ukrainian television. My speech was broadcast from Britain - a teleconference was organized. I said the usual phrase: in August 1939 Hitler and Stalin divided Poland. I was interrupted by a fierce opponent: everything was done correctly! Stalin only annexed Ukrainian lands to Ukraine. Try to tell Ukrainians now that this is not our land! Well, try it!

I'm angry, too.

First, if it was a territorial dispute, it was between the Soviet Union and Poland. It should have been settled with Poland. But not with Hitler.

Secondly, since the mid-1930s a great war had been brewing in Europe and throughout the world. Comrade Stalin knew about it, spoke openly about it with hope and joy, including in March 1939 from the rostrum of the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party. Taking into account the impending major war, with the solution of territorial problems could have been delayed. The Soviet Union had somehow lived without those territories for two decades - it could have patient.

By acquiring new territories, Stalin lost his "safety cushion" in the form of Poland. The partition of Poland meant the emergence of a common border with Germany, thus giving Hitler the opportunity to deliver a crushing blow to our country, including a sudden one.

Thirdly, if without Hitler's help it was impossible for us to regain the Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands, Comrade Stalin should have put the question differently: take what you consider yours, Hitler, and I will take what is mine, but let a reduced but still independent Poland remain between us. Then there will be no common border between Germany and the Soviet Union. Then you won't be able to attack me suddenly!

Comrade Stalin did not like this option for some reason. He needed a common border with Germany for some reason. For the sake of this, he even gave Hitler Warsaw, which had once been part of the Russian Empire, but had never been under German rule.

Why such generosity? Because Comrade Stalin considered the border along the Bug River to be temporary. And he made no secret of it.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko announced this in his order, published in all Soviet newspapers, read before the formation of each company, battery, squadron:

The Soviet Union grew significantly and pushed its borders westward. The capitalist world had to squeeze and give way. But it is not for us - the fighters of the Red Army - to become conceited and complacent about what we have achieved! (Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400 of November 7, 1940).

That's it: we've pushed our borders westward, but we won't rest on that. It's not enough.

This is not a politician's speech or a journalist's report. This is a combat order to all formations and units of the Red Army. But west of the Soviet borders - only those countries that are allies of Germany, or those lands that Germany has captured. Thus, in the order to the Red Army, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR officially announced that we will get to Germany as well.

It was not for the liberation of Ukrainians and Belarusians that Stalin established a common border with Germany, but for the sake of creating conditions for a surprise attack on Germany and the seizure of Europe.

To my fierce opponent from Kiev and all those who share his point of view, I recommend you to think about this: *Comrade Stalin did not annex the lands torn away from Poland to Ukraine and Belarus.*

He annexed them to the Soviet Union.

The power in those lands was not Ukrainian or Belarusian. The power, like everywhere else in our country, was Soviet, commissar, Chekist, stukak, vertukhai, firing squad.

CHAPTER 2

1

June 7, 1940 Army General Georgy Zhukov was appointed commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District. He was appointed for a reason: another liberation was planned. Comrade Stalin decided to tear Bessarabia away from Romania and turn it into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Moldovans and Romanians are twin brothers. They had nothing in common with Russians - neither language nor way of life. But the Soviet leaders were not embarrassed by this. Bessarabia was once part of the Russian Empire. Therefore, it was necessary to return it under the native roof, correcting the historical injustice. And at the same time to return and Northern Bukovina, which had never been part of the Russian Empire.

June 9, 1940 by order of Zhukov troops of the Odessa and Kiev military districts were raised on alert, and immediately began their concentration and deployment on the border with Romania.

On June 20, 1940, the Southern Front was secretly formed; Army General Zhukov became the commander of the front. The Southern Front included:

- control of three armies (5th, 9th and 12th);
- control of 13 corps (10 rifle corps, 3 cavalry corps);
- 40 divisions (32 rifle divisions, 2 motorized rifle divisions, 6 cavalry divisions);
- 14 brigades (11 tank brigades, 3 airborne brigades);
- 96 artillery regiments (66 regiments as part of divisions, 14 as corps regiments, and 16 as reserves of the General Command);
- 45 fighter and bomber air regiments.

The Southern Front is 460 thousand soldiers and commanders, 12 thousand guns and mortars, 3112 tanks, 2168 combat aircraft. To ensure the actions of the coastal flank of the Southern Front attracted part of the Black Sea Fleet and ships of the Dnieper Flotilla, transferred to the mouth of the Danube. Behind the troops of the Southern Front

NKVD units were deployed at the front. In total, more than half a million fighters and commanders took part in the operation.

The troops of the Southern Front were ordered by Zhukov to defeat the Romanian army if it resisted. After concentrating troops on the border, Comrade Molotov demanded that the Romanian government return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Romanian government, realizing that resistance was futile, ordered its troops to withdraw.

2

Why did Stalin and Zhukov need Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina? Here is the official answer of the Soviet historical science. It was given by Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Colonel A. S. Orlov:

From the territory of Bessarabia Soviet aviation could threaten the oil fields of Romania, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany. Northern Bukovina was needed because through its territory ran a rocket railroad of strategic importance from Odessa through Kishinev, Chernivtsi to Lvov, which had a European gauge and allowed the use of rolling stock on the railroads of Europe (Military History Journal. 1991. № 10. P. 17).

I don't understand anything! In September 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Treaty of Friendship and Border. I repeat: On friendship! In June 1940, Germany had no military plans to attack the Soviet Union. And the troops of the Southern Front under the command of Army General Zhukov moved into Bessarabia to "keep the oil fields of Romania, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany, under threat".

What kind of friendship is that? Hitler did not threaten the Soviet Union at that time. On the contrary! In June 1940, Hitler was fighting against France and Britain, the rear of Germany was not protected by anything. It wasn't Hitler who threatened the Soviet Union - it was Stalin and Zhukov who were ready to cut off

Germany from sources of oil. Production of synthetic fuels in Germany in noteworthy quantities was not established 1943. In June 1940, Germany, blockaded on the seas by the British fleet, received oil only from Romania and the Soviet Union.

Thus, the invasion of the Red Army in Romania with the simultaneous cessation of oil supplies from the Soviet Union could in an instant stop on all fronts at once all German tanks and armored personnel carriers, artillery tractors and vehicles, fighters and bombers, cruisers and battleships, destroyers and submarines.

To put it simply, the Southern Front under Zhukov's command did not just tear away some land from Romania, but created a threat to Germany's existence at a time when Germany was waging war against France and Great Britain. If Comrade Stalin gave an order, the Red Army would strike Ploesti, and the Second World War would end with the victory of the Soviet Union.

Our academics call me all sorts of bad words, but openly recognize that the actions of the Red Army against Romania in June 1940 had the main purpose of creating a threat to the oil-bearing areas of Romania, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany. And that's the whole point of "Icebreaker." Citizens of academia, thank you for your support!

It was not enough for Stalin and Zhukov to threaten Germany. They also needed Northern Bukovina, steam locomotives and cars with European gauge. Why "use rolling stock on the railroads of Europe" if the Red Army was not going to attack Europe?

3

The most terrible and most shameful military defeat in all of world history is the defeat of the Red Army in 1941. No army in the world had ever left the enemy with so many tanks, guns and airplanes, so many rifles and machine guns, so many cartridges and shells, such vast territories and so many prisoners.

The General Staff, which since January 1941 was headed by Army General Zhukov, planned the Red Army's combat operations. And so

There are people who claim that Zhukov did not lose a single battle. Are not the General Staff and its "genius" chief responsible for the disgrace of 1941?

Zhukov's guilt in the defeat of 1941 is not exhausted by his criminal negligence in the planning of combat operations and his self-removal from the leadership of troops at the outbreak of war. The defeat of 1941 was possible because a year earlier Zhukov's Southern Front jeopardized German security. Zhukov had torn Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina away from Romania without a fight. But this bloodless victory had bloody consequences: Hitler suddenly realized that he was not the master of Europe at all, that Germany was completely dependent on the further actions of the Soviet Union.

The actions of the Red Army in June 1940 required Hitler to assess the strategic situation from a very different point of view: Germany was at war against Britain, but at any moment the German army, air force and navy, as well as industry and transport could be paralyzed if Stalin so decided.

The great strategic theorist B. Liddell Garth believed that the ominous actions of the Red Army in the summer of 1940 was the impetus that forced Hitler to think about Stalin's future plans and make the only possible conclusion:

Hitler had a serious conversation with Colonel-General A. Jodl about the possibility of war against the Soviet Union in case the Red Army tried to seize the oil-bearing areas of Romania (Liddel Hart B. History of the Second World War. London: Cassell, 1970. C. 150).

This event was the first step in developing a plan to attack the Soviet Union - not for the sake of conquering some "living space", but to save Germany. In the summer of 1940 Hitler had so much living space that he could hardly control it: from Narvik to Lyon, from Copenhagen to Prague and Vienna, from Warsaw to Paris.

In 1976, Voenizdat published the above-mentioned book by Liddell Garth in Russian translation under the title "World War II". The editor and author of the foreword was Colonel O. A. Rzeshevsky, a well-known fighter for historical truth.

Apparently, due to an oversight, the above-mentioned fragment about the reasons that forced Hitler to begin preparations for war against the Soviet Union was left out of the text of the book. Perhaps it was for this and similar minor omissions in the preparation of foreign books for publication, when the most important things were omitted and the meaning was lost or reversed, that Oleg Aleksandrovich Rzeshevsky was awarded orders, positions, academic degrees and titles, became president of the Association of World War II Historians, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, professor, doctor of sciences, and so on and so forth.

But Rzeszewski was just a fighter on the ideological front. And how did Zhukov himself assess his actions in June 1940, which prompted Hitler to begin preparations for an attack on Soviet Union?

Zhukov did not evaluate his actions in any way.

"Krasnaya Zvezda" (December 15 2009) calls Zhukov's memoirs "an invaluable book." But in this "invaluable book" the great commander forgot to inform his enthusiastic readers about what he was doing in May 1940. At that time, Hitler was smashing France, and Zhukov was in Moscow and did not hold any posts. Allegedly he was sitting around with nothing to do.

But he had a case. At this time Zhukov was preparing the war against Romania. The recent experience of the war in Finland showed that small wars should be prepared as seriously as large ones. June 7, 1940 Zhukov arrived in Kiev not empty-handed, but with a ready-made plan to defeat Romania in the event that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina will not be given without a fight. The creation of the Southern Front and the concentration of troops did not require new meetings with Stalin to clarify the details. Everything had already been decided and worked out - all that remained was to prepare the troops.

But Zhukov did not remember or reflect on all this in his memoirs. The first edition does not mention Romania and the Southern Front

not a word! The second edition was published after Zhukov's death, but there is no mention of the Southern Front.

Since the early 1980s, for two decades I have often appeared on British radio, mostly on Seva Novgorodtsev's program. And I persistently chiseled at one point: Zhukov does not remember that in June 1940 there was a Southern Front, that Zhukov himself was commander of the Southern Front, that the actions of this front played a fatal role in the fate of our people, our Motherland!

I don't know whether my cries had an effect, or whether some other factor was at work, but gradually the late strategist's memory became clearer, and after 20 years after his death he, finally, "remembered" that the Southern Front existed and that he himself had commanded it. The relevant fragment was inserted in the memoirs, though with an emphasis on some comical moments and without delving into serious issues.

It's a pity that having remembered the Southern Front, the strategist did not reflect on the consequences of his actions.

5

In his memoirs, numerous interviews and speeches, Zhukov portrayed himself as a strategist and Stalin as a cowardly little man who did not understand military matters - at least in the first half of the war. Zhukov told director Grigory Chukhrai: "*Stalin was afraid of war. And fear is a bad advisor*" (Krasnaya Zvezda, September 19, 1995).

Delightful! If Stalin was afraid of war, then the great strategist Zhukov should have said in May 1940: Comrade Stalin, the idea of liberating Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina is extremely dangerous. Especially now, when all the tanks, all the airplanes, all the navy, all the smart generals and almost all Hitler's divisions are fighting in France. We'll scare Hitler! He has nothing to defend Romania with. Why do we need Bessarabia, and even at a time like this? Don't you and I have enough land in the Soviet Union? Imagine, Comrade Stalin, that we are waging a full-scale war against Japan, that we have no oil of our own, that we buy it from independent Azerbaijan, which cannot defend itself from a powerful enemy. And now next to these vital important for us areas of oil production someone

concentrated a half-million-man army with three thousand tanks, two thousand airplanes, ten thousand guns. You and I, Comrade Stalin, will not be well. So imagine how Hitler feels now. After all, he has to react to our threat somehow. What are his options? Hitler can take away the threat from Romania only by defeating the Soviet Union. By our actions we provoke Hitler to retaliate! We are provoking a German attack! After all, Hitler will be forced to start a war against us for the defense of Germany!

Stalin, according to Zhukov, was stupid and cowardly, while Zhukov himself was a wise and brave strategist. Why did not the wise and brave Zhukov keep Stalin from making a fatal mistake?

6

The Soviet Union was ruled by three forces: the Party, the army and the State Security.

When we speak of the party, we mean related and related structures: the state apparatus, including the courts and the prosecutor's office, the Communist Youth Union, the press (and it was all party), and trade unions.

When we talk about the army, we also mean the military industry, paramilitary organizations, tens of millions of reservists.

When we remember the organs of State Security, we take into account the entire punitive apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship: legions of snitches, police, border and internal troops, prisons, camps.

So in June 1940, three figures met in Kiev:

1. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, is the party;

2. Army General Zhukov, commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District (and the Southern Front), is an army;

3. people's commissar internal affairs of Ukraine Commissar of State Security 3rd rank Serov is the GB.

Ukraine was as as if a smaller a replica, a model of the entire Soviet Union.

Khrushchev, Zhukov, Serov - three fighters for people's happiness. One fought for a bright future in Moscow, shooting tens of thousands of people, and no less so in Ukraine, the second liberated Poland, the third - Romania.

Khrushchev, Zhukov, Serov - a triumvirate, three bogatyr, three musketeers, three tankers - three cheerful friends, brotherly pouring Russian folk drink for three.

They understood each other.

The great and mighty, true and free Russian language has so many beautiful words, vivid and figurative expressions, but there is only one word to describe this case: sniffed. Soon the war scattered them across the vast expanses of the Soviet Union, but they did not forget about each other and helped each other as much as they could - throughout the war and after it. The frontline roads brought them together and then scattered them thousands of miles apart.

7

On November 7, 1943, Lieutenant General Khrushchev, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov reported to Stalin: Kiev has been taken! It was taken right on the anniversary of the October Revolution! Many years later, poet Yuri Leonidovich Nesterenko will write about such victories:

*And it was known to the
soldiers who were torn from
their homes by war,
That cities are taken by dates. And
therefore, at any cost.*

Kiev is a shining example of this. To the great date! We will not stand for the price!

There will be many more to come - cities taken for anniversaries. And the crowning achievement is Berlin. It will have to be taken by May 1, 1945, the holiday of solidarity of all proletarians of the world.

In November 1943, Nikita Khrushchev stayed in Kiev to rebuild Ukraine, and Zhukov went to Berlin. Following him.

Serov. After the war, fate raised one or the other. Then suddenly threw into disgrace. In March 1947, Stalin removed Khrushchev from the post of master of the Ukraine, but in December of the same year again returned to the place. Then, in December 1949, Stalin put Khrushchev in charge of Moscow for the second time.

In the spring of 1945, Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank Serov was appointed Zhukov's deputy for civil administration in Germany. Zhukov and Serov had untold wealth at their disposal. Both of them turned around. It was not only about the treasures of German banks, not only about captured bags of unaccounted money that was still in circulation, not only about kilometers of expensive fabrics, carloads of precious furniture, but also about the paintings of the Dresden Gallery, about gold and diamonds, about the crown of the wife of the German Kaiser.

Stalin learned of a wide rampage of reckless looters. Serov got off scot-free, and soon even got a promotion.

Zhukov would have gotten away with it, but in addition to looting, grand larceny, illegal distribution of orders and other criminal offenses, he also highlighted another stain - unrestrained bragging: Zhukov attributed to himself victories in battles in which he did not actually participate. Stalin removed Zhukov from high positions and sent him to command the Odessa Military District, and two years later - the Urals.

Zhukov did not lose hope. His friend Khrushchev was a member of the Politburo, that is, he was one of the top ten leaders who governed the Soviet Union. His friend Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General Serov was the first deputy minister of internal affairs of the USSR. Zhukov could count on the fact that one day Khrushchev will return him to the heights of power. And Serov would help.

The opportunity arose in summer of 1952.

Key point

Opening	the book	"History	border	border
service	of Belarus," which	published	B published	State
	border committee			

of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk: data-processing center of the Ministry of Finance, 2011). On page 251 we read:

After the Soviet and Nazi troops came to the line of demarcation, a border treaty was signed between the USSR and Germany on September 28, 1939.

That's how! On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Germany in the Kremlin. Signed by Comrade Molotov and Herr Ribbentrop. The treaty went down in history with their names in the title.

The treaty is extremely strange. There was no common border between the Soviet Union and Germany. There was Poland between them. Therefore, Germany could not attack the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union could not attack Germany.

But come on! Why sign a non-aggression treaty when an attack is physically *impossible*?

The box was simply opened: the non-aggression treaty was in fact *a treaty of attack* on Poland. The agreement to divide Poland was enshrined in an additional secret protocol. If Poland was divided, there would be a common border between the Soviet Union and Germany. A non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany was precisely what was needed for this purpose.

The partition of Poland meant that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany, i.e. a European, and therefore a world war would arise. Stalin understood that. Hitler did not understand that.

The treaty was signed, Hitler attacked Poland and got a war against Britain and France, potentially against the US and the rest of the world. So Comrade Stalin pushed Hitler into World War II by staying on the sidelines, waiting for the opportune moment.

For decades, the leaders of the Soviet Union denied the existence of an additional secret protocol on the division of Poland. They say that we did not divide Poland with Hitler, therefore, the Second World War was unleashed by anyone but Stalin. Molotov himself categorically denied the existence of an additional secret protocol. Writer Felix Chuev, who had dozens of conversations with Molotov, testifies about this: "*Several times I asked about this* .

Molotov - *the answer is one*" (Chuev F. I. Molotov. Semi-powerful ruler. Moscow: OLMA-press, 2000. p. 28). Chuev himself was inclined to believe Molotov: they say that additional secret protocols have been published, but is it not a fake?

Let us assume that on August 23, 1939, no agreement was reached between Molotov and Ribbentrop - that is, between Stalin and Hitler - on the partition of Poland, and that there was no additional protocol. In that case, I repeat my question: *why should Ribbentrop and Molotov sign a non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany, if such an attack without the partition of Poland is impossible?*

Let us now turn again to a quote from a book published by a respected institution by the name of the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus:

After the Soviet and Nazi troops came to the line of demarcation....

Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939. Comrade Stalin waited until Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, when Germany would crush the main forces of the Polish army. Having waited for such a moment, Stalin gave the order to the Red Army, and On September 17, 1939, it stabbed Poland in the back. Soon Soviet and German troops, advancing from two sides, met on the line of demarcation.

Stop! When and by whom was this line established? Let us assume that it was not Molotov and Ribbentrop who divided Poland and drew this boundary line in the Kremlin on August 23, 1939. Question to the leadership of the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus: where did this boundary line come from? Who drew it, coordinated it, approved it by Stalin and Hitler?

Let us agree for a moment that the published photocopies of the secret additional protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are a fake, an anti-Russian scoundrel. But if not Molotov and Ribbentrop in the presence of Stalin and with the consent of Hitler drew the demarcation line on the map, then who, where and when did this line draw?

But that's just the first question. And here is the second. On September 28, 1939, Ribbentrop once again visited Moscow, the border line between the Soviet Union and Germany was finally clarified and agreed upon, after which Treaty of Friendship and Boundary was signed

- I have already mentioned him in this book. Now let us read once again a quote from a book of Belarusian border generals. They called this treaty "On the Border".

Here, citizen readers, is a brilliant example of falsification of history. From the official title of the treaty between the two great powers, a single word has been thrown out, and the meaning has changed radically: it turns out that there was no friendship with Hitler.

CHAPTER 3

1

In order to understand the logic of the battles and battles invisible from the outside, which after the Second World War shook our country from Moscow to the outskirts, from the southern northern seas, we are obliged to remember the basics.

All the classics of communism linked the path to a bright future with war. Speaking at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Union of Communists^[4] on September 15, 1850, Karl Marx warned:

We say to the workers: You may have to live through another 15, 20, 50 years of civil war in order to change the existing conditions and to make yourselves capable of domination (Marx K., Engels F. Works in 39 vols. In 42 books. Second edition. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1955-1966. T. 8).

Friedrich Engels also had a good idea of how the coming world war would turn out for mankind. In the Introduction to Borkheim's pamphlet "To the memory of the patriots of 1806-1807" (1887), he predicts the coming "world war of unprecedented size, unprecedented force" and assesses the consequences of this war as follows:

Only one outcome is absolutely certain: universal exhaustion and the creation of the conditions for the final victory of the working class (ibid. Vol. 21).

In 1914, the long-awaited world war finally broke out. Lenin rejoiced at first: everything was going as written, just as predicted by Marx and Engels. However, the war dragged on, and The "final victory of the working class" was somehow not visible on the historical horizon. Lenin was not discouraged: maybe there would be another war of the same kind, World War II.

the World Revolution would break out. In September 1916, Lenin composed "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution," in which he wrote:

Humanity will survive - at worst - a second imperialist war if revolution does not grow out of this war.

Lenin himself at that moment had already lost all hope that the revolution would happen in his lifetime. On January 9, 1917, in a quiet, calm, contented Switzerland, he said: "We old people may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution. But to Lenin's luck - and to the misfortune of the peoples of our country - the revolution broke out the next month, and in a place where no one, including Lenin, did not expect it - in Russia. So World War I still gave a partial result - the victory of the Communists on one-sixth of the land. What remained was to wait for the Second World War.

And here's what Joseph Stalin said about it:

Things are heading towards a new imperialist war ... it will surely unleash revolution and question the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries (January 26, 1934 Report to the XVII Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)).

World Imperialist War I gave victory to the revolution in one of the most largest countries. second world imperialist war may also lead to the victory of revolution in one or more countries (March 10, 1939 Report to the XVIII Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)).

These last words were spoken less than six months before the first shot of World War II was fired. In the same year a new Red Army field manual PU-39 was issued, in which the following was written:

If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking ever

of the attacking armies. We will wage war offensively, with the most resolute aim of completely defeating the enemy on his own territory.

The fig leaf of "if the enemy imposes it" is used here: we, they say, eagerly and hopefully await the war that will free the proletarians of capitalist countries from slavery, but it is not we who impose this desired war. It is being imposed on us. But then - open text: the Red Army will be the most attacking of all armies ever attacked. That is, the Red Army will surpass all the aggressors of history, eclipse the glory of the great conquerors of the past - Atilla, Genghis Khan, Batyi, Tamerlane, Bonaparte.

2

"The most attacker" Comrade Stalin did not have time to become: he had to fight off another "most attacker" who was ahead of Stalin by a couple of weeks or perhaps just a few days, if not even one day.

The Second World War overturned all communist theories. According to the Marx-Lenin-Trotsky theory, the damned bourgeois had to fight against communism simply because proletarian power in one country would be an example for the proletarians of all other countries: this is how you will live happily if you overthrow the damned bourgeois by our example!

But no bourgeoisie attacked the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the United States and Great Britain did their best to save Stalin, who was in trouble. And it was not capitalists who attacked the Soviet Union, but socialists. The war on the European continent was largely between the world's first two socialist states - by the Soviet Union and Germany. If we follow the logic, this war should have been called the First Socialist War.

The Second World War has died down, but it did not fulfill the hopes that Comrade Stalin and other comrades had pinned on it. It was not possible to put the whole of Europe on our path of development. What next?

The next thing to do was to prepare for World War III. At the same time, of course, without assuming responsibility for its unleashing,

hiding behind the same leaf: if the enemies impose war, then, at last, the long-awaited World Revolution will break out and win.

3

In 1951, the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences published the textbook "Historical Materialism". The book killed by the mere composition of the authors - or rather, not the composition of the authors, but its absence. The names of the authors of the textbook were hidden. It was said simply and expressively: *authors*. It was reported only that this work was created "under the general editorship of Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR F. V. Konstantinov". V. Konstantinov".

We know about Fyodor Vasilyevich Konstantinov that he was Comrade Stalin's favorite philosopher. After Stalin, he became the favorite philosopher of comrades Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov. He was a Hero of Socialist Labor, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, since 1955 - head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

In 1951, this textbook could not be published without Stalin's permission and approval. The most terrible punishment in those days awaited the one who made the smallest blunder in ideological battles. In 1951, a step aside in matters of Marxist-Leninist philosophy was considered an escape - the convoy would shoot without warning.

To anyone who claims that Stalin supposedly abandoned the idea of World revolution, strongly recommend to read "Historical Materialism" (Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1954). The basic idea of this textbook is as follows: The World Revolution is inevitable, the October Revolution is the beginning of the World Revolution. Then there is the usual fig leaf: if the enemies unleash a third world war, that is when they will come to an end, that is when the proletarians will rise up and win on a world scale.

If the imperialists dare to go mad and try to launch a new world war; their adventure will lead to the collapse of the entire system of world capitalism. This statement follows from the historical experience of the first and

the second world war. World War I ended with the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia. World War II led to the breakaway from capitalism of a number of countries in Europe and Asia.

<...>

Only with the disappearance of the imperialist states will the attempts at military interventions and the related attempts at the restoration of capitalism disappear. And the capitalist environment will disappear only as a result of the socialist revolution in all the major capitalist countries.

<...>

The October Socialist Revolution is not only a revolution within the national framework, it is by its very nature an international revolution, a part of the world proletarian revolution. It was with the victory of the Soviet revolution that the epoch of the world proletarian revolution began. The October Socialist Revolution opened the epoch of proletarian revolutions in the countries of capitalism, it opened the epoch of colonial anti-imperialist revolutions, which are part of the world proletarian revolution. <...>

The October Revolution was the beginning of the world proletarian revolution and the basis for its development.

4

Stalin did not throw words into the wind.

Previous hopes that the "Great War" will lead to the victory of the World Revolution and the creation of a world socialist system, not justified. Therefore, Stalin, while the people rejoiced in victory, decided the traditional for Russia the question - what to do? Prepare for a new world war or to deal with domestic problems, maintaining friendly relations with allies in the anti-Hitler coalition? Being a true Marxist, Stalin did not long agonized over the problem of choice. Since the main goal - World revolution - remained

unchanged, the way to it was seen only through the Third World War, which was destined to become the last and decisive battle with imperialism (Drogovoz I. Big Fleet of the Country of Soviets. Minsk: Harvest, 2003. P. 140-141).

On November 27, 1945, Stalin signed a top secret decree "On the Ten-Year Plan of Military Shipbuilding for 1946-1955". The plan envisioned the construction of:

- 4 heavy cruisers of "Stalingrad" type (total displacement 43 thousand tons, main caliber^[5] - 9 guns of 305 mm caliber, speed 34 knots);
- 30 light cruisers of "Sverdlov" type (total displacement 16300 tons, main caliber - 12 152 mm guns, speed 33 knots);
- 188 destroyers;
- 177 patrol ships;
- 367 ;
- 18 marine monitors^[6];
- 36 naval gunboats;
- 345 big hunters;
- 600 small hunters;
- 736 minesweepers;
- 828 torpedo boats;
- 195 landing craft.

In the country, in many areas of which there was famine, tens of millions of people lived in dugouts, and the role of draught cattle in the villages played by women, was to build 3,524 combat units (ibid. P. 154).

But that's not all.

The original variant program envisioned the construction of 1,200 submarines between 1950 and 1965 (Krasnaya Zvezda. April 11, 1996).

It was planned to develop military aviation on the same scale. Stalin decided to form 100 new aviation divisions of front-line bombers in addition to the existing ones (Military History Journal. 1992. № 10). A front-line bomber division is 102 combat aircraft (93 Il-28 and 9 Il-28R). 100 new aviation divisions are only frontline bombers, and in addition to them there are also strategic. The actions of both need to cover the appropriate number of fighters. In addition, deploying simultaneously 100 new divisions of front-line bombers and the appropriate number of fighter divisions, you need to increase the number of attack aircraft, scouts, transport planes. And build thousands of airfields. And open new flight and technical schools.

But it was not aviation and the navy that were to become Stalin's main trump cards. The main emphasis was placed on the creation of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery.

Key point

After World War II, the views of Stalin and his closest disciples and associates on the ways of further development of the country and the world sharply diverged. Many members of the Politburo believed that the main efforts should be directed not to the preparation of World War III and the World Revolution, but to solving the internal problems of the country.

Apart from Stalin himself, the course for World War III and World Revolution among the Politburo members was advocated only by Khrushchev, but he disagreed with Stalin on another issue. Khrushchev believed that the economic problems of the Soviet Union could be solved by selling irreplaceable natural resources - lay a pipe and pump oil to Europe! Stalin responded in the Stalinist way: to trade in resources is to trade in the Motherland.

CHAPTER 4

1

The stuffy, sticky summer of 1952. On the border the clouds are walking gloomily. And over Moscow there are no clouds - dust, stuffiness. At night all the windows in Moscow

— wide open. Ah, it would thunder! But there is no heavy rain, which the capital, longing for coolness, is waiting for.

Comrade Stalin locked himself in the dacha in Volynsky. Comrade Stalin is not receiving anyone. Comrade Stalin is planning something, preparing something. And everyone who can think, it is quite clear what exactly Comrade Stalin is planning.

And in the Kremlin is ripening conspiracy against Comrade Stalin. The highest leaders of the country, loyal disciples and associates of Stalin - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Molotov, Voroshilov, Andreev,

— united against the leader of the nations.

For more than three decades now, the Soviet Union has been in a severe economic crisis. Capitalists also had crises from time to time - crises of overproduction. Farmers poured milk on the ground, slaughtered cows, filled carcasses with chlorine, burned grain - all because there was nowhere to put it. Progressive filmmakers filmed this barbarism and showed it in every movie theater in the world before the start of the show.

We did not and could not have such a thing. We have a socialist economy. We had a chronic crisis of underproduction. We had nothing to feed the country. And all these decades our leaders have been looking for the reason for this situation. In the first years everything was clear: the devastation after the Civil War. Then it turned out that the kulaks were hiding bread, not wanting to sell it. (Why not? Don't they need money?) The kulaks were exterminated. Millions of them. But it didn't get better.

Then it was suddenly revealed with crystal clarity that pests were interfering. Pests were searched for everywhere, caught, tried, imprisoned, shot - also by the millions. It didn't get better.

Then the war began. Hunger after the war is understandable - devastation.

It was 1952, seven years after the end of the war, but the country was still unable to feed itself. Something drastic had to change.

Therefore, Comrade Stalin decided to change the entire top leadership of the country.

Therefore, the entire top leadership of the country decided to change Comrade Stalin.

2

But overthrowing Stalin from the heights of power is not at all easy.

Stalin

— General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This has been his principal position for thirty years. This position is the pinnacle of a stable and powerful vertical of power.

Stalin's opponents had a simple to stupid option: completely legally at the next party congress not to elect Stalin to this most important leadership position in the Soviet Union.

Stalin knew that the danger threatened him from different sides, including from this one: the next party congress could send him out of retirement to farewell speeches and thunderous applause. Therefore, Stalin, violating the statute of the party, congresses did not meet for thirteen years, missing four whole terms. Plenums of the Central Committee in accordance with the party charter was supposed to be held at least once every three months. Comrade Stalin also faithfully ignored this rule, not gathering plenums for years, missing dozens of terms.

On August 5, 1952, members of the Politburo, acting clearly against Stalin's will, convened a plenum of the Central Committee, which decided to urgently, in two months, convene the XIX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b). The reason was quite good: the party charter was outdated, it was necessary to adopt a new charter, which, among other things, provided for the holding of party congresses not only by decision of the higher party bodies, but also at the request of the grassroots party organizations.

In other words, it became irrelevant whether Comrade Stalin wished to convene party congresses or not - congresses could be convened without the chief's permission and approval, contrary to his plans and designs. So to speak, at the numerous requests of the workers.

This provision of the new charter was anti-Stalinist.

Directed against Stalin personally!

Any lower party organizations, neither before nor after that time, were strongly discouraged from taking the initiative, especially in matters of such importance. The right to demand the convening of a party congress, which was guaranteed by the new statute, was never exercised by any party organization for decades afterwards. No party secretary of any high or low rank could ever think of doing something on his own initiative without a command from above or demanding something from his superior leaders.

At the forthcoming XIX Congress, the opening of which was scheduled for October 5, 1952, it was proposed to change the name of the party from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The Politburo was also to change its name and henceforth be called the Presidium of the Central Committee. Many other innovations were to be introduced.

The trick was that one small, inconspicuous detail was lost in the verbosity of the official hollow debates caused by the appearance of the new statute. The charter, composed by Stalin's devious disciples and associates, bypassed the following

— i.e., simply did not mention - the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. It should be especially emphasized: the post was not abolished, not abolished, but simply not mentioned.

The congress was assembled. At the Congress proclaimed grandiose plans to move with seven-mile strides to a brighter tomorrow and all-round improvement of the lives of working people. Congress amicably voted in favor of the new charter and thus, without realizing it and without realizing it, deprived Stalin of his main position.

The delegates did not even realize that they were taking part in a coup d'état.

Could Stalin have accepted
it? Anyone but him.

3

That the convention was very unusual is shown by the following facts.

First, the full transcript of the 19th Congress of the CPSU has not been declassified even today, 60 years after it was held^[7]. The mass media got some fragments, but only those that did not concern fundamental issues and in no way could lead the general public to think that there was a fierce struggle for power in the country's leadership. There are pictures taken at the congress, there are newsreels - on these shots one can clearly see the conference hall, the rostrum and right in front of it and just below - four stenographers. But what those stenographers wrote is for some reason still not allowed to be shown to anyone.

Second, on the last day of the congress it was customary to elect a new Central Committee. The newly elected Central Committee immediately met in its first plenum to elect an even higher leadership - the Politburo of the Central Committee. After that, the final session of the congress was held, at which the list of the Politburo of the Central Committee was announced: here are those who will henceforth command you.

At the XIX Congress everything was different. On the last day a new Central Committee was elected, but for some reason the Central Committee did not elect an even higher leadership, which was henceforth called the Presidium of the Central Committee. The congress ended its work on October 14, 1952, the delegates went home, not knowing who would now govern the party and the country. And only two days later, on October 16, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held.

Third, at the plenum, Comrade Stalin made a great speech, which lasted an hour and a half. This speech of Stalin at the plenum turned out to be the last public speech of his life. An hour and a half is an unusually long time. Stalin knew how to be silent, and here he suddenly seemed to burst through. Only we do not know what he said. The transcript of that speech remains secret even 60 years after it was made. We only know that Stalin at this plenum publicly called Comrades Molotov and Voroshilov British spies. (Their wives were already sitting in the cellars of the Lubyanka and dutifully gave the testimony that Stalin's investigators affectionately demanded from them).

In the old days, after Stalin's accusation of espionage, Comrades Voroshilov and Molotov would have been immediately dragged to the penitentiary. The next thing would be a closed trial, the decision of which was predetermined, and

a firing squad. It is possible - and without a trial. Surprisingly, the top party bosses did not react to such accusations of the genius of all times and peoples.

In the election of a new Presidium of the Central Committee, Stalin gave the challenge to Comrades Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kosygin, Mikoyan and Molotov. In other words, Stalin demanded that the majority of the former Politburo, by whose decision the XIX anti-Stalin Congress was assembled, be driven from the top of power. Surprisingly, but the members of the Central Committee of Stalin's challenge did not accept and all the named comrades decided to re-elect to the top party leadership. Including full confidence was given to the two "British spies". The members of the Central Committee decided that the "spies" were fully worthy of continuing to lead the Soviet Union and the entire socialist commonwealth.

Stalin immediately makes a retaliatory move. In the Politburo, which led the country until October 1952, there were 11 members (Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Molotov, Khrushchev, Andreev) and one candidate (Shvernik). The list of leaders was not alphabetical, but according to the position they held in the hierarchy of power. Stalin proposed: since now we have not the Politburo, but the Presidium of the Central Committee, let us make this body more representative: let it have not 11 members, but 25!

In the Politburo, if Stalin was not counted, there were ten old rebellious members. True, two of them, Kosygin and Andreev, showed a certain uncertainty and restraint. Stalin decided to inject fresh blood into the new supreme governing body of the party. In this case, the anti-Stalinist majority would be diluted and become a minority. And the number of candidates Stalin proposed to increase from one to eleven! Total: members and candidates were 12, and should become 36! A total increase of exactly three times! For each old member and candidate - two newcomers.

It's a proven trick. All great tyrants used this trick - Genghis Khan, Louis XI, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Chairman Mao. Its meaning is as follows: to bring the ancestors closer to themselves, to knock down the pride of the generic. And if necessary, the hands of the young guard to strike the old guard. This technique was skillfully used by Comrade Stalin himself. Back in 1922, when Stalin became

General Secretary, the Central Committee had 27 members and 19 candidates. But already in 1925, the Central Committee had 63 members and 43 candidates: it was Stalin who diluted the highest organs of party power with his nominees, turning the old guard into a minority.

4

Such tactics Stalin used not only against the top leadership, but also in relation to the entire party. Having received the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin in the early 1920s did three important things at the same time.

First, he removed Lenin from power and isolated him, cutting off all contact with the outside world.

Second, declaring Lenin great, outstanding, brilliant. Third, declaring Lenin genius and infallible, inflating the cult of Lenin, Stalin cautiously but persistently and steadily mastered the post of the high priest of the new cult, the chief interpreter of Leninism, the fighter for the purity of Lenin's teachings. Lenin spoke and wrote a lot and even very much. Lenin's quotes can underpin anything. Stalin molded the cult of Lenin in order to get the most powerful weapon of the struggle for power.

Trotsky at the time of the Communist seizure of power was superior to Lenin. During the Civil War, Trotsky was equal to Lenin. After Lenin was sidelined and isolated, Trotsky considered himself the leader of the Soviet Union and the World Revolution. The country sang with one chorus:

*With a detachment of navy
men, Comrade Trotsky.
He will lead us into mortal combat!*

Trotsky was vocal. Trotsky spoke with his ideas and in his own name: I think so, I approve it, I reject it.

And no one sang songs about Stalin in those years. Outside of the leading top of the Communist Party, few people had heard of him. Stalin even in the narrow circle of leaders on his own behalf did not

was performing. He was more cunning. He acted differently. He said: "This is how the great Lenin teaches!"

5

Comrade Stalin helped Comrade Lenin find a direct and short way to the . The deceased leader, of course, could not be replaced, but Comrade Stalin found a way to somehow compensate for the irreparable loss. Immediately after Lenin's death, Stalin announced the so-called Leninist appeal to the Communist Party: instead of one Lenin, we will accept 200 thousand advanced in the party "machine workers"!

At Lenin's (and actually Stalin's) call, careerists rushed into the party. Those who, during the Revolution and the Civil War, had been in a hurry to join any camp or to make their choice. Now, when it was finally clear that the Bolsheviks had gained the upper hand, the most nimble of those who were popularly called

"They were all for Stalin - it was Stalin who opened the way to power for them. They were all in favor of Stalin - it was Stalin who opened the way to power for them. He was the only one they supported.

Diluting the ranks of fighters for the happiness of the common people ignorant and unprincipled new recruits-karéristov, relying on their unconditional support, Stalin the next year crushed Trotsky, the main contender for supreme power in the country.

6

Since then, almost three decades have passed, and here in October 1952, Comrade Stalin repeated his favorite technique: he proposed to dilute the ranks of the old fighters, launching into power a fresh herd of young careerists. Stalin's proposal to triple the number of members and candidates of the top party leadership was accepted. And how could it not be accepted? On the one hand, Comrade Stalin himself called young people in the supreme power. On the other hand, the pressure from below was very powerful: the young leaders could not wait to get to the shining top. And behind each of the new nominees was his team. If up rises head of the

of the group, he pulls the whole team with him. Therefore, by climbing higher following their leader, the team pushes him even higher.

And so, next to Voroshilov, Molotov and Kaganovich, who had been entrenched in the Kremlin since the early years of Communist power, the then unknown Andrianov and Chesnokov, Ignatov and Ignatiev, Puzanov and Korotchenko, Pegov and Yudin, Kabanov and Zverev, Melnikov and Mikhailov nestled on the Kremlin heights. Among them were those who would shine in a dozen years: Brezhnev, Kuusinen, Suslov.

However, the list of the new Party leadership was this time published in alphabetical order. And Comrade Stalin appeared in the general list of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee in the twentieth place out of twenty-five! But in the last years of Stalin's reign, the leaders were listed not alphabetically, but according to their position in the system of power. Why was it suddenly decided to depart from the established order? Yes, because the struggle in those days with varying success was not only for every phrase and every word, but also for every letter. In one case, Stalin won, and his proposal to sharply increase the number of top party organs was adopted. In another case, the anti-Stalin group won, and the list of leaders was published alphabetically, putting Comrade Stalin next to Puzanov, Pegov and Chesnokov.

Stalin's trick of attracting nominees to the organs of supreme power was only partially successful. The old guard held on as a cohesive group, realizing that in case of defeat all awaited the fate of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Trotsky and Bukharin, Yagoda, Yezhov and Tukhachevsky: a bullet in the back of the head or an ice pick to the skull. And the new The "fighters" acted more and more in scattered formation, caring only about how to survive in the heated battle, how not to accidentally elbow someone.

7

Trick with the expansion of the composition of the leaders did not give Stalin a decisive advantage, and then he struck a blow almost killing power: On November 5, 1952, that is, just three weeks after the election of the new Central Committee, he realized that this option did not work,

Stalin instructed the Interior Ministry leadership to arrest the doctors of all members of the rebellious ruling elite.

The further development of events was easy to predict: in Stalin's custody arrested doctors confess that they worked for British intelligence, then Stalin's opponents, all these Khrushchev and Mikoyanov, Voroshilov and Molotov, who were treated by doctors-spies, will be tied up and sew them articles for loss of vigilance. And some of the leaders Stalin has already accused of espionage. So expect loud revelations and harsh sentences.

The case of the Kremlin doctors was spun decisively and quickly. Inevitably approached the moment of the beginning of the trial, at which the doctors - villains had to confess to their espionage, subversive and sabotage activities. In parallel and as if without any connection with the "case of the doctors" watchful authorities on the orders of Stalin since January 5, 1953 began a mass capture of relatives, friends and subordinates of Khrushchev, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Molotov and Kaganovich. Beria's entourage was especially hard hit: his protégés in the Caucasus were tied up by the dozens, as bunches of radishes are tied up.

A ring around old associates of Stalin's old associates was rapidly shrinking. It wasn't long before the old Kremlin guards were left to walk around on to walk free. There was nothing nothing to do: the most "center" members of the supreme leadership - Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev - in the evening of February 28, 1953, went to Stalin's dacha with a palm branch: we were wrong, you were wrong, let's make peace! But it must be remembered that Stalin's closest aides and protectors had already been cut down around him.

Sly Stalin's associates from the Politburo have long been planting the relevant information to the leader, weakening the ranks of Stalin's fighters by the hands himself Stalin.

As early as April 1952, Stalin removed Lieutenant General Vlasik, the chief of his bodyguards for the past two decades, from his post as head of the MGB Main Security Directorate. In November 1952, Stalin kicked out Lieutenant General Poskrebyshev, his personal secretary for the past thirty years. And Poskrebyshev, among other things, was the second-in-command of the

after Stalin himself in Stalin's personal intelligence service.

This is what allowed the four Stalinist guests who came to reconcile to carry out another, secret and insidious mission.

They talked to Stalin and left. Stalin was left alone.

After that no one saw Stalin conscious anymore. The guards became concerned only by lunchtime the next day (March 1): Stalin did not come out for breakfast or lunch. Raised the alarm. All the same Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived at the dacha and found Comrade Stalin unconscious. And ordered the "sleeping" Stalin not to disturb. Doctors arrived to Stalin only the next morning, March 2, - the incredible fact of the absence of a doctor at the dacha next to the leader of the country, perhaps due to the paranoid suspicion of Stalin, who did not trust anyone, including doctors, especially against the background of the unfolding "case of the doctors of saboteurs".

And only on March 4 it was announced to the country and the world that Comrade Stalin was ill.

Key point

If we take a cursory look at even the last two centuries of our country's history, we are surprised to find an abundance of political conspiracies.

Paul I was strangled in his bedroom with a silver officer's scarf. According to another version, he was killed with a heavy snuff-box, wrapped in a towel and smashed to the highest forehead. However, these two versions do not exclude each other, but in this case the main thing is not exactly how Emperor Paul was killed, but that he died as a result of a conspiracy. If he had not been killed, the history of our country, the history of Europe and the whole world would have been completely different. I am not saying that it would have been better or worse than the current one. I am saying that it would have been different. For example, if Paul had remained on the throne, Bonaparte would not have invaded Russia. This, turn, would have had many consequences for both France and Great Britain, and with them for the world.

There is a version that the eldest son of Paul was privy to the plans of the conspirators, but did not prevent them. After his father's death, he ascended the throne and became Alexander I.

The death of Alexander I is also shrouded in legends and mysteries.

It was the signal for the beginning of the rebellion. The conspiracy was prepared in the circles of scoundrels, later called the Decembrists. In their circle they uttered pompous phrases about liberty, equality and fraternity, but this is exactly how the Jacobin dictatorship in France began: high-minded phrases that were immediately replaced by the guillotine in the Place de la Concorde and the public cutting off of thousands of heads.

What the so-called Decembrists planned and intended led them down the same slippery slope. The first point of their program was the establishment of a dictatorship - with a good purpose, of course, to restore order. They even outlined in advance which of them would be the dictator. The Decembrists would end the way the head of the Jacobins Robespierre ended: first Robespierre slaughtered all his associates, and then he himself fell into the arms of the guillotine. If the Decembrists' scheme had succeeded - and all the conditions for this were there - our history would have been quite different. But the mutiny on Senate Square was eventually suppressed by cannon fire. Alexander's youngest son, who became Nicholas I, decided to do it.

Nicholas I ruled for a long time, but he died somehow too suddenly.

He was replaced by Alexander II, whom the conspirators were really hunting. They organized an explosion even in the Winter Palace. After several assassination attempts, Alexander was killed by a bomb in the streets of St. Petersburg.

Alexander III ascended the throne and died in the prime of life, the victim of a medical assassination.

A full-scale terrorist war was unleashed against his son Nicholas II. The conspirators killed ministers and relatives of the Tsar. They killed and slandered Rasputin. Nicholas himself was overthrown as a result of a conspiracy in the ranks of the highest aristocracy and generals.

I am not insisting that we are special. When we dust off the pages of history, we see equally heartbreaking pictures of desperate struggles for power in others

countries: the conspiracy of marshals against Bonaparte, the assassination of American presidents in the theater and on city streets, the bomb in a briefcase under Hitler's desk. The First World War, which resulted in the collapse of three powerful empires in Europe, began with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a group of conspirators.

The entire history of mankind is woven with political assassinations and conspiracies - the assassination of Julius Caesar at a meeting of the Roman Senate, which is familiar to most of us, was by no means the first and by no means the only event of this kind. However, someone persistently insinuates into our heads the idea that conspiracies are extremely rare and that it is very silly to explain these or those historical events by the organized actions of individual groups of people aimed at seizing power. Against all those who try to unravel the tangles of history, a chiseled formula has been devised: it's a conspiracy theory! This formula is uttered with disgust and contempt: ah, there's that conspiracy theory again. We are taught to think that conspiracy theory is something frivolous, that only losers and charlatans investigate conspiracies, that it has nothing to do with the study of history.

I've had people squeamishly throw in my face more than once: what you write is a conspiracy theory! But I'm not proud. I answer: yes, in this case too! It's a conspiracy! If we remove conspiracies from the history of mankind, if we don't study and unravel them, there will be no history left.

CHAPTER 5

1

On the evening of March 5, 1953, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was convened. The meeting was scheduled to begin at 20:00, but the beginning was postponed to 20:40 - there were intense behind-the-scenes whisperings, something was decided by someone in the very last minutes.

Finally, the meeting opened. And it lasted exactly 10 minutes. The writer Konstantin Simonov was a member of the Central CPSU Committee. Here is his account of this event:

I had the feeling that the people who appeared from there, from the back room, in the presidium, the old members of the Politburo, came out with some hidden, not outwardly expressed, but felt in them a sense of relief. It somehow manifested itself in their faces.... There was such a feeling that right there, in the presidium, people were freed from something that was crushing them.... (Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Znamya. 1988. No. 3. P. 107)

Stalin's closest disciples and associates were indeed relieved of a heavy burden. At the same time, they relieved Comrade Stalin of a heavy burden. They announced that Comrade Stalin was relieved of his duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Comrade Malenkov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Stalin was also relieved of his duties as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU - and as we remember, he had not been General Secretary since October 1952. The new composition of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was approved - it included 11 members (Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin) and 4 candidates (Bagirov, Melnikov, Ponomarenko, Shvern timer).

2

The meaning of what was happening was this: Stalin's idea of expanding the composition of the top leadership of the Communist Party was rejected. The top leadership would not have 25 members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, as Stalin had proposed in October 1952, but only 11 - as it had been before. And the personal composition of the Presidium remained almost the same, including the two "British spies" but excluding Comrades Kosygin and Andreev, who had shown indecision and restraint in the course of the struggle against Stalin. These comrades were not even among the candidates for the Presidium. Instead of them, the Presidium included Pervukhin and Saburov, who did not show indecision.

The whole herd of young leaders, which Comrade Stalin tried to dilute the old guard, from the top thrown out. All the "homeless", who Stalin introduced into the top leadership, from there, kicked out decisively and quickly. But this time the list of leaders was again made not in alphabetical order, but in accordance with their real weight in the hierarchy of power. And in this list, Stalin was again the very first! So, he was still recognized as the chief among all?

Yes, Stalin was recognized as in charge. Stalin was lying unconscious at that moment. It was clear that consciousness will not return to him. Why not recognize him as great, outstanding, powerful, the only, brilliant, infallible? Especially since it wouldn't take long. Just for an hour.

On March 5, 1953 at 9:50 p.m. Comrade Stalin passed away.

What a loss! What a lamp of reason gone! What a heart that has ceased to beat!

And the list of members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (the one that was made not in alphabetical order, but according to the real weight of each in the hierarchy of power) was published so that everyone knew who in his position follows Comrade Stalin and in what order.

3

I do not rule out that the time of Stalin's death, 21:50, is nothing more than a convention. It is quite possible that an hour earlier, at 20:50, loyal associates elected to the Presidency of the already deceased leader, demonstrating to the whole country their love and devotion. This is not my speculation.

Stalin was still alive, or was thought to be still alive
(Simonov K. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Znamya. 1988.
№3. C. 107).

When Khrushchev reported to the plenum proposals of the Presidium of the Central Committee on measures to simplify the management of the state and on candidates for senior government positions, there was a definite impression that Stalin is already as if not alive, that he will never again stand at the head of the party and the state ... Malenkov to Khrushchev Beria and Bulganin were in high spirits and apparently knew better than anyone else about Stalin's imminent demise (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 2001. C. 621).

Four years later, Nikolai Pavlovich Dudorov, Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, reported to the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that *"the manuscript on the formation of the composition of the Soviet government is dated March 4, 1953"* (Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU. Fond 2. Inventory 1. Case 257. Session one. June 22 1957).

So, it is officially considered that Stalin died on March 5, 1953 at 21:50, but already on March 4, a list was compiled in which the head of the government named not Stalin, but Malenkov.

4

The country was shocked by the news of the death of the greatest genius. People wept and wailed. Plants, steamships and locomotives were humming. At the moment when Stalin's coffin was brought into Lenin's mausoleum, life in the country froze: stopped trains and icebreakers, electric trains and artillery tractors, bulldozers and dump trucks, tanks and armored personnel carriers, cruisers and excavators, conveyors and machines in factories, convoys of convicts and camel caravans. Grief-stricken comrades-in-arms of Comrade Stalin made speeches and swore allegiance to the precepts.

At the next, XX Congress of the CPSU, the same leaders, faithful Stalinists, his disciples and followers, accomplices of all his crimes, executors of the darkest and most nefarious of his plans and designs declared Stalin a villain of all times and peoples. But the exposers of Stalin - that is, his disciples, nominees and drinking buddies - was extremely unfavorable to admit that they themselves killed Stalin. Then it would turn out that the whistleblowers - the same mokrushniki and urki, as well as killed by them pakhan. Therefore, the legend of Stalin's natural death was put into circulation.

Let's say that's what happened. Let's say that Stalin died a natural death. That happens to some people sometimes. However.

However, Stalin's death was predetermined by his inner circle as early as August 5, 1952. On that day, members of the Politburo, clearly against Stalin's will, after missing a dozen deadlines, was finally assembled plenum of the Central Committee. At the plenum it was decided to convene in two months the XIX Congress of the Communist Party after, as we remember, four missed terms through Stalin's fault. The Congress was convened in order to adopt a new charter of the Party. And the new charter was adopted in order to remove Stalin from his main position, in order to remove Stalin from power. Thus, the convening of the plenum in August 1952 was nothing more than the appointment of povkovishcha, at which the right guys decided to push "charge" pakhanu.

But suspending Stalin was not enough. By suspending him, Stalin had to be neutralized. Otherwise he would have slaughtered everyone.

Therefore, removal from power also meant subsequent isolation. This is how Comrade Stalin himself once removed Comrade Lenin from power. And having removed him, he isolated him by declaring him sick. And he did not allow Comrade Lenin to write for more than 15 minutes a day, taking care of his health. And he did not give Comrade Lenin newspapers - so as not to disturb him. Lenin was given only the newspaper Pravda, which was compiled and printed in a single copy especially for him - so that the leader of the world proletariat would not worry.

These measures were not enough. Comrade Lenin contrived to write and transmit to the proper authorities a so-called Letter to the Congress, in which he proposed to remove Comrade Stalin from the post of General Secretary:

Mr. Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated in his hands immense power, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use this power carefully enough Therefore, I propose to the comrades to consider a way to move Stalin of this place and appoint another person to this place.

Isolation did not help. Lenin continued to oppose Stalin. Comrade Stalin had to use the most radical method of isolation, putting Comrade Lenin in a gilded coffin.

The same logic of struggle led Stalin's associates. It was a battle in which no prisoners are taken. If we remove from the post of General Secretary, then after that - isolation. Complete.

But let us assume that Comrade Stalin died a natural death in March 1953. If so, then he died at the most opportune moment. Otherwise, he would have been killed.

5

In March 1953, by influence and political weight, the seats of power were distributed in the following order: Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev. In the last years of his life, Stalin gradually shifted the center of power from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the government of the Soviet Union. Therefore, on March 4, 1953, when Stalin was still alive or officially considered as such, Beria proposed to appoint Malenkov as head of the Soviet government - Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The proposal was unanimously accepted.

Malenkov immediately proposed to appoint Beria as his first deputy. The proposal was supported - and who could object? In addition, Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria headed the new Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was formed by the merger of two ministries - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security. All punitive bodies of the country came under a single leadership. Officially, Malenkov was in charge of the Soviet Union - but only officially. Beria preferred to be slightly behind, to be ostensibly second in order to actually be first.

The position of party secretary at that time was not considered the most important, so they gave it to Khrushchev. And for nothing. The Central Committee was still deciding the most important question - the personnel issue: who and to what position to appoint.

"Personnel decide everything" - so Comrade Stalin once declared. The distribution of personnel was put in the hands of Khrushchev. Thus, the most powerful lever of power was in Khrushchev's hands.

6

At the junction of 1952 and 1953, the struggle for power was not only between Stalin and a group of Politburo members, but also within the group itself. Each tried to strengthen their positions, elbowing fellow party members. Each pulled into power whole clans of his supporters. Most of all it was like a quiet, so far without a fight, crush on the stairs leading upwards. In this struggle, Lavrentiy Beria rose above all, but Nikita Khrushchev succeeded the most.

In February 1941, Khrushchev managed to sneak his friends Zhukov and Serov into the Central Committee candidates. After the war, Stalin, having expelled Zhukov from the pinnacle of military power and appointed him commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, kicked him out of the Central Committee candidates as well. In October 1952, Khrushchev for the second time held disgraced Marshal Zhukov as a candidate for membership in the Central Committee.

At the moment when Stalin suddenly "fell ill", there was intense and rapid bargaining among the top leaders of the Party: if this post is taken by your man, then this one is mine, support me in this appointment, I will support you in that one. On March 4, 1953, when Stalin was still alive or believed to be alive, Khrushchev managed to bargain for his clan the post of First Deputy Minister of Defense. All that remained was to decide which of his old friends to put in this post.

7

Moreover, the battle was not just for power, but also for how that power would be used. Each Kremlin leader had a clear idea of where he would lead the country if he managed to break through to the top and take the place of the defeated leader.

And the rudder had to be turned vigorously and quickly - the way the rudder on the Titanic had to be turned to avoid crashing into an iceberg. The steering wheel had to be turned urgently and to the point of failure, either in one direction or, again, to the point of failure, in the other. The Soviet Union had to:

- Or change their economic system and become a normal country like all other countries,
- or change the economic system of all the other countries. Either we become like everyone else, or we make everyone else like us.

Most of the chiefs - and leaders were Malenkov and Beria - were inclined to turn to the right. To get off the path of socialism. Then we wouldn't have to remake the whole world. Malenkov and Beria had a powerful argument in their hands. Before, we could count on the fact that as a result of a new war, the proletarian revolutions in the capitalist countries would win. But nuclear weapons came along. It made a major war suicidal for everyone. A nuclear war cannot be won. That's why now we can't get the whole world into our rut. That's why our country has to turn away from the path it took in 1917.

And only Comrade Khrushchev thought otherwise. We will not turn from the path of Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin! We will destroy the whole world of violence to the ground, and then we will build a new world! Communism is the bright future of all mankind! If the capitalists unleash a new war, it will lead to the victory of the proletariat in many capitalist countries!

The trouble with Khrushchev was that he was in a pathetic minority. He was supported by Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin. But his penchant for drinking Russian folk drink made Bulganin both a weak politician and an unreliable ally. And then Khrushchev was approached by his longtime comrade-in-arms from before the war, and now commander of the troops of the Ural Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: it is possible to win a nuclear war! Give me power! Give me a year and a half! I will prove by example that victory in the Third World War is possible!

And on the day of Stalin's death, March 5, 1953, the commander of the troops of the Ural Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union

Zhukov was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. On March 16, 1953, this was officially announced.

CHAPTER 6

1

After Stalin's death, it was profitable for someone to start a rumor that no one Stalin in October 1952 from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party did not remove. It is claimed that this position allegedly disappeared back in 1934.

These rumors were beneficial to the people who overthrew Stalin and took his place. If we recognize that in October 1952 Stalin was removed from his main post, then the whole logic of the heated battle of the Kremlin titans becomes clear:

- convening a party congress against Stalin's will;
- the adoption of an anti-Stalinist party charter at the congress;
- expansion of the composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee at Stalin's suggestion, so that the rebellious associates, who were in the Presidium majority, were in the minority;
- the arrest, on Stalin's orders, of doctors who treated Khrushchev, Beria, Bulganin and Malenkov;
- the widespread arrests, ordered by Stalin, of people in the entourage of the country's top leaders;
- the sudden "illness" of the leader;
- banning the country's top leaders from allowing doctors to see the dying Stalin;
- The high spirits of Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev at a time when grief and sorrow should have been portrayed.

And , after Stalin's death:

- termination of the "case of doctors" arrested on Stalin's orders;
- dispersal of the Presidium of the Central Committee, enlarged at Stalin's suggestion;
- the return of power to those who removed Stalin from his chief post;
- and, finally, the overthrow of the genius of all times and peoples by his most faithful disciples and associates right at the next XX Party Congress.

But if you let the rumor that the post of General Secretary disappeared without a trace back in 1934, then it turns out that there was no battle for power in the Kremlin, starting in August 1952, no one removed Stalin from office, did not resist Stalin fiercely, trying to remove from power and strangle his rebellious boyars. Then it turns out that there was no need to kill Stalin.

In our country and abroad there are enough voluntary and paid falsifiers, as well as those whom Lenin called useful idiots. All of them, some of them foolishly and some of them for a fee, have repeated the rumor started by Khrushchev and continue to do so.

Let's ask the useful idiots and falsifiers a question: where is the document?

So, no one has yet produced a document that Stalin ceased to be General Secretary in 1934. Rumors are flying around, there is no confirmation. Let us consider: was the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the most important position in the great country, was canceled so that no traces, no documents, resolutions, resolutions, no evidence, no reports about it have not survived?

Could such an event have happened without a trace? Could it have happened? The answer is, it could not.

2

But is there documentation that Stalin remained General Secretary even after 1934?

There are such documents. A lot of them.

What is it all about? How do the perverters of our history and falsifiers of all stripes manage to fool the people for half a century?

The fact that Stalin was a good psychologist: he understood the importance of personal modesty, and therefore often signed documents simply as Secretary of the Central Committee. And in letters to his daughter even called himself "secretary". However, in the decisive moments of history, Stalin used the full title - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b). Any researcher can see for himself: I strongly recommend the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, fund 93. If there is no possibility behind those armored doors to penetrate personally, one should use the opportunities of those who have access to the secrets.

The historian is the scout of the past. This is my conviction. I have been professing and defending this point of view for many years. I urge historians to improve their intelligence skills. Analyzing the situation is important, but equally important is agent penetration and agent extraction. You don't have to break the safes that contain the secrets of history - instead, you can, figuratively speaking, give a box of chocolates to a pretty girl who has the key to that safe. In military strategic intelligence, this is called recruitment. By recruiting someone who has access to the keys, you can penetrate the most inaccessible vaults of documents.

3

For me the date of June 22, 1941 is of the greatest interest. To the study of this day, everything that preceded it and what followed it, I have given my whole life. Here are some documents around this date, Stalin signed. Under the top secret decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) No. 1724-733ss "On the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" of June 23, 1941, there is only one signature: "Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) I. Stalin".

Let us assume for a moment that the position of General Secretary was abolished in 1934, and Stalin from that moment on was simply called Secretary of the Central Committee. After 1937-1938, that is, after the Great Purification, Stalin's personal power compared to 1934 was extremely strengthened. If our assumption is correct, then before the Great Purge, the opulent title of General Secretary of the Central Committee corresponded to the enormous, but still limited power of Stalin. And the modest title of Secretary of the Central Committee, which Stalin had in the period of preparation of the Great Purge, during it and after it, corresponded to nothing limited, unprecedented in history power.

Now let's consider: why would Stalin on June 23, 1941, in the most terrible days of his life and the life of the empire he created, to sign with a lavish, long-abandoned title, which corresponded to a relatively small power, instead of signing with a modest title, which implied power not limited by anything?

Top Secret Decree of the USSR SNK and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b)

"On the Stavka of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" is a document of extreme importance. This is Stalin's decision on who will lead the war. Did Stalin, on June 23, 1941, decide to sign the title, which was removed from him seven years ago? Did he decide to make a joke? If I am not confused, he was not at that moment to joke.

So here it is: our assumption is wrong. Nobody canceled the title of General Secretary of the Central Committee in 1934. Just Stalin used his power cautiously and carefully, not wasting cannon shells to shoot at sparrows flocks. The main title he left only for the most important things and used it only in extreme cases.

4

On the same day, June 23, 1941, under the top secret decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) No. 1734-743ss "On putting into effect the mobilization plan for ammunition" there was again one signature: "Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) I. Stalin". Let's pay attention to the fact that the numbers of the decrees are double. Why?

That's because power in the Soviet Union was duplicated. Here, for example, is a district. In the central square of a large village or small town, there is an imposing building. This is the executive committee. This is the state authority to which the entire population of the district is subordinated.

But in the same central square of the district center, another building rises. It's a little bigger, it's a little better. This is the district committee of the Communist Party. This committee controls and directs the work of the executive committee, that is, the state power in the district.

Let's go higher. The regional center. The picture is the same: the regional executive committee, and next to it and above it - the regional committee. The executive committee is the state power in this region, but above it is the regional party committee. The first secretary of the regional committee commands the chairman of the regional executive committee (Oblast Executive Committee), that is, the state power in the region, directing and controlling it.

It is the same in the krais: krai executive committees, and above them - regional party committees. Even higher are the republics. Take Ukraine, for example. Ukraine was ruled by the government. And the government was governed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

And at the very top it was exactly like that. At the head of the state stood the government - the Council of People's Commissars, after the war - the Council of Ministers. The head of the government until May 1941 was Comrade Molotov. Comrade Molotov was the second man in the state. The country and its people were subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars, but the government was under the control and in full subordination to the Communist Party. Above Comrade Molotov is Comrade Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee.

Since May 5, 1941, Comrade Stalin has headed not only the party power, but also the state power, accepting at the same time the post of head of the government. The state power from the very top sends down an order about what must be done. At the same time, the supreme party power sends down the same order to all lower party structures: this is how it should be done.

Hence the two numbers. The first is the number of a government document, the second is the number of a party document. And the letters "ss" mean "top secret".

Let us note the difference in the numbers of the two decrees signed by Stalin on the same day, June 23, 1941: 1724-733ss and 1734-743ss. Both government and party documents differ by exactly ten units. This means that on June 23, 1941 at least a dozen joint decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) were signed.

To all those who claim that Stalin was not General Secretary after 1934, I recommend not to be stingy, buy a box of chocolates, find the girl with the keys, give the chocolates to her, get into the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and read the documents, the numbers of which are between the two I mentioned. It is possible for the sake of interest to leaf through and those that were signed by Stalin before June 23 and after. Then the argument about whether Stalin was General Secretary after 1934 or not, will subside by itself.

But if there is no desire to penetrate the Archive of the President, you can at least use open sources. There are quite enough of them. They have long been published and are available to everyone.

But could it be that Hitler struck and Comrade Stalin suddenly remembered his title, canceled in 1934? No, it is not so. Stalin used the title of General Secretary and before the German attack. Let's not go far away from the ill-fated date of June 22, 1941. Here under the top secret Decree of the USSR SNK and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) № 1711-724ss "On camouflage painting of aircraft, runways, tents and airfield facilities" of June 19, 1941 is signed: "Chairman of the SNK of the USSR and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) I. Stalin".

This ruling alone is enough to consider my entire theory set forth in "Icebreaker" as proven. Moreover, the mere title of this top secret document and the signature under it are enough to close all "icebreaker" debates. For two decades, until June 19, 1941, it never occurred to anyone to paint airplanes, tents and runways with camouflage colors. And then suddenly... The Central Committee decides... to paint tents. And the signature of Comrade Stalin.

Why should I? If Comrade Stalin did not like the color of the tents, he could have called on the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko and expressed his displeasure to him. And let Timoshenko sign the order on when and how to paint the tents, and at the same time - airplanes, airfield facilities and runways. You don't even have to bother the People's Commissar of Defense with such a trifle. There is the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Zhukov, and he would have to say that the tents were the wrong color.

But why was Comrade Stalin himself suddenly concerned about the color of the tents? Why is the decree not secret, but top secret? Maybe Comrade Stalin realized that now they are going to attack? Nothing of the sort. It is not for me to prove that Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack. He didn't believe on June 19, or June 20, or June 21. And on the morning of June 22, when German bombs were raining down on Soviet airfields, when German tanks were milling on tracks first

kilometers of Soviet land, Stalin still refused to believe that a real war had begun. All this has been proven without me.

The top secret order to camouflage airfields and aircraft, signed by Stalin on June 19, 1941, is a sign of war, imminent and inevitable.

But Stalin did not believe that the war would be started by Germany. If, in Stalin's opinion, the inevitable war between Germany and the Soviet Union, which should break out in the coming days, will not be unleashed by Hitler and his generals, then - who?

If Hitler falls away, who is left?

5

Perhaps the documents given by me are not enough for someone. Then I recommend to find the Decree of the USSR SNK and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) No. 1509-620ss/ov of June 6, 1941 and see what kind of signature is under that document. This is an even more serious document. Grif "ss/ov" - top secret, of special importance. This is the "Mobilization Plan for Ammunition and Cartridges" signed by Comrade Stalin, Chairman of the SNK of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b).

And why is the ordinance on ammunition of June 6, 1941 closed with the "ss/ov" stamp, while the ordinance on ammunition of June 23, 1941, signed by the same person who holds the same positions and carries the same titles, is classified with only the "ss" stamp?

Because, citizens, the decree of June 6, 1941, describes to whom, when, what ammunition and in what quantities to produce. And the decree of June 23, 1941 is just an order to proceed to the execution of the previously issued plan. Without unnecessary specification of who, when, where and how much.

And this again gives us something to think about. On May 5, 1941, Comrade Stalin for some reason also took over as head of government of the Soviet Union. Stalin did not believe in a German attack, but his first concern on May 6, 1941, was wartime munitions production.

I refer to the documents of 1941 only because I am up to my ears in materials about this period. Anyone who digs deeper into other years will get the same result.

The fact that Stalin was General Secretary of the Communist Party both during the war and after it, is evidenced by another, albeit indirect, but very convincing fact. In the countries conquered by the Soviet Union during the war, state building was carried out in our image. On this basis, where Communists came to power after World War II, the chief Communist bore the title of General Secretary. If we did not have such a title, neither would they.

After Stalin's death, the chief communist of the Soviet Union was called First Secretary. With some delay, the chief communists in the countries under our control began to be called so. Here is an example. Until the mid-1960s, Romania was a loyal ally of ours. Everything that we had, our Romanian brothers diligently copied. Until 1954, the Communist Party (at different times the party had different names) had seven General Secretaries. Since September 13, 1953, the chief communist of the Soviet Union was called the First Secretary. Correspondingly, in Romania, as it should be, with some delay, the chief communist from April 20, 1954 became known as the First Secretary. He became Gheorghe Apostol.

6

The most important evidence that Stalin was General Secretary until October 1952 is, of course, the official biography of Stalin published during his lifetime. The first edition was published in 1939. This is the peak of Stalin's greatness. The Great Purge of 1937-1938 had just been completed. In September 1939, Stalin annexed the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia to the Soviet Union. And on December 21, 1939, Stalin turned 60 years old.

By this date and was published "Brief Biography" of 243 pages. This book Stalin edited personally. Checked every word. Drew unwanted eulogies. Inscribed new ones. And in this book, Stalin is named General Secretary.

In 1947, a second, revised and expanded edition was published and has been reprinted many times. I found one of the most recent versions of this book. It was signed into print on the day

Stalin's birth - December 21, 1951. Circulation - 8,375,000 copies.

And the second edition Stalin edited personally, calling at night in his office the entire author's team. Drafts of the biography with Stalin's personal edits have long been published and are available to any researcher. Corrections and additions were made a lot. But all corrections and additions in both editions did not concern this paragraph:

April 3, 1922, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party at the suggestion of Lenin elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the best and most faithful student and associate of Lenin - Stalin. Since then, Stalin has worked in this post without fail (p. 88).

Incidentally, two of these sentences are present in the first edition as well

"The Great Soviet Encyclopedia."

Stalin often signed documents using the title of Secretary of the Central Committee. On this basis, some have concluded that he ceased to be General Secretary. However, Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, also used this title - Secretary of the Central Committee - quite often. Using this title, he signed not only routine papers, but also documents of exceptional importance. But it does not follow from this that Khrushchev ceased to be the First Secretary of the Central Committee.

7

"Brief Biography" of Stalin was prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6) and was printed in the First Model Printing House named after Zhdanov. Zhdanov. Let us pay attention to the composition of the authors of this book.

Georgi Fyodorovich Alexandrov - candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, winner of the Stalin Prizes of the first and second degrees, after Stalin's death - Minister of Culture of the USSR.

Galaktionov Mikhail Romanovich - before the war division commissar, during during the war - major general, chief editor "Krasnaya Zvezda", after the war head of the military department of "Pravda". Kruzhkov Vladimir Semyonovich - professor, Doctor of Philosophy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in 1944-1949 Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b).

Mitin Mark Borisovich - member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, winner of the Stalin Prize of the first degree, in 1939-1944 - Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. - Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b).

Vasily D. Mochalov - Deputy Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), Head of the Stalin Sector of this Institute.

Piotr Nikolaevich Pospelov - member of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1939-1971), editor-in-chief of Pravda (1940-1949), secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (1953-1960), candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (1957-1961), member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Stalin Prize of the first degree.

It is not by chance that I list in such detail the positions and titles of the authors of Stalin's biography. Would any of these responsible comrades dare to distort the biography of the great leader? And if one of them had dared to do so, he would have been immediately killed by his own associates, saving their lives from the punishing hand of the angry proletariat. And why should they put their heads and other parts of their bodies on the line, making up things that do not correspond to reality? And if they had made something up, the editor-in-chief would have corrected them. All of them at once.

He knew how to do that.

8

But even after Stalin's death, very official sources reported when Stalin was stripped of the title of General Secretary.

*On April 3, 1922, the plenum of the Central Committee at
the suggestion of Lenin, elected Stalin as
General secretary general OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE*

of the party; in this position he served until October 1952, and then was secretary of the Central Committee until the end of his life (Encyclopedic Dictionary. M.: Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopedia, 1955. T. 3. C. 310).

"The Great Soviet Encyclopedia" (second edition, vol. 40, 1956) reports the following about Stalin:

In April 1922 at the plenum of the Central Committee S. [Stalin. - Author's note] was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee and remained in this position for over 30 years.

There are two points of extreme importance in this sentence.

First: *over 30 years*. 30 years as General Secretary expired on April 3, 1952. Therefore, even after that Stalin still remained in that position.

The second point: *over 30 years*, but it is not stated that Stalin remained in this position until his death, which would be simpler and more logical, if it corresponds to reality. Why before 1956, official sources reported that Stalin was removed in October 1952, and after this issue simply bypassed in silence?

Here it is simple. After his death, Stalin remained a great, brilliant, infallible eternally living leader and teacher. Your humble servant at a young age, along with everyone else, used to shout songs like this:

*We are faithful to the cause of Lenin
and Stalin. The Communist Party of
the country calls the Soviet peoples to
exploits.*

This continued in 1954 and 1955. From the fact that Stalin remained great and holy, suspicions of unnatural death in most citizens did not arise. Because there was no need to hide that Stalin was removed from office in October 1952. Because

"The Great Soviet Encyclopedia," published by the most anything but official bodies, reported exactly when Stalin ceased to be General Secretary.

But in 1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev portrayed Stalin as the devil of hell, presenting himself as the main fighter against Stalinism. And then there was logical logical chain:

Comrade Khrushchev и other comrades hated Stalin already in his lifetime, fought with him, opposed him, acted in spite of him, and therefore removed him from high office in October 1952. And soon Stalin took and died ... And the unconscious citizens had bad questions: if the Kremlin leaders already at that time understood the criminal the criminal essence of Stalinism, if they knew about the monstrous atrocities, if they hated, if they resisted, if they fought, if they were removed from high office, - but because he, Stalin, was probably kicking, - they could have killed the leader.

Why not? That's when it became necessary to cover up the murder. That's when it became necessary to stop talking about the fact that Stalin was filmed shortly before his death. That's when the editors of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" put their recent revelations into oblivion.

A quarter of a century later, when the question of succession to the throne in the Stalinist empire lost all urgency and relevance, it became possible to tell the truth:

After the end of the war, Stalin, as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman of the Soviet Ministry. Soviet Ministry. USSR, made a great contribution to the development of the program of post-war world order (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. In 8 vol. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980. T. 7. C. 516).

This is a quote from an official publication of the USSR Ministry of Defense. These words were signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet S. G. Gorshkov, Air Chief Marshal P. S. Kutakhov, eight army generals, three colonel generals and three lieutenant generals.

To finally dispel doubts, the writer Felix Chuev asked the personal pensioner Molotov Vyacheslav Mikhailovich: when was Stalin removed from the main post? Molotov replied: Stalin was removed from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee in October 1952 (Chuev F. I. Molotov. Semi-powerful ruler. P. 393).

Key point

It is quite clear why in 1956, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev launched the legend that the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee had disappeared as if by itself back in 1934.

Khrushchev's interest is to prove: we did not remove Stalin from his post in 1952, there was no conflict between us and we had no reason to kill him. The mention of Stalin's removal from the highest state post would be a vivid proof of the existence of an acute conflict within the party top brass of the Soviet Union, with all the ensuing consequences.

But it is difficult to understand why even today there are people who repeat Khrushchev's fabrications in spite of the published, all available, very official documents, which even after 1934 indicated the most important position of Stalin - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b).

Question: if Stalin was General Secretary

Central Committee of the Party right before the war and during the war, could he have lost that title after 1941?

The answer is that it could not. Because neither in 1941, nor in the following years until October 1952, if you remember, there were no party congresses. And without a party congress to deprive Stalin of his main title, no one could not. Only the Congress could decide this issue.

That is why Stalin opposed the convening of congresses. That is why his faithful disciples, associates and companions so stubbornly sought to convene a congress, putting their lives on the line.

CHAPTER 7

1

So, in October 1952, Comrade Stalin was quietly, quietly removed from his main post. But it was not so easy to deprive him of all the full power. Stalin responded with a series of powerful blows. The next, the most terrible blow was to bring down and sweep away from the political horizon all the top leadership of the Soviet Union. But Comrade Stalin suddenly suddenly fell ill and immediately died.

Stalin's legacy was very heavy. I would say - unbearable. Some problems Stalin managed to solve. During the war and immediately after it in the Soviet Union, crime in general and banditry in particular rose sharply. In the country - a shortage of everything from potatoes and bread to kerosene and rubber boots, but weapons in the forests - in abundance: gather a gang, go on the big road. Banditism in Rostov, Odessa, Lvov, Kharkov and other major cities was suppressed using the most extreme measures. Army officers, disguised in civilian clothes, at night pretended to be tipsy late passers-by and when meeting with robbers shot in the forehead without warning. This method of fighting crime was used not only in Odessa, allegedly on the orders of Zhukov, but in all major cities on the orders of Stalin.

But there were much more complicated problems. During the war, civil war was raging in the occupied territories of the USSR. It covered Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea, the North Caucasus, the Kalmyk steppes, Smolensk, Pskov and Bryansk regions. Entire nations had to be subdued, driving them from their native land to Kazakhstan and Siberia. Germany was defeated, but the guerrilla war against the liberators continued in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and Poland. Stalin had to carry out grandiose punitive operations to deal with this problem as well.

Millions died in the war. For every million dead, there were some (and quite a few) cripples - deaf and blind, armless and legless, burned and received other

terrible injuries. In the first postwar years, the suburban trains, train stations, squares, bazaars, cemeteries, and city parks of the Soviet Union were packed with beggarly invalids. The country could not provide them with housing, food, clothing, money, or medical care. All of them, dirty, lousy, rotting, putrid, perpetually drunk, were dressed in threadbare military uniforms. On their heads - caps, officers' caps with broken visors, tank and flight helmets, callipers with the names of warships long since erased. On the chest - scratched orders with cracked enamel, worn medals with greasy ribbons. They sang songs about past battles and battles:

*He walked in front with a machine gun in his
hands, Sailor of the Black Sea Fleet....*

They told horrible stories about the war. They begged for alms, which they immediately drank. They consumed denatured alcohol, polymer and similar products of the chemical industry. With their disgusting appearance they spoiled the festivities of the victorious nation. What to do with them?

Comrade Stalin had radical solutions for any problem. And they managed to cope with this scourge, too. The country was quickly cleansed of the disabled: under the pretext of caring for their health, war invalids from all over the country were taken to "invalid homes" and left there to die without decent provision and care (it is known, for example, that one of such boarding homes had been functioning on the island of Valaam since 1952).

So, that problem too has been solved. But not all problems were solved as smoothly as the struggle with defenseless disabled people. Some problems were only partially solved.

During the war, millions of Soviet soldiers and officers fell into German captivity. Many died in a foreign land. But those who survived were in no hurry to return to their beloved homeland. In addition, the Germans exported about five million citizens of the Soviet Union to work in German enterprises. The war was over, but these citizens were not at all eager to go home. They had to be returned by deceit and force. Not all of them were returned. The most nimble ones evaded

to return to the homeland that liberated Europe from the brown plague. And those who were forcibly returned did not feel any more patriotic.

It was joked in those days that Stalin made only two mistakes in the war.

One: showed Ivan to Europe.

Two: showed Ivan to Europe.

Millions of Soviet soldiers traveled to Germany and Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Finland, Hungary and Romania, even Norway and Denmark. And everywhere, in all these countries, people lived differently than in ours. The poorest villages of war-torn Europe were still better off than the Soviet collective farms.

Soviet soldiers and officers returning from the war hoped that something would start to change now. Everyone was sure that now the collective farms would be dissolved.

But they were not dissolved, so it did not get better. The main problem remained the same: the country had nothing to feed.

2

In the 1970s, the Soviet press reported a confession by Churchill [\[8\]](#) that, during summit meetings, he and everyone else in the room supposedly stood up when Stalin entered and supposedly held their hands at the seams. Your humble servant was also a victim of Soviet propaganda. I also repeated this nonsense in my books. But I checked my sources and made sure - Churchill neither said nor wrote such things. I take it back. I apologize for my stupidity.

Soviet propaganda concocted and put into circulation another stamp of praise for Stalin: he took Russia with a plow and left it with an atomic bomb [\[9\]](#).

I did not fall for this chaff, I did not repeat this foolishness, because I observed the life of Soviet collective farms from a very short distance. Because my grandfather, blacksmith Vasiliy Andreevich Rezunov, worked all his life in the collective farm named after Shevchenko in Solonyanskiy district of Dnepropetrovsk region. Khutor Sadovyi, where I sometimes came to visit my grandfather and grandmother, remembered both cannibalism after collectivization and cannibalism after the war. The stories of the men were amazing

monotonous. And the elderly women did not tell anything - they only cried when there was talk about the times of the "great turning point", i.e. collectivization, and the times of the "great victory over fascism".

The sorrowful stories of slightly tipsy men at the end of the day about collectivization and its results cannot be used in the case. Therefore, let's turn to official sources.

With bread in 1947 after the famine of 1946 was very bad.

This was recognized by Comrade Serdiuc Z. T., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia (Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU. Fund 2. Inventory 1. Case 257. Evening session of June 26, 1957).

Had the Soviet Union not collapsed, the transcript would have remained secret forever. In those days, it was only allowed to be read by party leaders with a rank no lower than the secretary of the regional committee, i.e. the governor of the region, if we use modern terms. But even these figures were allowed to read not what was discussed at the plenums - for them another version of history was created, combed and powdered. The same phrase looked different for the lower-ranking figures:

*With bread in 1947, after the **crop failure of** 1946, there was
a
a little heavy* [emphasis mine. - B.C.].

But all our history cannot be rewritten, that's why sometimes inadvertently slipped bits of truth in it:

In Ukraine in 1946 there was a terrible famine and there were cases of cannibalism.

These are the words of Comrade Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. Fund 2. Inventory 1. Case 257. Evening session of June 28, 1957). In 1946, Khrushchev was the master of Ukraine. He should know,

what was going on in this republic. But if anyone is interested, documentary evidence on this issue can be found in abundance and without much difficulty.

The people expressed the same thing in shorter and simpler terms:

Sickle and hammer - death and hunger.

3

Why did the famine happen? Because for the sake of the so-called The "industrialization" of the early 1930s robbed the village, the most industrious and active peasants were declared kulaks and exterminated as a class. The rest were driven into collective farms by terror and hunger in order to take bread, potatoes and lard not from each individual, but from faceless, irresponsible collectives. The crowd.

A peasant's labor is not mindless mechanical work, but true creativity: here you have to feel nature and make many important decisions on your own every day. But in collective farms people had no incentives to work creatively. If the state took everything out of the collective farm barns, why work?

They didn't pay money in the collective farms. Why should we? After all, it is a common collective economy. After all, a husband in a family does not pay money to his wife for washing the floors. A wife does not pay money to her husband for chopping wood. This was the way it was organized in the collective farm - without money. On the collective farm, they counted how many days you worked. The unit of account for each collective farmer's individual contribution to the common cause was the labor day. If you served a day, the foreman would write a stick on your statement: the day was counted. If you worked hard, the foreman could write two sticks in the report for one day, three sticks for your drinking buddy, or even five sticks for your sweetheart.

Then, at the end of the season, the calculation took place. After the deliveries to the state had been made, the collective farm was left with so many potatoes, so many cabbages, so many beets. Some was put aside for seeds, the rest was divided. There are so many people in the collective farm. The total number of labor days counted for all of them during the season. We divide the rest by the total number of sticks counted. We get that one labor day corresponds to

some potatoes, cabbage or beets. After that we distribute to each one according to his merits.

However, kolkhozes were created for the state to take as much as it needed out of the kolkhoz barns. And it did so in accordance with its needs and plans. Therefore, by the end of the season, the sticks earned could mean nothing at all.

Our people are not bad. They have long known a simple wisdom: whoever is a good driver, is the one who gets the load. So why should men be happy about the results of their labor? Why work hard, if for this they will increase the plan of supplies to the state?

There was no point in working. There was no point. And even more so, there was no point in working well. There were no incentives. That's why the village was drinking moonshine and getting drunk. Peasant labor morality, formed over centuries, was being rapidly destroyed and eroded. The people appreciated the collective farm system accurately and immediately:

*Here comes the hammer, here
comes the sickle, This is our
Soviet emblem.
If you want to reap it, or if you
want to bite it, you'll still get a
dick.*

Khrushchev himself was forced to admit that this was the case. In 1945, he visited his native Kalinovka, the village where he was born. This is his story. Obviously, it was not intended for the press and was addressed to a narrow circle of associates gathered at the June (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Comrades, it is not enough to say that they [collective farmers. - Author's note] lived badly. No horses, no wagons, bread. I asked then Comrade Grechko to help with horses (there were a lot of trophy horses in the army at that time). He gave horses, wagons, collars. They brought the horses, but the collective farm didn't accept them, because they had to be taken care of! And the collective farmers do not want to work in the collective farm. They only got sticks for their work. They would like the soldiers to take care of these horses ... To feed horses the collective farmers do not

want, they were not interested in it. This was the lying situation not only in Kalinovka, but in our agriculture in general.

I saw that they were sowing those crops that were not yielding. But what could I advise them? You have to sow, everything is according to the plan. And what a plan! Geniuses sit in Moscow and write down how much spring wheat to sow, how much winter wheat, how much barley, how much vetch [\[100\]](#), how much beet. And so it is written from top to bottom. Who could deviate from this so-called plan? No one. Whoever would change the structure of sown areas would violate the directive (Transcript of the June (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. CPSD. Fund 2. Inventory 1. Case 257. Evening meeting of June 28, 1957).

In the same speech at the plenum of the Central Committee in June 1957, Khrushchev admitted: *"The collective farms were ripping out the last of the kolkhozes, thus ruining agriculture..."*. In 1951, collective farmers were scattering".

Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU comrade Mikoyan reported:
"We really trade meat only in Moscow, Leningrad, with a sin in half in Donbass and the Urals, in other places with interruptions" (Transcript of the July 1953) plenum. Evening session of July 3 1953. RGANI. Fund 2. Inventory 1. Case 45. Published: Izvestia
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU. 1991. № 1-2).

So, it is silly to say that Stalin took Russia with a plow and left it with an atomic bomb. But if we resort to such an assessment, then for the sake of objectivity, the second part of this phrase should have been changed: with the same plow and left.

4

Russia, which we lost, was able to export bread, but the Soviet Union could not feed itself. This is one of the main achievements of the socialist mode of production and personally of comrades Trotsky, Sverdlov, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and others of the same fraternity.

The disastrous consequences of the criminal anti-peasant (i.e. anti-people) policy of collectivization were superimposed with such a

the same catastrophic consequences of the war. Millions of workers did not return from the war. But those who survived were in no hurry to return to their native collective farms. Working hands were needed everywhere, demobilized soldiers went to rebuild the mines of Donbass and metallurgical plants of Dnepropetrovsk, to clear the ruins of Stalingrad and Kiev, Voronezh and Novorossiysk. People went to the lumber camps, to the construction of new factories in the Urals and Siberia, to Metrostroy in Moscow and Leningrad. Anywhere but on the collective farm.

Therefore, after the end of World War II and the cessation of food supplies from the United States, famine naturally and inevitably fell upon the Soviet Union. The leaders were forced to mention this sometimes in passing during their talks. A. N. Kosygin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, future head of the USSR government, former and future member of the Politburo, was speaking about the first post-war years:

During that period, I had to travel to a number of regions: Bashkiria, Kuibyshev, and Moldavia in connection with epidemics and famine. Many people were dying of hunger in a number of regions (Transcript of the June (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Evening session of June 28, 1957. TSSD. Fund 2. Inventory 1. Case 257).

At the same plenum, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the DPRK, Comrade A. M. Puzanov, spoke and said that in October 1952, at the XIX Congress of the CPSU it was reported that "*the grain problem had been successfully solved, solved finally and irrevocably*". Comrade Puzanov continues: "*It was not just a varnishing of reality. It was a grandiose deception of the Party and the people!*"

Comrade L. I. Lubennikov, former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Karelian-Finnish SSR, and after the entire population of the republic fled to Finland, first secretary of the Karelian Regional Committee, adds: "*In Karelia it was impossible to get a liter of milk for a sick child..... And potatoes and vegetables will soon be in abundance*" (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and others

Documents. C. 382). In other words, under the leadership of our dear Nikita Sergeevich we will raise agriculture! Soon even potatoes, cabbage and cucumbers will be enough! However, at the moment, four months before the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the country does not have enough potatoes.

Comrade I.K. Lebedev, First Secretary of the Stavropol Krai Committee of the CPSU: "*In the Penza region, where I worked, in some villages up to 40% of huts were boarded up. The people had left, there was no one to work*" (ibid. P. 640).

The leaders in their circle recognized that the Russian village was dying out under their wise leadership.

And Russia was dying out along with it.

Key point

People reproach me: you write books about our history, but your style is not scientific.

I agree. I'm not making excuses. I'm just trying to make sense of some of the obscure parts of our recent past. And if I manage to unearth something that might be of interest to the masses, I publish my thoughts and conclusions.

Our history is insanely interesting. But there are people who write this amazingly interesting history in a deliberately tedious way. And they're proud of it.

For me, people should know their history. At least be interested in it. So let someone explain to me why to make it, horrible, wild, monstrous, amazing, dazzling, sparkling, tedious, gray and boring? Let us write in such a way that the people's interest in their history does not fade. Our history. I try to write in a way that is clear and understandable - it is not always possible, but I try.

CHAPTER 8

1

After the end of World War II, not only Stalin's domestic but also his entire foreign policy was a failure. At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, Stalin proposed to place Libya, which had been an Italian colony until 1942, under the guardianship of the Soviet Union. This was Comrade Stalin's way of trying to get colonial possessions in Africa: Libya means bases on the Mediterranean Sea and oil on top of that. The Allies did not support this proposal.

The second option was to build Soviet naval bases in Yugoslavia. But even here there was a bummer: Yugoslavia, which Comrade Stalin could not get his hands on during the last stage of the war and the first postwar years, fell out of Soviet control in 1948.

During World War II, Red Army troops were introduced into Iran. Half of Iran went to Churchill and half to Stalin. The war ended, the British troops were preparing to return home, and Stalin decided to leave his troops in Iran for good. But even this he was not allowed to do, threatening war. Stalin, leaving Iran, tried to cut off an oil-bearing piece of this country, declaring it "Iranian Azerbaijan" and tried to annex it to the Azerbaijan SSR under this pretext, but this was opposed by the U.S. and Britain.

Stalin then decided to take Greece and Turkey under his warm wing. The West responded by creating NATO: We will not give up Greece and Turkey.

Stalin, contrary to the Potsdam Accords he had signed, planned to take over West Berlin. For this purpose, starting from June 24, 1948, he arranged a transport blockade of West Berlin. The West responded by creating an air bridge unprecedented in history. Food was supplied to West Berlin by air, and fuel - there it was, there were century-old linden trees on every boulevard. The people of West Berlin cut the trees on the boulevards and in the parks for firewood, but they did not give up.

Stalin struck South Korea. The West responded with comprehensive military aid and then the landing of powerful military contingents of the US, Britain and their allies on the Korean peninsula. South Korea held out.

Stalin tried to push Communists into the governments of Italy and France. This succeeded, but only partially. In the end, it failed again.

As a result, the USA and Great Britain, which had been allies of the USSR during the war, became its adversaries. Relations with these countries were sharply damaged, and a long period of confrontation, later called the Cold War, began.

2

Soviet historians usually refer to Churchill's speech in Fulton on March 5, 1946 as the reason for the start of the Cold War. Where is Fulton? Look on a map, you won't find it. And who was Churchill? By that time he had already lost the post of Prime Minister of Great Britain, having lost the next parliamentary elections in July 1945, and went into opposition.

Miracles: former Prime Minister Churchill made a speech and the Cold War broke out. So, if he hadn't, there would have been no Cold War. East Germans would not have fled to West Germany and North Koreans to South Korea. And the border guards wouldn't be shooting them in the back. And the Soviet Union would not have supported African princes on the path of socialism. And we would not have built nuclear submarines in unimaginable quantities. (Until 1994, Russia had built 243 nuclear submarines, while all other countries of the world combined had built 221 (Krasnaya Zvezda. December 5, 2001).)

In my opinion, the cause of the Cold War was not at all a speech made by an influential politician. The reasons lay somewhat deeper. The Red Army liberated several countries in Central Europe from the "brown plague", but once liberated, it did not want to return home. Soon in all the liberated countries under the protection of Soviet tanks came to power those guys who were pleasing to Comrade Stalin. They immediately embarked on socialist transformations. And to keep people from fleeing from

of the "happiness" imposed on them, the borders were closed with strong locks and bolts. The order came to the valiant border guards to shoot all those who were running away from happiness.

The ousted Churchill, speaking in the provincial American town of Fulton, merely drew the attention of an honorable audience to the sad fact that "from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, across the continent, the Iron Curtain has been lowered". Churchill merely reported that in those countries where the Red Army had come, small Communist parties had somehow seized power and were striving "to achieve totalitarian control in everything." Which was entirely true.

So it does not matter at all whether some Churchill made a speech in some Fulton or not. All that matters is that the Soviet Union imposed a socialist system on the conquered nations of World War II, that is, an extremely inefficient economic system run either by criminals or by fools with criminals behind them. Socialism was imposed on Poland and East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. However, the fraternal peoples of these countries sought to escape from the friendly embrace at the first opportunity.

This opportunity was close and real. December 21, 1949, all of progressive humanity solemnly celebrated the 70th anniversary of Comrade Stalin, the great genius of all times and peoples. In the hearts of many there was hope: Comrade Stalin is not eternal, well, three more years will last, well five He must someday complete his service to mankind.

3

And then one day Stalin was gone. Those who plotted against Stalin were neither friends nor associates. They were mortal enemies of each other. The main conspirators against Stalin were Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, but while Stalin was still alive, another conspiracy arose within this group: Khrushchev and Bulganin against Beria.

We are told that Beria was also preparing to seize power. We cannot rule out such a possibility, of course, but no one has yet provided any evidence of this. One thing is clear: pushing and eliminating yesterday's allies, each Kremlin leader strengthened his personnel positions. Comrade Khrushchev succeeded most of all in this endeavor.

On the day Stalin's death was announced, Khrushchev appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov as First Deputy Minister of Defense, having brought him back from exile in the Urals. Khrushchev himself ruled the Communist Party, and two of his old pals from before the war, Zhukov and Serov, had served as first deputies - the former in the Ministry of Defense, the latter in the Ministry of the Interior.

Now Khrushchev's task was to take them both up a notch. And he had to hurry. Stalin's death had revived the people's hopes for for a better for a better life. In the northern, Siberia, the Urals and Far Eastern camps, a wave of terrible uprisings broke out. The cousins and vertukhayevs caught and boiled in iron barrels. Yes, exactly like that: they poured water, lit a big fire and boiled them like sturgeon soup. There was a threat that several uprisings would merge into one big resistance movement, which could not be suppressed, and then hundreds of thousands, or even millions of convicts would break out into the expanses of the Soviet Union. The leaders in the Kremlin faced the question: what to do? By the way, в in recent in recent years there have been reports o that that the population of the Gulag at the time of Comrade Stalin's death was a measly one and a half million prisoners. And it is published supporting documents.

We will not argue with the documents. Let's just remember that by the time of Comrade Stalin's death, in our country, where man breathes so freely, there was not just one Gulag - there were eleven. Even eleven with a tail - with a very long tail. Here is a list of independent from each other main camp directorates and their heads as of March 5, 1953:

1. Main Directorate of Camps (Gulag), chief - Comrade Dolgikh I. I. И.
2. Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps (GULZhDS) - Comrade A. A. Smolyaninov.

3. General administration camps Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Industry Camps (GULGMP) - Comrade N. A. Dobrovolsky.

4. Main Directorate of Industrial Construction Camps (GULPS) - Comrade A. Komarovsky.

5. General construction management construction in Far North Comrade I. L. Mitrakov.

6. Main Directorate of Forest Industry Camps (GULFP) - Comrade Timofeev M. M.

7. Main Directorate of Hydro-technical Construction Camps (Glavgidrostroy) - Comrade Rapoport Ya. Д.

8. Main Directorate of camps for the construction of oil refineries (Glavspetsneftestroy) - Comrade Barabanov V.A.

9. Main Directorate of Mica Industry Camps (Glavsluda) - Comrade I.A. Karasev.

10. Main Directorate of Asbestos Industry Camps (Glavasbest) - Comrade A. P. Mityukov.

11. Special Main Directorate (SGU) - Comrade Kharitonov FP.

The Main Directorate for the Construction of Highways (GUSHOSDOR), which also had its own camps, was adjacent to these main directorates. The labor force of GUSHOSDOR was not entirely from the camps, but partially, or rather predominantly.

In addition to the main directorates, there were separate directorates that were not subordinate to the Gulag, including:

- Prison Department - Comrade Kuznetsov M. V.
- Directorate of Special Institutes - Comrade A. Zavenyagin.

II.

If all all of this went up in flames, if
if millions masses
prisoners broke out on the outside - not no
more the country a new civil war.

4

So, the four conspirators got rid of Stalin, but the question of what to do next split this coalition in two. Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria and Lieutenant General Malenkov were calling for a single

side. Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin and Lieutenant General Khrushchev - in the exact opposite direction.

Bulganin and especially Khrushchev were ardent supporters of preserving Stalin's personality cult. Beria and Malenkov were ardent opponents. On the second day after Stalin's funeral at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee Malenkov said: "*We consider it mandatory to stop the practice of the cult of personality.*"

Let us not be under any illusions: both these four and many thousands of people of lower ranks were drenched in people's blood up to their nostrils. Some of them - for example, Beria - spilled a moderate amount of blood of their compatriots. Others - for example, Khrushchev - spilled immeasurably more. But it was not a question of volume - the blood of innocent victims was on the hands of each of the leaders - it was a question of how to survive the country in the current situation.

Immediately after Stalin's death, a rapid departure from Stalin's practice of governing the country began. This process was led by Beria. Stalin had not even been buried yet, hundreds of thousands of people with sobs and cries still rushed to Red Square to say goodbye to the deceased leader, and Beria already on March 6, that is, the day after the announcement of Stalin's death, gave the order to prepare a government decision to transfer all the construction of the main directorates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the civil ministries, and camps and colonies - under the Ministry of Justice.

Beria destroyed the system of eleven gulags decisively and quickly. On March 21, 1953, he sent a draft decree to the government to stop work on twenty-three no-needed "great construction sites of communism". Among them were the Main Turkmen Canal, the Volga-Ural gravity canal, the "dead road" Chum - Salekhard - Igarka, the Ust-Donets port, the hydroelectric power plant on the Lower Don and others. All these grandiose objects were built by the hands of prisoners. All of them were useless for the country's economy and destructive for nature and for the people who built them.

On March 26, 1953, three weeks after Stalin's death, Beria sent to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee a note on amnesty, which was announced on May 9 of the same year. Under this amnesty, 1 million 181 thousand 264 prisoners were released from prisons and camps, and at the same time the investigation cases of 400 thousand people were closed.

They say that there were many criminals among those who came out of the camps, that crime in the country has increased dramatically.

Yes, there were many criminals among the amnestied, but there were even more innocent people who had been imprisoned for a joke about Stalin or for three unwanted spikelets picked up in the field. Yes, crime rose sharply, but imagine what could have happened if hundreds of thousands of prisoners had broken out of the camps on their own, with weapons, heated by victories over the guards.

But it was not even about the number of amnestied prisoners. Beria broke the entire structure of state planning. Previously, grandiose projects were implemented in the following way: the State Planning Committee calculated labor costs based on the efficiency of forced, slave labor, in accordance with them, the necessary amount of labor force was determined, then the punitive authorities received an order on how many criminals they should catch and for how long to put them in the zones. The order was distributed by republics, krays, oblasts and districts. Each chief from the Minister of Internal Affairs to the district police officer had to fulfill the plan. That is why they were imprisoned not only for three spikelets, but also for "stealing two hundred meters of sewing material" - that is, for a spool of thread.

But there was order, the Communists say. No, comrades, there was no order - there was a total shortage of everything, there were kilometer-long queues for soap and matches, for needles and thread, for galoshes and candles. Servile slave labor is unproductive, and therefore the country did not produce in sufficient quantities anything except weapons. So people stole spikelets from the very fields that supposedly belonged to them to save their children from starvation. If

women did not drag "sewing material" from factories from a good life. The competent authorities stayed up at night to catch those who picked up spikelets in the collective farm field, i.e. in their own fields. Although everyone realized that if the spikelets were not picked up, they would be pecked by sparrows, eaten by field mice, or simply rot under the snow.

Even after Stalin's death, slave labor of prisoners was used extensively, but the very principle of staffing the camps had changed, when the number of prisoners was determined by the current needs of the state in free labor. It was Beria who broke this mechanism.

5

On April 4, 1953, Beria signed a top secret order No. 0068, which categorically prohibited the use of physical measures against arrested persons, demanded the elimination of torture rooms in prisons and camps and the destruction of all instruments of . The order warned that not only those operative officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who in the future attempted to use physical measures against arrested persons, but also their supervisors would be brought to trial.

On April 13, 1953 Beria sent a note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee with a proposal to stop the practice of inflating the cult of personality of the leaders - in particular, he proposed not to bring to demonstrations portraits of the highest leaders of the state and the party, especially those who are currently running the country.

During Stalin's lifetime, 13 volumes of his works were published. In May 1953 Beria suggested that the publication of Stalin's works should be discontinued. And it was indeed discontinued, and the typesetting of the next volume was scattered. June 10, 1953 in Pravda appeared in an unsigned article, which for the first time sounded a new term for our propaganda - the *cult of personality*. Stalin's name had not yet been called, but everything was clear - whose other cult dominated and flourished in recent decades? "Pravda" condemned the cult of personality and pointed to those who from now on will lead the country on the right path:

"The essence of our party's policy is set forth in the speeches of G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria and V. M. Molotov". Thus, it was not Khrushchev who first began to fight the cult of personality three years later at the XX Congress of the CPSU, but the newspaper Pravda - three months after Stalin's death.

There is no doubt that it was Beria who initiated the fight against the cult of personality, for it was he who was the master of the Soviet Union at that time. In the very first anti-Stalinist publication, quoted above Pravda unequivocally indicates who was now in charge of the country. But one of these three, Malenkov, was under the complete control of Beria, and Molotov had already been pushed out of the leading roles for several years, although the broad masses of the people were unaware of this. Note that in this article, published in the central organ of the Communist Party

Soviet Union, no mention is made of Khrushchev, although he was the head of the party at the time.

6

The country's main problem was that people were running away from socialism. And if they had no opportunity to flee in peacetime, they ran - and would run again - during the war. Beria must have remembered well the summer of 1941, when the Red Army soldiers surrendered without a fight in hundreds of thousands and millions, abandoning serviceable tanks and planes by the thousands, guns and mortars by the tens of thousands, machine guns by the hundreds of thousands, ammunition, food, engineering equipment, fuel and lubricants by the millions of tons. In a huge country there were no fools to die for collective farm slavery, for party committees and mass shootings, for the Gulag and hunger lines. In the summer of 1941 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army did not consider the war neither Great nor Patriotic. The Red Army went into German captivity almost without resistance and almost in its entirety - only reservists remained. And if it were not for the dull stupidity of Hitler and his "great" generals, the reservists would have surrendered.

Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria understood that in case of a new war, the defeat of 1941 would inevitably be repeated, and it would be repeated for the same reasons: there would be no fools to fight for socialism. And if the new enemy would not be as stupid as Hitler, the Soviet state would perish.

But at that moment, even in peacetime, the Soviet Union and the countries it occupied were rapidly rolling into the abyss. In those years, the only place where mass exodus from the socialist camp was possible was the border between West and East Berlin, and there 447,000 people fled from East Germany alone to West Germany between January 1951 and April 1953. On June 1, 1953, mass workers' strikes swept Czechoslovakia. The workers of Prague, Ostrava, Bratislava were on strike. These demonstrations, like wildfire, spread across the borders to neighboring "brotherly" socialist countries. Poland was next in line, and there it could not have been a single fire. It could have exploded there.

Beria believed that the Soviet Union had no need to interfere in the affairs of other nations - it had to put its own house in order. And for this purpose it was necessary to radically change both foreign and domestic policy, - therefore, to create conditions under which people will work voluntarily, willingly and conscientiously. In this case, the country would become rich and prosperous. In this case, the population will grow. In this case, life in our country will be attractive our neighbors, they will take an example from us, they will respect us. And if war breaks out, our people will fight hard, because they will have something to lose.

Malenkov also supported the same line on getting rid of Stalin's legacy as soon as possible. Even during the war, he was instructed by Stalin to establish trusting personal relations with British Prime Minister Churchill. Remembering the old friendship, Malenkov immediately after Stalin's death appealed to Churchill with a proposal to be a mediator between the USSR and the United States to end the war in Korea. Churchill agreed.

Informal negotiations began and soon yielded results: the Korean War ended.

Malenkov took a decisive step in the matter of providing food for the country. A man under Stalin had to pay for having a cow or a pig, apples or cherries in his garden, for growing dill and cucumbers. Malenkov abolished ruinous taxes on personal peasant property, and allowed homestead plots to increase fivefold! And the people sang:

*And Comrade Malenkov
gave us bread and
pancakes.*

Malenkov advocated withdrawal of Soviet troops from foreign territories, reduction of exorbitant military expenditures, and an end to free military aid to Asian and African princes. Malenkov's proposals by no means meant unilateral disarmament. Malenkov proposed to withdraw Soviet troops from Germany only on condition that the troops of the United States, Great Britain and France would also withdraw from Germany, and Germany would be declared a neutral and permanently disarmed state.

The Soviet leadership had no time for chatter. Three months after Stalin's death, on June 17, 1953, East Berlin revolted. The leadership of the so-called German Democratic Republic fled under the protection of Soviet troops. The uprising spread throughout East Germany, with strikes in 13 of the country's largest cities, including Berlin, Leipzig, Magdeburg and Rostock. Historian Nikolai Zenkovich reports:

The discontent of East Germans was fueled from the outside. Five major West German radio stations called on the population of the GDR to civil disobedience (Zenkovich N. A. Marshals and General Secretaries. Smolensk: Rusich, 1997. p. 289).

Such statements I strongly do not understand. If the calls of five West German radio stations for civil disobedience provoked the people of East Germany to strike and revolt, then we should have turned on ten of our radio stations at full power and called for civil disobedience among the people of West Germany. And ten more radio stations at the same time would have called the proletariat of France to arms! And they would have risen! Wouldn't they? It wouldn't hurt to raise the American working class to proletarian revolution!

But our agitators do not explain why, at the call of the West German radio stations, the people of East Germany rose against the government, while at the call of our radio stations the people of Finland and Germany, Great Britain and Canada did not rise against their governments. Was the power of the radio stations insufficient?

<i>Key point</i>

On March 5, 1946, Churchill gave a speech in Fulton. A lot of water has passed since then, but there are still people who persevere

repeat: if Churchill had not made that speech, there would have been no Cold War. But let's remember that exactly six months before Churchill's speech, on September 5, 1945, Igor Sergeevich Guzenko, a cipher officer of the GRU diplomatic residency, asked for political asylum in Canada. He took with him 129 documents, among which there was not a single secret one. 88 documents were labeled "ss" (top secret), 41 - "ss/ov" (top secret, of special importance). The Canadian authorities refused to believe the documents at first, but when they checked and believed them, they were not the only ones who trembled.

It turned out that GRU agents had gained access to the most closely guarded secrets of the Canadian government, British diplomacy and intelligence, and the American nuclear industry. The leaders of the Soviet Union made the right speeches about peace and friendship, but during World War II they launched a real secret war against their main allies - the United States, Britain, France and Canada.

By the way, July 24, 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, two weeks before the U.S. atomic strike on Hiroshima and a month and a half before the escape of Igor Guzenko, U.S. President Harry Truman told Stalin that the U.S. has weapons of absolutely incredible power. Stalin seemed to ignore this statement and turned the conversation to another topic. To this day there are still people who laugh at silly Stalin. Stalin, in their opinion, did not understand the importance of technological breakthrough in the field of atomic weapons. But at that moment, "silly" Stalin raking paws GRU has already stolen all the necessary technical information that made it possible to create and test the first Soviet atomic bombs RDS-1 (in 1949) and RDS-2 (in 1951) and move on to the creation of RDS-3 and RDS-4.

The real Cold War was the USSR's secret war against its allies during the joint war against Nazi Germany. But if we still believe that not deeds, but someone's speeches were the trigger of the Cold War, it does not hurt to remember that in those turbulent times speeches were made not only by retired Prime Minister Churchill. Speeches were also made by another political figure, who was vested with the full power of the state. And one of his speeches was made not in a distant province, but in the capital.

The name of that figure is Joseph Stalin. The place where the speech was delivered was the city of Moscow, the Bolshoi Theater. The speech was delivered on February 9, 1946 - that is, almost a month before Churchill's speech in Fulton. Even the newspaper "Red Star", the central organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, on March 11, 2006 was forced to admit that "*Stalin's speech of February 9 was perceived in the West as a call for a new confrontation with capitalism*".

Nevertheless, Stalin was by no means the first to call for a confrontation with capitalism. The Cold War, in my opinion, began with the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd - more precisely, with Trotsky's speech at the Second Congress of Soviets on October 26, 1917:

All our hope rests on the fact that our revolution will unleash the European revolution. If the rebellious peoples of Europe do not crush imperialism, we will be crushed - this is certain. Either the Russian revolution will raise the whirlwind of struggle in the West, or the capitalists of all countries will strangle our revolution (Trotsky L. Works. Vol. 3. Part 2. Moscow-Leningrad, 1925. P. 66).

Trotsky was wrong. No capitalists strangled us. We ourselves shouldered the responsibility for the fate of the whole world, while being completely irresponsible for the fate of our own people and our own country.

By fighting for the happiness of the peoples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Germany, Angola and Ethiopia, Indonesia and Egypt, Chile and Vietnam, Korea and Romania, Algeria and Poland, Great Britain and Libya, Estonia and Finland, Latvia and Yugoslavia, Albania and Lithuania, Iran and Turkey, Afghanistan and Argentina, we have undermined the vitality of our own country. Several generations of Soviet people worked to the detriment of themselves and their descendants. And now our dying people have nothing left but to be proud of their heroic past and to celebrate great victories, which in the end turned into total defeat.

CHAPTER 9

1

June 1953, Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria urgently arrived in East Berlin and ordered Colonel-General Andrei Antonovich Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army Group in Germany, to bring tanks into the streets. The uprising in East Germany was crushed. Colonel-General Grechko - the same one who in 1945 at Khrushchev's request gave the collective farm in the village of Kalinovka trophy horses - was immediately promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Soon he would become Marshal of the Soviet Union and twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Grechko went through the whole war, but he did not become a hero in the war. But in peacetime - twice!

Grechko, by order of Beria, crushed the popular protest, but Beria returned to Moscow and said that next time this issue will not pass and we must look for another solution to the German question. The construction of socialism in Germany should be abandoned. Beria proposed to unite Germany and make it neutral.

Beria was right! The attempt to build socialism in East Germany failed. Socialism was built there for exactly 40 years, and it collapsed in one day.

Beria's proposal to abandon the construction of socialism in East Germany was very much disliked by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Zhukov. Yes, they sent Stalin to the next world, but it did not follow that they decided to abandon the Stalinist path. In foreign policy Bulganin, Khrushchev and Zhukov stood firmly on the positions of Stalinism. They were not going to give up East Germany.

Beria returned from Berlin and reported that it would not be possible to build socialism in Germany. The people of East Germany are voting with their feet, leaving for West Germany. Those who remain realize that life in West Germany is better than in East Germany. Sooner or later the Soviet Army will have to leave. It is better to leave now, provided that the Americans also leave, than to wait for the moment when we are forced to leave and they stay. Better to leave now, bargaining for Germany's eternal neutrality.

Comrade Beria was not allowed to preach these ideas for long. Nikita Khrushchev - and he was a cunning man - managed to persuade Malenkov to oppose Beria. How he did it, I do not know. Malenkov and Beria held approximately the same views on the ways of further development of the country and were friendly with each other.

Khrushchev proposed something to Malenkov. Malenkov agreed.

2

So, the uprising in Berlin began on June 17, 1953. Beria suppressed it decisively and quickly, and already on June 25 he returned to Moscow. And on June 26, Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria was arrested in the Kremlin.

*Beria, Beria, Out of
trust.
And Comrade Malenkov
kicked him.*

You can't take a word out of a song. Malenkov was among the participants in the conspiracy against Beria. He will regret it.

Soon Beria's closest associates - Merkulov, Vlodzimirsky, Kobulov, Meshik, Goglidze, Dekanozov - were arrested. The group to capture Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria was personally led by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov. It was impossible to put arrested Beria in prison. In all prisons - his subordinates.

But the army has its own system of detention of arrested persons - brig and disciplinary (during the war - punitive) battalions. Beria spent the first night under arrest in the Moscow garrison brig.

But the head of the brig has no right to receive arrested persons without a corresponding document. The chief who makes an arrest is obliged to fill out a document called a "Note of Arrest". This document contains the date, position of the arrested person, military rank, surname, first name and patronymic, by whom and when arrested, the reason for the arrest, for how long arrested, in what cell to keep, when washed in the bath, the doctor's conclusion about the state of health of the arrested person and the signature of the arresting officer. Zhukov the requirement of the statute did not

and filled out an arrest note. He gave Marshal Beria a 15-day sentence - he had no right to arrest him for a longer period.

Beria did not serve this term. The next day he was transported to the underground bunker of the Moscow Military District headquarters on Osipenko Street. This is on Khoroshevka Street, not far from the place where the Aquarium will soon be built.

I don't know what Zhukov wrote about the bath and what the doctor's conclusion was. Perhaps he just put dashes. We only know what he wrote in the column about the reason for his arrest. Participant of those events, Major-General Zub many years later told that Zhukov, filling out the document, thought for a moment and decisively scribbled: "*For loss of vigilance.*"

3

Seo 2 To 7 July 2 through July 7 1953 July 2 through July 7,
1953 B Moscow took place Plenum of the Central
Committee OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU,
at which at which Beria was accused B
"criminal anti-party and anti-state actions."

On the first day of the plenum, Khrushchev made a proposal to transfer Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov from candidate to member of the Central Committee. The proposal was adopted unanimously.

The Plenum severely criticized the activities of Beria and his accomplices. For the sake of space and time, I will cite here only one accusation set forth in the speech of Comrade Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee:

In the first days after the death of Comrade Stalin, he [Beria. - Author's note] advocated against the cult of personality.... Beria wanted to undermine the personality cult of Comrade Stalin (RGANI. Fond 2. Inventory 1. Case 45. Transcript of the July (1953) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Evening session on July 3, 1953. Published: "Izvestiya TsK CPSU". 1991. № 1-2).

What kind of a bastard would have to be to do such a thing! He wanted to undermine Comrade Stalin's cult of personality! It's not enough to shoot him for that!

On the last day of its work, the plenum adopted a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On criminal anti-party and anti-State

Beria's actions," which stated, in part:

In recent times Beria had become so unbridled that under the banner of combating shortcomings and overreaches in collective farm construction in the countries of the People's Democracy and the GDR he began to openly express anti-colkhoz views, even to the point of proposing the dissolution of collective farms in these countries. In light of the exposed crimes of Beria it becomes clear that he was slipping into hostile positions and in relation to the collective farm system of the USSR (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation APRF). F. 2. Op. 2. Д.

198. Л. 10-14. The document is published in the book: Lavrentiy Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 1999. C. 370).

Let us evaluate at least two of these proposals. Beria did not propose to dissolve collective farms in the Soviet Union, but he was highly critical of the forcible transfer of our sad experience to the agriculture of Poland and East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Vigilant comrades realized in time: he disliked our collective farms too! That's when Zhukov arrested Beria!

Zhukov's personal contribution to the preservation of slavery in our country has not yet been appreciated by anyone. The majority of the population of the Soviet Union at that time lived in rural areas. The entire rural population was forcibly driven into collective farms back in the early 1930s. Those who resisted were killed. By the millions. Collective farms did not pay money for work. Instead of money, they wrote sticks on the payroll. Collective farmers were not supposed to have passports - so they wouldn't run away. The majority of the country's population at that time did not have any personal documents at all _ that is, the majority of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union were not citizens of their own country.

Khrushchev and Zhukov dreamed not only of keeping Russian and Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian, Uzbek and Tajik muzhiks in slavery, but also of spreading this

system to all the countries of Europe which the Red Army had liberated from the
"brown plague."

In the summer of 1953 Beria was not yet against slavery in our country, but in such intentions was suspected and timely neutralized.

4

"Serf" means "fixed," that is, not having the opportunity and right to leave at will. We are told that a Soviet collective farmer differed from a serf in that a collective farmer could not be sold. Correct. However, serfs before 1861 were of four categories: landowners, factory peasants, monastery peasants, and treasury peasants. The landed ones were sold and bought. There was no prohibition to sell factory, monastery and state serfs, but they were not sold for many reasons. So our collective farmer met the definition of a "state serf" in all respects.

Paul I's Manifesto of April 5, 1797 prescribed a three-day long labor: a serf worked for the baron only three days a week. Besides, he did not work on holidays, and there were many holidays in the Orthodox calendar. And in our native collective farms they worked all week long. Who would have taken the liberty of allowing collective farmers to work for Khrushchev and Zhukov only three days a week?

A landed serf could buy himself out of slavery. Or someone else could buy him and make him free. So admirers of talent threw themselves together and bought Taras Shevchenko. And who could buy out a Stalinist-Khrushchev-Khushchev-Jukov serf muzhik from the collective farm?

A landowner could let his men go free. Let's remember the poem "To Whom It's Good to Live in Russia" by Nikolai Alekseyevich Nekrasov:
"The *admiral-widower walked the seas, walked the seas, drove ships...*"
When dying, the admiral wrote a will in which he gave free rein to all his men.

The landlord could replace the bar landlord's duty with a share. Remember "Eugene Onegin": the peasants no longer worked in the bar's fields, but paid him in money or in kind. Only after the death of Khrushchev and Zhukov, on August 28 1974, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved a new regulation

about the passport system. It was decided to recognize Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and other collective farmers as citizens of their country to some extent and to issue them internal passports. Zhukov died two months before the introduction of internal passports for collective farmers. If he had lived to see it, he would probably have been very sad: he arrested Beria, among other things, to prevent the abolition of slavery in the Soviet Union.

5

And now just a little bit of statistics. Compared to the Russian Empire in 1913, grain production in the Soviet Union in 1953 decreased by 3.5 million tons per year, the number of cows - by 4.5 million heads. This is not the evil fiction of a vile anti-Soviet, but the speech of Comrade V. V. Matskevich at the June (1957) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Comrade Matskevich V. V. V., Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Minister of Agriculture, member of the CPSU Central Committee (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 633).

At their secret gatherings, the leaders recognized that in matters of agricultural production there are still some shortcomings. Propaganda insisted that "Stalin took Russia with a plow", and the leaders of the country at their meetings did not hide from each other that their wise leadership lowered the country much lower than that plow.

It should be kept in mind that cows have not just become fewer over these 40 years. The cow of 1913 is one thing; she, the nurse, was cared for individually. And a skinny, bony Soviet cow in a 1953 collective farm herd is something else. Tsar Nicholas had no collective farms, no tractors and combines, no automobiles in agriculture. He had no millions of tons of fertilizers. He did not invest any state money in agriculture, he did not hold meetings in the Kremlin on livestock farming, he did not award orders to agricultural leaders.

In the early 1930s, Comrade Stalin and other comrades destroyed kulakdom as a class. Destroyed in the truest sense. And why? Because the kulaks were hiding bread, hindering

to build a new life. Surprisingly, but under Tsar Nicholas Alexandrovich the same kulaks did not hide bread for some reason, and did not prevent anyone from building anything.

6

After Stalin's assassination, Marshal Beria was the most powerful politician in the Soviet Union. Beria's arrest and removal from power was a coup d'état. It was carried out by a small group of military men. This group included:

- Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov,
- Colonel-General of Artillery Nedelin,
- Colonel General Moskalenko,
- Lieutenant Generals Batitsky and Biryuzov,
- Major Generals Baxov and Brezhnev,
- Colonel Zub,
- Lieutenant Colonel Yuferov.

Zhukov was the first to be promoted: a week after Beria's arrest, he was promoted from candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee to member of the Central Committee. On August 3, 1953, a month or so after the coup, Moskalenko received the rank of General of the Army, Batitsky and Biryuzov - the rank of Colonel-General. All three would become Marshals of the Soviet Union a few years later. The next day, August 4, 1953, the other members of the conspiracy received their next military ranks. Colonel General Nedelin became Marshal of Artillery, Major General Brezhnev became Lieutenant General, Colonel Zub became Major General, and Lieutenant Colonel Yuferov became Colonel.

Six years later, Nedelin will receive the title of Chief Marshal of Artillery, another year later he died at the spaceport during the explosion of rocket 8K64.

In two decades, Lieutenant General Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich, having broken through to the pinnacle of power, skipping the rank of colonel-general, will confer on himself the rank of army general, two more years later

- Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Speaking of Brezhnev. Some of our leaders had an excellent sense of humor, and the undoubted leader here was, understandably, Comrade Stalin. Before Brezhnev was struck down by marasmus, he also appreciated

a good joke and liked to joke himself. In 1964, Brezhnev overthrew Khrushchev and seized the main leadership position of the Soviet Union. At the top, everyone who had ever opposed Brezhnev was dispersed. True, now they were no longer shot, just kicked out of the upper floors of the pyramid of power. And Comrade Suslov decided to specify: with what wording to expel?

Brezhnev, not thinking long, replied, "For negligence."

7

In December 1953, the trial took place - understandably, in private. The chairman was Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev Ivan Stepanovich. He personally read the death sentence to Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria, Army General Merkulov, Colonels-General Goglidze and Kobulov, Lieutenant Generals Vlodzimirsky and Meshik, former Soviet Ambassador to Germany, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR Dekanozov^[1]. Colonel General Batitsky personally shot Beria.

So, in June 1953, Bulganin and Khrushchev with the hands of Zhukov, Konev, Nedelin, Biryuzov, Moskalenko, Batitsky, Brezhnev and other comrades made a coup d'état. From the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Internal Affairs was thrown Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria. He was exposed, incriminated, slandered, crushed and destroyed.

I am putting the conspiracy against Beria "in special production" - I hope that someday I will write a book about this historic event. There will be time - we will return to this fascinating topic. Now I will only note that our country in its history had many chances to change the direction of development for the better. All these opportunities were missed. One of these opportunities arose after Stalin's death with the actual coming to power of Marshal of the Soviet Union Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria. Beria planned to put the USSR on the same path of development that Communist China took much later, and as a result became an economic superpower.

But we've had some pretty bad luck here, too.

Key point

Even during the reigns of Lenin, Sverdlov, and Trotsky, a system had developed that allowed Soviet leaders to bribe their party cronies. The bribery was carried out along many lines.

The highest ranking leaders, in addition to dachas and luxurious apartments, had apartments in the Kremlin (it was considered a sign of the highest position). Leaders of lower rank were allowed to live in the apartments of tsarist ministers and generals. In the republican and provincial centers, the housing issue was solved according to the same principle - every cricket knows his own place: one was given a governor's palace, another a merchant's mansion, another a landowner's estate.

Party leaders were guaranteed the most qualified medical care, including that abroad. For party leaders were opened special sanatoriums, special clinics, special distribution centers, special restaurants.

The leaders knew how to have fun. Future exposé of Stalin Fyodor Raskolnikov, being the commander of the Baltic Fleet, rolled feasts on board the royal yacht "Standard" with the appropriate scale of such a place.

Among the many ways of bribery was a very vulgar one. It was called the blue envelope. For leaders of all ranks there was a so-called party maximum - a level of monetary income that could not be exceeded. If you got more than the party maximum, give the surplus to the party communal fund! Let the population know that the country is headed by the spineless! The people and the party are united!

But how is the proletarian leader to live on the remaining pittance? The Party found an answer to this question. Once a month, each leader received a blue envelope. Why blue? Because it was once established that way. The envelopes later became white, gray and brown, but they were still called blue.

There was money in the envelopes. According to rank. This money was not subject to the party maximum. Neither in any declarations nor in any statements was this money accounted for. It was a real bribe - only it was not a lower-ranking person giving a bribe to a higher-ranking one, but vice versa. This achieved monolithic unity of the party ranks.

After Stalin's death, Beria and Malenkov decided to abolish the blue envelope system. Already with this decision Beria turned the majority of party functionaries against himself and signed his own death warrant - party comrades suddenly discovered that Beria was a scoundrel, a sadist and a lecher. With this one decision, Malenkov incurred the wrath of the entire Soviet officialdom. Thus Beria and Malenkov gave Khrushchev an opportunity to play on the deepest strings of the official souls and strengthen their positions.

CHAPTER 10

1

In September 1953, the next plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held. The agenda: the development of agriculture. The plenum did consider the issues of agricultural development, and they were indeed the main issues in its work.

But this plenum also considered other, no less important issues. People loyal to Khrushchev spread among the members of the Central Committee, gathered in the Kremlin, a short news: the most important thing - the well-being of the servants of the people - was encroached upon by the sex maniac Beria and the confused Malenkov. And why? No firm hand. If Nikita Khrushchev had all the power in his hands, he would not have allowed the abolition of blue envelopes. But all is not lost. Let's give power to our dear Nikita Sergeyevich - he will correct this mistake.

And the members of the Central Committee decided: collective leadership is good, but a firm (and generous) hand is better. This is where the collective leadership established after Stalin essentially ended.

But it was indecent in 1953 to declare Khrushchev General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee after this position had just - in October 1952 - been abolished. What to do if the new leader could not be called General Secretary? And so, on September 13, 1953, instead of the abolished post of General Secretary, the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee was established by the decision of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, bypassing the CPSU Statute. This position was taken by Khrushchev, who first of all restored the system of blue envelopes.

2

Khrushchev faced the same problems that Stalin had faced earlier. The main problem, I remind you, was that the country could not feed itself. Khrushchev had his own plan for solving the food problem: to create new collective farms in Kazakhstan, to throw the army, students, volunteers to the rise of virgin lands

(voluntarily and compulsorily), machinery, fertilizers, appropriations, spare parts, fuel. And plow the vast black earth steppes, which no one had ever plowed before.

Khrushchev decided to create the same collective farms where people had no incentives for creative labor. Khrushchev decided to create new collective farms, but where there were no roads, electricity, water, housing, schools, post and telegraph, medical facilities, and everything else. The transfer of millions of people to deserted areas gave rise to many demographic and social problems: settlers lost social ties and could not create families (among the first virgin farmers the majority were men), having no opportunities for proper recreation, many quickly became drunk and degraded. Police stations did not appear in those areas immediately, and there was virtually no one to control the crowds of men who were driven to the virgin lands.

Tremendous funds were spent on the development of virgin lands, but Khrushchev's scheme resulted in poverty for the central regions of Russia, from where people, machinery, construction materials, fertilizers, and fuel were taken to the virgin lands. A significant outflow of able-bodied male population of reproductive age from the central regions of the Soviet Union aggravated the already difficult demographic situation in the country, which had barely recovered from the war: according to some data, after the end of the campaign to develop virgin lands, about six million Russians and Ukrainians who had come from the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR remained in the Kazakh SSR alone.

Besides, this idea turned out to be an ecological disaster for Kazakhstan. Thousands of years old chernozems were plowed and received unprecedented harvests, but these harvests could not be harvested - there was not enough grain harvesting equipment. What was harvested could not be transported because of the lack of roads. There was nowhere to store what was taken out - there were no elevators for such a large amount of grain. We started to build elevators, and this was a work for several years. While they were being built, steppe storms blew out the black soil: all neighboring regions washed black mud from their streets and squares, from their windows, walls and roofs.

That was the end of the experiment.

3

The position of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee will be restored after 13 years, but this will happen after Khrushchev's overthrow. At the same time, the Presidium of the Central Committee will receive its original name - Politburo of the Central Committee. This will be later. In the meantime, we are looking at the times when Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria was declared an enemy and a spy and liquidated.

After Beria's arrest, Malenkov condemned his former comrade: they say that he was a bad man. Perhaps very soon afterwards Malenkov regretted what he had said: Beria was overthrown, but then Malenkov himself began to be slowly squeezed out of power.

However, it was not so easy to overthrow Malenkov - not everyone defected to Khrushchev's side. Malenkov still had his supporters. And not everyone could be bought for a blue envelope. There were quite a few high-ranking executives who understood: a blue envelope was good, but where would we dance under Khrushchev's leadership? Before, one could hope for a World Revolution, but the advent of nuclear weapons put an end to these dreams. It was clear that the Soviet Union could no longer invade developed countries without risking a crushing nuclear strike. And if this was so, it was necessary to look for other ways of development.

Malenkov tried to find a new path.

4

On March 12, 1954, Comrade Malenkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said something monstrous in a speech before the electorate. He said that in the third world war, if it starts, there will be no winners. The massive use of nuclear weapons would lead to the death of world civilization.

It was the statement of a vile confounder, a perverter of the great and bright ideas of communism. It was an attempt to gain cheap credibility with those who were unwilling to fight against the exploiters of the working class, who did not burn with the desire to die with a smile on their lips in the holy war for the great future of all mankind. What do you mean there will be no victors? That's not true! We are not afraid of war! We will win any war! Let the warmongers know: we will not be behind the price!

The next day, March 13, 1954, marked exactly six months since Khrushchev became First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev was known to be a fanatical Stalinist. On that day he struck Malenkov and his supporters two blows back at once. True, those blows were not visible to the uninitiated and were struck as if not at Malenkov. The strategy of indirect action in its purest form.

That is what the first blow was. On the same day, Khrushchev summoned Fyodor Vasilievich Konstantinov, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, to his office and ordered him to immediately reprint Stalin's textbook "Historical Materialism", slightly shortening it, throwing out the minor things, so that the idea of the inevitability of the victory of the World Revolution would shine even brighter.

The order was fulfilled rapidly. Under Stalin, the textbook was published in 200,000 copies, but Khrushchev, a loyal Stalinist, was not enough. Give me a million!

The composition of the authors of the textbook was again not specified. The book was signed, as in the last time, simply and uncomplicatedly: the authors. Its central idea remained the same, purely Stalinist, without changes:

If the imperialists decide to go crazy and try to start a new world war, their adventure will lead to the collapse of the entire system of world capitalism ...

Only with the disappearance of the imperialist states will attempts at military interventions disappear.....

The capitalist environment will only disappear as a result of socialist revolution in all major capitalist countries ...

The October Socialist Revolution is not only a revolution within the national framework, it is by its very nature an international revolution, a part of the world proletarian revolution. It was with the victory of the Soviet revolution that the epoch of the world proletarian revolution began. The October Socialist Revolution opened the epoch of proletarian revolutions in the countries of capitalism, it opened the epoch of colonialism.

anti-imperialist revolutions that are part of the world proletarian revolution ...

October revolution was the beginning of the world proletarian revolution and the basis for its development.

Further - in the same spirit. The book contains 58 lengthy quotations from Stalin's works. In the preface it was reported that "*historical materialism gives the only true, scientific answer to the most general, fundamental theoretical and methodological questions*".

That was the answer to the confused Malenkov. The only true scientific answer. The book was recommended for study in all institutes and universities, military schools and academies. The book became the granite foundation of our ideology.

The second blow was more sophisticated. Everyone knows that any ideology is only worth something if it can defend itself. After the overthrow of Marshal Beria, the history of the bloody punitive organs of the Soviet Union was decisively and quickly ended - and immediately started with a clean slate. There is no going back to the past! No more hated NKVD, OGPU, NKGB, SMERSH and other punitive institutions. Now our ideology will be defended by a completely different type of organization. With the democratic name "committee". The Committee for State Security.

KGB.

On March 13, 1954, Khrushchev signed a decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the creation of the KGB. Khrushchev promoted Colonel General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, Hero of the Soviet Union, to the post of KGB head. A man from his own team. An old friend since September 1939, since the time of his work in Kiev.

Those who do not believe in the possibility of a World Revolution, those who express conciliatory and defeatist sentiments, those who do not agree with our ideology, will now have to deal with an organization called the KGB.

<i>Key point</i>

But still these measures to overthrow Malenkov and all those who shared his views were clearly not enough. And then Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov intervened in the battle of the titans. On March 12, 1954, the day Malenkov addressed the voters, Zhukov called Khrushchev and asked to receive and listen.

The meeting took place the next day, March 13, 1954, just after Khrushchev had signed the decree establishing the KGB and the decision to publish Stalin's textbook Historical Materialism, which tells of the imminent victory of the World Revolution that will begin as a consequence of World War III.

Zhukov reported to Khrushchev that in the post of first deputy defense minister wasted no time, that much has been done, that he is ready in practice

- During the exercise, to prove that the Soviet Union can win nuclear war. It takes exactly six months to complete the preparations.

Zhukov was given the time and authority to complete the preparations.

CHAPTER 11

1

At dawn on July 13, 1954, at 5:41 a.m., the 128th Gumbinnen Rifle Corps of the 28th Army of the Belorussian Military District was raised on the alert. The commanders and chiefs of staff of two divisions, one brigade and all sixteen regiments, both those directly subordinate to the corps commander and those belonging to the divisions, were summoned to the citadel of the Brest Fortress.

In those years, the fortress served as a cantonment site for the command post and headquarters of the rifle corps, a communications center, combat and support units, corps and division warehouses, a hospital, a repair base, a brig, and storage facilities for military equipment. During the past war, the defense of the Brest Fortress could have become an example of indomitable courage and a symbol of heroism of Soviet soldiers. Instead, it became one of the most shameful episodes of the war, in which the tragic consequences of the crimes of the authorities were highlighted with a particularly incisive brightness.

Not even ten years have passed since the end of the war, and the shame of the so-called "defense of the Brest Fortress" has not yet been forgotten. That is why it was not customary to remember what happened here in the summer of 1941. The time to pull the card had not yet come, and by that time no one had thought of calling the monstrous disgrace a heroic feat. No one thought of building monuments, lighting an eternal flame, opening a museum, or leading crowds of young enthusiastic patriots here.

In 1954, the fortress was simply a huge stationary military camp, like that of Rome, crammed with troops, military equipment, ammunition, and other supplies needed to conduct furious offensive operations. The hundreds of casemates of the citadel and the two rings of forts that ringed the central part of the super-powerful fortification ensemble were used as barracks for personnel and weapons storage. The corps headquarters was located in a barracks on the central island. When you leave the commander's office, you find yourself in a curving, receding

somewhere beyond the many twists of a corridor with brick vaults, like the castles of the Prussian Crusaders.

The door of the commander's office swung open. The first deputy bellowed: "Comrade officers!"

Generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels jumped up. Lieutenant General Chizh Vladimir Filippovich, the corps commander, slammed the door. This did not bode well.

The general took off his cap - for some reason his head was shaved, shaved and smelling of cologne. In some other corps this would have been a surprise. But in the 128th Rifle Corps they had not been surprised by anything for a long time. The corps commander looked frowningly at those whom he was to lead into battles and battles in case of war, growled like a company petty officer:

— In columns of three... STAND UP!

It had been a long time since generals, colonels and lieutenant colonels had had to carry out such commands. But they lined up quickly - each of them had worked out and memorized such commands at the level of instincts in their youth. It turned out something like a full-blooded tank company - 49 people: deputy corps commanders, chiefs of artillery, corps headquarters, rear, followed by the commanders of two divisions and one brigade with their chiefs of staff, further - regimental commanders, even further - the chiefs of regimental staffs.

— Na le...VO!

The company turned, rattling its heels, turning from a column of three to an unfolded formation of three ranks.

— First rank! Five steps forward. Step forward. MARCH!!!
Cool...GOM! Get on the stools!!!

Another door slid open, and the commandant's platoon entered with clattering steps. They all wore white coats, obviously borrowed from the hospital. It is known what kind of soldiers are selected for the commandant's platoon. All handsome young men, good-looking giants, all equal to each other. Each has a clean sheet in his left hand. In his right hand - a black cylinder, the volume of a bottle of "Stolichnaya", the palm of his hand barely covers. On the tails of the cylinders are long cords.

— Haircut naked, "like Kotovsky."

The black cylinders turned out to be electric machines, which had been rumored for a long time, but no one had ever seen this miracle of electrical engineering. The commander of the corps had prepared everything in advance: there were enough stools for one row, cables were laid so that all the machines were supplied with current at once. Played, hummed miracle machines, sprinkled on the floor resin curls. One soldier, specially assigned for that purpose, sweeps black, white, red hair from the floor with a broom, another with a bottle of "Shipra" runs along the rows, pumps a rubber pear, refreshes the sheared commanders with a hissing jet.

If you create a hairstyle, it takes time. You have to bring a mirror to a client: look at yourself, are your temples straight or are we going to do them in a corner? And if you cut hair like a sheep, you don't need much time. And why? It seems that the 128th Rifle Corps hasn't gotten lousy yet. But it's not customary to ask questions here. We've been ordered - then you have to.

They cut everyone's hair. Very quickly. Lieutenant-General Chizh Vladimir Filippovich looked over his army and, apparently, was satisfied. In any case, he didn't swear, didn't break any stools. There was a saying about Lieutenant-General Chizh Vladimir Filippovich: Chizhik is a small bird, but he snorts hard.

- All right, comrade commanders. To all units and units the machines have been delivered in plenty, some electric, some ordinary, manually driven. Go back to your units and cut everyone's hair. Start with deputies and staffs. All of them. Mustaches and beards shaved. Each of you is personally responsible for each of your subordinates. Report to me personally when ready. Any questions? No questions. R-r-get out of here!

2

In order to get to the heart of what is going on, it is imperative that we understand what the Soviet Rifle Corps of the first half of the 1950s was all about. If we delve deeply, we will evade our narrative. I will only report that the 128th Gumbinnenskiy Rifle Corps, like any such corps, was a rifle corps in name only. It's like a penknife. At one time people wrote with goose quills. Feathers, like pencils, had to be repaired from time to time. That's what they were for.

folding penknives were invented. Then they switched to steel pens, then to ballpoint pens; they stopped writing with goose pens, and penknives were left for other needs. And so it was here: the corps was called a rifle corps, that is, an infantry corps, but there were no infantry in it, not a single company.

Established on April 21, 1944, at the final stage of the war, the 128th Rifle Corps made its glorious way through Poland, East Prussia to Berlin and on to Prague. During the war, the 128th Infantry Corps was commanded by Major-General P. F. Batitsky, the same one who in 1953 personally sent Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria into oblivion. After the war Batitsky was promoted, and the 128th Rifle Corps was transferred to Brest.

The structure of the corps, as well as the structure of all other corps of the Soviet Army, was constantly being improved, and the combat capabilities of the corps were growing rapidly. In the summer of 1954, the 128th Rifle Corps had not three divisions, as usual, but only two:

1. 12th Guards Mozyr Red Banner Order of Suvorov Mechanized Division;

2. The 50th Guards Stalin's twice Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Rifle Division.

In 1957, all mechanized divisions of the Soviet Army were transformed into tank divisions, and rifle divisions into motorized rifle divisions. In 1954, they were already essentially the same, just they had not yet had time to change their names. Therefore, if you pay attention to the essence, and not to the names, which mislead in , then in composition of the 128th.

The "rifle" corps in the spring of 1954 had two Guards divisions - a tank division and a motorized rifle division, also heavily loaded with tanks. In addition, the corps included:

- 47th Cannon Artillery Brigade (54 M-46 guns of 130 mm caliber and 36 ML-20 howitzers of 152 mm caliber),

- heavy tank-self-propelled regiment (53 IS-3 tanks, 24 ISU-152 self-propelled artillery units);

- Guards mortar regiment reactive artillery (54 BM-24 multiple rocket launchers);

- reconnaissance battalion (armed with PT-76 floating tanks and BTR-40 light armored personnel carriers),

- anti-tank division (100-mm BS-3 guns),
- anti-aircraft division (57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns),
- communications battalion,
- a sapper battalion,
- Pontoon Bridge Battalion,
- Motor Transport Battalion,
- repair battalion,
- medical battalion,
- Chemical Defense Battalion.

The corps has a total of one brigade and 16 regiments, both forming part of the divisions and directly subordinate to the corps commander, including the following regiments:

- 2 heavy tank-self-propelled,
- 2 tank,
- 3 mechanized (motorized infantry on armored personnel carriers with tanks and self-propelled artillery units),
- 3 motorized infantry (motorized infantry on vehicles with self-propelled artillery units),
- 6 artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and mortars. Corps armament (two-division composition):
- 106 IS-3 heavy tanks,
- 48 heavy self-propelled artillery units ISU-152,
- 187 of the newest T-54 medium tanks,
- 94 T-34-85 medium tanks,
- 21 SU-100 self-propelled artillery units,
- 21 SU-76 self-propelled artillery units,
- 48 PT-76 floating tanks.

In addition - 406 armored personnel carriers, 115 armored artillery tractors AT-P, hundreds of guns and mortars, thousands of vehicles and unarmored tractors AT-C and AT-T, tens of thousands of soldiers and officers.

The rifle corps of the first half of the 1950s were powerful highly mobile all-armed formations, with tank and artillery units forming the backbone. In total, the 128th

The "rifle" corps had 88 battalions and divisions - tank, artillery, reconnaissance, engineers, communications, motor transport and others, and only 18 of these battalions were

There were no rifle corps at all. In terms of its striking and firepower, a "rifle" corps - even one with only two divisions rather than three - was far superior to any tank army of the war.

The 128th Rifle Corps was just like everyone else. No better and no worse. But at the end of 1953, real miracles began to happen to it.

3

At the end of 1953, the 128th Rifle Corps had, as it should, three divisions. In December 1953, by order of the First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, the 55th Guards Irkutsk-Pinsk Irkutsk-Pinsk Order of Lenin, thrice Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Rifle Division named after the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR was withdrawn from the 128th Rifle Corps. But the remaining two divisions, as well as artillery brigade, regiments and battalions, directly subordinate to the corps commander, staffed completely, to the last man. After that, persons of Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities who did not speak the language of interethnic communication were replaced by persons who did.

In January 1954, Zhukov's order came to all officers to take immediate vacations. The Soviet Army's vacation system was simple and straightforward:

*It's a cold January
Vanka the platoon leader is going
on vacation. In February, for fun,
The deputies are going on
vacation. The sun is
scorching hot - The deputy
commander is going on
vacation.
The regimental commander is
laughing - He goes on
vacation when he wants.*

And here everyone was sent on vacation in two shifts: the first in January and the second in February. Rarely did anyone get to go on vacation in March.

A murmur went through the officers' ranks: what is this? We can have a vacation even in Antarctica, in the company of

penguins are no strangers to it. It's not about us - combat readiness is falling! Where is it seen that the regiment commander, half of the staff officers, half of battalion, company, battery and platoon commanders are absent at the same time? On the second shift, the first deputy commander, the regiment's chief of staff and the other half of platoon, company and battalion commanders on vacation. And if there's a war? So not only we have such an outrage, but in all regiments of the corps. And in both divisions, the commanders are on vacation. And their deputies. And their chiefs of staff. And Lieutenant General Chizh, the corps commander himself, has been thrown out on leave. In the cold. What's the use of that? Isn't it sabotage? Those who were too vigilant were quickly reprimanded: Shut up! None of your dog's business.

The bosses know what they're doing.

4

A short-term, two-month decline, or even a complete loss of combat readiness, immediately turned into a sharp increase. All the officers returned from vacation, and here they all were at battle stations at once. Without absentees. And the combat training went on as the orders demanded: without relaxations and simplifications.

And commissions to the 128th Corps - one after another, one after another: from the headquarters of the 28th Army, from the headquarters of the Belorussian Military District, from the Main Directorate of Combat Training, from the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, from the Main Artillery Directorate, from the Main Armor Directorate, again from the headquarters of the 28th Army. The corps commander is also not lagging behind: the bird, as we remember, is not very large, but teaches hard.

And alarm after alarm. The dust over the tank ranges of the corps did not have time to dissipate overnight. So much of it was raised during the day that from early morning they started driving tanks in a haze, raising the dust even higher. From firing ranges fired shell casings were taken away by dump trucks. At the artillery range there was a continuous rumble: only a dozen batteries fired, and immediately another dozen took their place and again: fire! Fire! Fire!

All the officers in the corps had an officer's tan as early as May.

What kind of tan is that special officer's tan? Oh, it is when the hands are black-brown, half of the forehead, the face, neck and ears are the color of stained oak with a bronze cast. And the officer himself is all white.

He took off his gymnasphere, and his hands as if in brown gloves: along the line of each cuff a clear division, like a state border.

Tankers have a special tan. The tank helmet covers the ears and neck. That is why a tanker has only a mask on his face like a Negro, but he is still of the white race.

5

Meanwhile, the 128th Corps was reinforced with new units. A separate motorized rifle regiment with a special experimental structure and the most modern combat equipment was added to the corps

— T-10 heavy tanks, SU-122-54 self-propelled vehicles, ZSU-57-2 anti-aircraft self-propelled vehicles, BTR-50P floating tracked armored personnel carriers. The power is unheard of.

And there was also some very tricky structure called "part of Comrade Bobrov". Or simply "Bobrov's household." What part? What farm?

They placed that unit behind high fences. The personnel of the unit were taken to the forest for exercises. A motor transport platoon was assigned for this purpose

— 18 ZIS-151 trucks with awnings. Nobody saw these guys - they were covered with tarpaulins. No one even knew what rank comrade Bobrov had or how big his farm was. If we knew his military rank, we could estimate how many subordinates he had. However, the 18 trucks allocated for the transportation of personnel indicated that Comrade Bobrov's household was no smaller than a battalion.

Then a rumor got around: this part of it is the repairmen who are grimy. But why are those repairmen kept behind a fence? Why don't they show them to anyone? And why no equipment from those repairmen comes out of repair, and why no equipment comes in for repair?

And all because, dear comrades, those repairmen were not quite ordinary. The 3rd division of the 233rd Svirskaya 233rd Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky Engineering Brigade of the RWGC - Reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - was added to the 128th Rifle Corps. And the engineering brigade was not in fact, but only by name. The brigade was armed with carriers 8A11 (also known as R-1) - the first large Soviet ballistic missiles, created on model of German missile Fau-2 under leadership Sergei

Pavlovich Korolev. Having received at his disposal "repairmen", the corps commander could now launch nuclear strikes against the enemy himself, clearing the way for his tanks with the proud name of "Joseph Stalin".

In the meantime, combat training was not even at the limit of human capabilities. There are no such limits - don't be afraid to overdo it, man is capable of anything. Combat training was at the limit of the capabilities of technology. A tank is not a man. It is iron. Unlike a man, it needs care and caress. He must have maintenance. If it were not for this circumstance, we would have driven tanks, armored personnel carriers and armored artillery tractors without stopping.

April went by at this pace. And May. And June. July crept up, and combat training - still at the same frantic pace.

On July 13, 1954, the Corps was put on alert. And the corps felt the difference. Before that, it was alerted once a week, or even twice a week, but those were ordinary alarms, and here it was a combat alarm! The commanders and chiefs of staff, up to and including regiments, were summoned to the citadel of the Brest fortress, shaved naked. And then they ordered to shave all their subordinates. If we take into account the reinforcement units - the experimental regiment, the "Bobrov's farm", and other smaller units temporarily included in the corps - the total number of 36 thousand soldiers will be 36 thousand. All of them for Kotovsky.

And loading.

6

Now. let's figure it out: only in just one experimental motorized rifle regiment of the 128th Rifle corps alone 30 T-10 heavy tanks alone. This is one and a half thousand tons of combat weight (each tank weighs 50 tons) - a whole railway echelon.

In , the corps has 106 IS-3 heavy tanks - that's three more echelons.

48 ISU-152 heavy self-propelled vehicles - two more echelons.

And hundreds of tanks and self-propelled vehicles: T-54, SU-122-54, T-34-85, SU-100, SU-76, PT-76.

And ZSU-37 and ZSU-57-2 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.

And a lot of armored personnel carriers. Again, in the hundreds.

And artillery tractors are visible and invisible. In one artillery brigade alone there are 120 heavy artillery tractors.

Can you imagine an AT-T tractor? It weighs 20 tons. It's based on components and units of the T-54 tank. It's powered by the same tank diesel engine of fantastic power. The AT-T pulls a 130-mm cannon or a 152-mm howitzer-cannon; both weigh 8 tons each. In marching position, the length of the howitzer cannon is 8 meters, and the length of the 130-mm gun is twelve meters. Calculate how many wagons are needed to move one rifle corps.

This corps, like all the others, has 54 BM-24 multiple rocket launchers, and each division has 18 BM-14s. And hundreds of guns, howitzers, howitzer-cannons and mortars. And 4,509 automobiles. And more than thirty thousand haircut Guardsmen with a tan from eyebrows to standing collar.

Echelons were being loaded in such a way that the buffers were ringing. Ten echelons, twenty, thirty.... More and more.

Those echelons ran under the green light. Without stopping. They whistled, bellowed and clattered past stations and semi-stations, frightening aunts and girls with their unheard-of power: was it not war?

In those years, small businesses flourished at small stations and semi-stations. Kind aunts boiled potatoes, mashed them with lard and onions, salted cucumbers, and took the products of their labor to passing trains. Sometimes it was possible to buy a bottle of murky homemade drink from them secretly, hiding from prying eyes. It's a pity those echelons passed by. And songs rattled from the teplushkas:

*The wheels rattled on the tracks,
You waved at me from the slope:
I'll remember, I won't forget,
I won't forget, I won't forget!*

And the echelons were pounding with wheels - from Brest through Pinsk, Gomel, Bryansk, Oryol, Lipetsk, Penza, Kuibyshev to the South Urals Military District.

To the Totsky Proving Ground.

CHAPTER 12

1

In 1736, the Totsk fortress was founded on the Samara River, which the Ural Cossacks called Sakmara. In 1773, during the Pugachev rebellion, the Cossack garrison of the Totsk fortress voluntarily went into the service of the impostor. On March 9, 1774 the fortress was taken by the brigade of Major-General Mansurov Pavel Dmitrievich.

Six decades later, the great Russian historian Pushkin Alexander Sergeevich wrote "The History of Pugachev" and "Captain's Daughter". Gathering materials for his research, Pushkin passed and traveled through the places of former battles and battles from Samara to Orenburg. On this way on September 18, 1833 he stopped in Totskoy stanitsa.

At the beginning of the XX century, a polygon was founded not far from the site of the Totsk fortress. A lot of water has flowed into the Samara River since the times of Pugachev and Pushkin. The name of the river remained the same, and the cities of Samara and Orenburg turned into Kuibyshev and Chkalov. The Totsk polygon was located just between these cities. Echelons of the 128th Rifle Corps were carried here. Unloading at Buzuluk station.

It turned out that the 128th Rifle Corps was to participate in the military exercise "Snowball". The 7th Rifle Corps of the South Ural Military District, consisting of the 73rd Vitebsk Red Banner Mechanized and 270th Demidov Red Banner Rifle Divisions, prepared the defense. The 128th Rifle Corps, transferred from Belarus, had to break the prepared defense, using the most modern means of armed struggle.

2

It is customary to build an army tent camp in a line. The line itself is three, four, five, or even ten rows of tents. Behind these rows are parking lots for combat and transport vehicles, warehouses, kitchens, repair shops, and everything else required to support the lives of thousands of people.

The linear arrangement of military camps has its own reason. Each battalion, each regiment has an open front, it is common to all. At the same time, each battalion and regiment has its own open rear.

Let's say that a battalion of such and such a regiment has to be called up urgently to solve some task. This battalion would not have to wade through the orders of other battalions and regiments, because in front of each battalion, in front of each regiment - a clear field. And if it is necessary to give something to this battalion or regiment - for example, potatoes for camp kitchens or shells for tanks - there will be no problem either: behind each unit, each unit and connection there is also a clear field.

In 1954, at the Totsk range of the South Ural Military District, the front line of the tent city of the 128th Rifle Corps, which arrived from Belarus, and the 7th Rifle Corps, which played the role of the enemy, stretched for many kilometers. And aside from this linear tabor, in a birch grove, was erected general's town. There were not tents - there were prefabricated wooden houses. There were a lot of those houses. The commanders of all Soviet corps were gathered for the exercise. And the commanders of all armies. And the commanders of all military districts and groups of troops. And their chiefs of staff. And the commanders-in-chief of all branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs of staff. And the chiefs of the main and central departments

of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. We also invited our younger "brothers in arms" - representatives of fraternal socialist countries - to admire the spectacle: the top military leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Mongolia, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam and China.

Yeah, and China too. China was the Soviet Union's little brother in those years.

Next to the generals, in the same houses, they put in unknown civilian comrades in glasses, gray striped jackets and ties. These civilians were those who created the most powerful weapons and supervised their production. Among them - minister of medium machine building comrade Malyshev.

Vyacheslav Alexandrovich с deputies и leading designers.

And quite far from the military camp and from the general's town another town was built - a government town.

3

12 September 1954, Marshals of the Soviet Union Konev, Malinovsky, Vasilevsky, Timoshenko, Budyonny, Sokolovsky, Marshal of Poland Rokossovsky, Chief Marshal of Artillery Voronov, Marshal of Artillery Nedelin arrived at the Totsk test site, Marshal of Armored Forces Bogdanov, Air Marshal Zhigarev, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, Army Generals Chuikov, Biryuzov, Grechko, Krylov, Moskalenko and Baghramyan, Colonel Generals Batitsky, Biryuzov, Batov and Golikov.

On the same day, dear foreign guests, leaders of fraternal socialist countries, also appeared here. Representatives of neutral states - military attachés from Finland, Sweden and Afghanistan - were not forgotten. In total, representatives of 16 countries came to the exercises.

13 n September, the presence of Lieutenant General Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was noted in the Government Campus. Exactly one year ago, on September 13, 1953, he took office as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The Snezhok military exercises were in a sense a gift to the first anniversary of his assuming the title of the country's chief leader. Together with Khrushchev flew from Moscow the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Lieutenant General Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov, and the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin.

On the morning of September 13, 1954, the head of the exercise, Marshal Zhukov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, reported on the readiness of the troops and headquarters to conduct the exercise code-named "Snowball". The theme of the exercise: the breakthrough by a rifle corps of a prepared enemy defense using atomic weapons.

4

In the evening of the same day, Zhukov summoned to his field residence the former Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, former Army General and now Chief of Staff of the Siberian Military District, Lieutenant General Shtemenko. A year ago, in the summer of 1953, Zhukov and Shtemenko found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, at the head of a seizure team ordered by Khrushchev, personally arrested Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria. Army General Shtemenko was suspected of being Beria's confidant in the armed forces, so Shtemenko was immediately removed from his post, demoted two ranks and sent to Siberia.

And so it was just the two of them. A marshal and a lieutenant general. Between them - the abyss. And between them there is a table and a map with the plan of an unprecedented military exercise with the affectionate name "Snowball". The map has been moved to the side. In its place is a bottle and two glasses. The appetizer is simple. Front-line.

Fate had divorced them a year ago. But at the same time they had a lot in common, and over the preceding years they had worked together a lot and managed to maintain good relations - as far as it was possible in that environment.

Before the war and in its first weeks, Army General Zhukov was Chief of the General Staff. After the war, Army General Shtemenko was the Chief of the General Staff.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov is First Deputy Minister of Defense, and Lieutenant General Shtemenko was most recently First Deputy Minister of Defense as well.

During the war, Shtemenko headed the Red Army's main think tank, the Operational Department of the General Staff. Shtemenko prepared operation plans, Stalin approved them and sent Zhukov to the front to turn those plans into victories - by swearing, muzzling, tearing off epaulettes and shooting.

Fate has repeatedly brought together Shtemenko and Zhukov at Stalin's nearby dacha in Kuntsevo. A few days before the start of each major offensive, usually deep at night, Zhukov and Shtemenko entered the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and together with Stalin clarified the last details of the upcoming operation. The three of them were deciding the fate of millions of people.

But then came different times. After the war Zhukov was thrown from the top of power, Shtemenko was elevated, but a year before Stalin's death also thrown down. After Stalin's death, Shtemenko almost returned to his former heights, but was again thrown even lower with the loss of two stars on his epaulettes and exiled to the Siberian wilderness.

But I don't envy Zhukov either. He himself had only returned to Moscow from the Urals a year and a half earlier. True, no stars were torn from his epaulettes.

Zhukov returned to Moscow, but by whom? In the war, he was Stalin's deputy. Now Zhukov is Comrade Bulganin's deputy defense minister. And who is Comrade Bulganin?

In 1941, Comrade Bulganin was chairman of the board of the State Bank. In the war Bulganin was a political supervisor - he supervised the actions of the front commanders. He did not lead a single battle, not a single battle, not a single operation, but as a political supervisor he was given military ranks. The very first rank in his life - Lieutenant General, although Bulganin never commanded a department, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, corps, or army, and had no military ranks before. He continued to command no one, he only supervised, but the stars fell on his epaulettes: Colonel-General, General of the Army.

After the war, Stalin gave Bulganin his marshal's epaulettes and gave him the post of Minister of the Armed Forces. (The ministry changed its name several times during those turbulent years: Defense, Armed Forces, Military, Defense again.) Two years later, Stalin raised Bulganin even higher: he relieved him of his duties as Minister and appointed him Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that is, his deputy in the government. After Stalin's death, Bulganin retained his position as deputy head of government, and even returned the post of defense minister, but for people in the military he was always a despised accountant from the Gosbank.

I do not know what the two Stalinist commanders Zhukov and Shtemenko talked about on the evening of September 13, 1954. I would be glad to report, but there is nothing to report. I only know that since that evening their relationship was restored - and they never seriously and spoiled. There was no conflict between Zhukov and Shtemenko, it was their bosses Khrushchev

and Beria didn't share a place under the sun. But Zhukov and Shtemenko had nothing to share. They had a common interest.

Shtemenko's interest is to return to the marshal's position of Chief of the General Staff and receive a rank that corresponded to this position.

Zhukov's interest is to rise above the accountant from the State Bank, whom Zhukov is forced to obey.

The interest of both of them is to develop the armed forces in the way that is necessary from the point of view of higher strategy, and not in the way that the political babblers Khrushchev, Malenkov and Bulganin, who wear gold epaulettes but do not understand a damn thing about military affairs, think. The interest of both of them was to get the army out from under the control of state chatterers.

5

Zhukov had another reason to re-establish business contact with Lieutenant General Shtemenko. During the war, Zhukov surrounded himself with sycophants and sycophants. Zhukov lifted and elevated them, hung on them orders and general's stars. But after the war, when Stalin threw Zhukov from the heights of power, all sycophants and sycophants flee from their benefactor with the speed of tracer bullets that screech in the dark, hitting the concrete wall of the pillbox.

Zhukov remained Marshal of the Soviet Union. Zhukov retained an apartment in a government house in Moscow and a palace-type dacha in the Moscow suburbs. But in the Soviet Union, a man's position was determined not by his rank and not by presence of a palace, but by his position. And Zhukov's position since June 3, 1946 - commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, since February 4, 1948 - the Ural Military District. Compared to what was before - the deepest fall. If the fall has begun, everyone knows how it will end.

Therefore, when the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, came to Moscow for a couple of days to celebrate the new year of 1947, none of those whom he had raised and exalted during the war responded to his invitation. They all knew that Zhukov would not return to the heights of power, and therefore there was no reason to tarnish their reputations with friendship with the disgraced strategist.

But after Stalin's death, Khrushchev put Zhukov back in power. Zhukov took off again. The position of first deputy defense minister gave him the opportunity to remind his former favorites of their so indiscreet behavior in the not-too-distant past. Zhukov remembered everyone. Zhukov pushed each of them into such corners of our great Motherland, where the service was never honeyed.

But now Zhukov needed a new team. Shtemenko was neither a protégé nor a nominee of Zhukov. Shtemenko, like Zhukov, was Stalin's nominee. Shtemenko was not among those who turned their backs on Zhukov at the moment of his fall, and therefore Zhukov had every reason to take Lieutenant General Shtemenko in his new team.

Shtemenko was removed from his post and demoted to lieutenant general by order of Khrushchev. Consequently, Shtemenko could not be a supporter and ally of Khrushchev, and therefore such a general could be useful to Zhukov. In addition, Shtemenko, despite the fall, managed to maintain good relations with many old battle comrades. At that moment Zhukov did not have a reliable team, there were no people to rely on in a serious matter. Shtemenko had them. That's why there was a topic for conversation. It is a pity that no one will ever be able to reconstruct the details.

But I am convinced of one thing: at this meeting - most , at the very end of it, already seeing Lieutenant General Shtemenko off - Zhukov asked if he had a smart general in mind, capable of taking a serious risk in a very big case. Shtemenko replied that he had such a general in mind - Lieutenant General Mamsurov, commander of the 27th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army of the Precarpathian Military District. It was high time to put him on the army.

After shaking hands, Zhukov smiled and winked: everything is in our hands.

Actors

SERGEY MATVEYEVICH SHTEMENKO. Born 1907. Voluntarily joined the Red Army. He was a fighter and a junior commander. In 1930 graduated from the Sevastopol school of anti-aircraft artillery. For incomplete three years passed positions commander of the

platoon, battery, chief of staff of an artillery division and first assistant chief of staff of an artillery regiment.

In 1933 he entered the Stalin Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (since 1943 - Stalin Military Order of Lenin Academy of Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army), from which he graduated in 1937. He commanded a separate training heavy tank battalion. Shtemenko had an exceptional, phenomenal, inhuman memory and outstanding analytical skills, which was the basis for his enrollment in the next year, 1938 in the Military Academy of the General Staff, which Lieutenant Colonel Shtemenko graduated at the end of 1940.

During distribution he asked to be appointed to any command position in any military district, but was sent to the Operational Department of the General Staff of the Red Army. Here he met the beginning of the war.

In the fall of 1941 he was promoted to the rank of colonel. Since June, 1942.

- Head of the 4th direction of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. On November 23, 1942, the day when the mobile units of the South-Western and Stalingrad Fronts closed the ring of encirclement around the German troops near Stalingrad, Colonel Shtemenko was promoted to major general. On April 4, 1943, Shtemenko was promoted to the post of Chief of the Operational Department of the General Staff and the rank of lieutenant general. From that moment on, he personally, under the supervision of Stalin and Vasilevsky, directed the development of all strategic plans of the Red Army.

During the war, Stalin established not just strict, but truly severe order of the General Staff. According to Stalin's schedule, the top leaders of the General Staff had the right to sleep no more than four or five hours a day, the head of the Operations Directorate, Lieutenant General Shtemenko - only in the afternoon, from 14 to 18 hours, and if the fronts are quiet - then until 19 hours.

In 1944, the armed forces of the Soviet Union included 72 all-troops armies, 6 guards tank armies, 174 Rifle, 26 tank, 14 mechanized, 10 artillery, 9 airborne and 8 cavalry corps, 516 rifle (not

including motorized rifle, airborne and mountain rifle divisions), 105 artillery and mortar and 26 cavalry divisions, as well as 44 fortified areas. In addition - 18 air armies, 7 air defense armies, fleets and flotillas, military districts, 10 departments of defense construction, which were transformed into 10 engineer armies, hundreds of aviation corps and divisions. Shtemenko remembered the names of all commanders and commanders up to and including the division, knew the state and position of each front and fleet, each army and flotilla, each corps, each division. The situation was changing every day, every hour, every minute, and Shtemenko had time to cover and memorize everything.

But that's not all. Intelligence worked in every battalion, in every artillery division, in every regiment, in every brigade and division, in every corps, army, flotilla, fleet, front, intelligence of partisan detachments, military strategic agent intelligence on enemy territory. All information flowed into the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, which every six hours issued a summary: this German division has departed, this one has arrived, this one has been transferred from that area to this one, this division has fresh forces, this one is shattered.

There is an age-old curse hanging over military intelligence analysts: they are always to blame for everything. If you report immediately, the information is inaccurate, unreliable, unverified. And they'll ask you for it. If you report verified information, it means you are late with the report, it means the information is not the latest, it means the situation has already changed. And a question straight to the forehead, like a punch between the eyes: why didn't you report earlier?

In war, information about the enemy is always sketchy, approximate, doubtful. Here, too, everything is constantly and rapidly changing. Shtemenko was able to cover all this. The situation he reported personally to Stalin two or three times a day and no records were not used.

Once Stalin, being in a good mood, in the circle of associates decided to fight with Shtemenko in the knowledge of the situation at the front. The duel ended in a draw. Perhaps Shtemenko diplomatically decided not to show the surrounding superiority over the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But it is possible that in this .

competition there could be no winner: if Shtemenko's memory was inhuman, Stalin's memory was simply diabolical.

On November 17, 1943, Stalin promoted his favorite to the rank of Colonel-General. It took less than a year from the first general's star received by Shtemenko to the third.

In November 1943, Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin met in Tehran with the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister. Of course, Colonel General Shtemenko was always close to Stalin to keep the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed of the situation at the fronts.

In August 1945, the command of the 1st Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet made a mistake that almost led to the complete collapse of the career of Colonel-General Shtemenko, the creator of all the strategic plans of the Red Army.

A naval landing on South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was being prepared. The plan envisioned the landing of marine units from boats and small warships - patrol boats, minesweepers, small hunters. After that, huge dry cargo ships - the same ones that before and during the war from Nakhodka and Vanino transported slave labor, barbed wire and guards to Kolyma and Chukotka - were to approach the captured piers.

The big bosses in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk figured out what the paratroopers landing on the islands needed in the first place. There could be no two opinions: ammunition and grenades. And in the second place? In the second place - heavy weapons, which could not be brought by torpedo and patrol boats: mortars and 45-mm guns, mines and shells for them, flamethrowers to smoke the Japs out of concrete fire points. And then - means of demining and engineering equipment; it would be good to throw on each island and means of transport: motorcycles and American jeeps, fuel for them, means of communication to organize interaction - well, and everything else.

As they decided, so they did.

The preparation of the landing operation was carried out in deep secrecy. The people engaged in loading weapons, ammunition and other equipment could not have known the plans of the high command - they were ordered to load, and they loaded. In strict accordance with the order of the high command, they loaded the most important things. That's why the Marines

found themselves under fire from Japanese garrisons with only the small supply of ammunition and grenades that the men carried on their backs. The valiant Marines fought with minimal ammunition, without heavy weapons or anything else necessary to capture, hold and expand bridgeheads.

Everything that was necessary for fighting, everything that was loaded in the first place, ended up at the very bottom of the holds and was piled on top with hospital tents and cots, sacks of flour, rice and potatoes, barrels of cucumbers and cabbage, crates of stew and condensed milk.

The Japanese fought fiercely, because Russian blood was spilled there, even by our generous standards, in excess of any measure. Many people suffered for this, including Colonel-General Shtemenko. He himself was in Moscow. He himself did not prepare this "brilliant" operation. But Shtemenko was responsible for all the plans, and his fate hung on a thin string. Only a few months later, Stalin changed his anger to mercy.

On April 27, 1946, the Operational Directorate of the General Staff was transformed into the Main Operational Directorate, with Colonel-General Shtemenko remaining its chief. On November 12, 1948, Shtemenko was appointed Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces. He was promoted to the rank of General of the Army, but held the position of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Army General Shtemenko was the youngest Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in its history. At any time Stalin could make General of the Army Shtemenko a marshal - the position he held allowed - but he could not. Two of Shtemenko's predecessors in this position were examples of this.

Colonel General Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, was promoted to the rank of General of the Army by Stalin on January 18, 1943. Twenty-nine days passed, and Stalin put the diamond-studded star of Marshal of the Soviet Union around Vasilevsky's neck.

After Vasilevsky, Army General Antonov was appointed to this post. He was Chief of the General Staff at the final stage of the war, in its most advantageous period, when orders and ranks

were given out with special generosity. However, Antonov never became a marshal.

Army General Shtemenko could count on both the first option and the second. A year passed, the second, the third, the fourth.... And now Army General Shtemenko has been working at the marshal's post for the fifth year in a row, fulfilling the duties of a marshal, giving orders and instructions to marshals, but he is still not a marshal himself.

Army General Shtemenko had a good friend - Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich. In 1952, sensing something wrong, Stalin began to actively weaken the positions of his closest associates. The main blow - on Beria and his clan. Among those who suffered this Stalinist blow, was and Army General Shtemenko. On June 17, 1952, he was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff and appointed Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army Group in Germany: from the post of Marshal of the Soviet Union Shtemenko was moved to the post of Colonel-General. In addition, he was expelled from Moscow to distant foreign possessions.

In October 1952 at the XIX Party Congress Stalin dramatically expanded the composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, but Stalin's opponents dragged in the Central Committee groups of their supporters. In other words, if Stalin succeeded in subduing the Presidium of the Central Committee, the floor below, in the Central Committee itself, will sit politicians of a completely different tone. Khrushchev, among others, among the candidates for membership in the Central Committee held disgraced Marshal Zhukov, and Beria gave the same honor disgraced army general Shtemenko.

Immediately after Stalin's death, Khrushchev brought Zhukov back from the Urals to Moscow and made him first deputy defense minister, and Beria brought Shtemenko back from Germany and made him first deputy chief of the General Staff.

In June 1953, Khrushchev overthrew Beria with the hands of Zhukov. The entire Beria clan was defeated and dispersed, but Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko was lucky. He was not shot among the closest associates of Beria and was not even arrested. He was simply demoted to lieutenant general and sent to serve in Siberia.

CHAPTER 13

1

If we are facing a fortified castle, fort or fortress, then we can seize this stronghold in two ways: by attack, that is, by storm, if in German expression, or by exhaustion.

You have to pay for the time you take. Sometimes a castle or fortress has been besieged for several years and still could not be taken.

You have to pay for an assault with blood. Our commanders at all times preferred assault, because time is expensive, and the blood of soldiers is of little value.

If we venture into the assault, it will consist of two phases.

First, you have to get inside the fortress somehow: climb over the wall or break through it.

Secondly, we must deal with the defenders of the fortress.

At the very beginning of the 20th century, a new phenomenon emerged in the practice of warfare - a continuous front that could extend for hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, flanked by the sea, a mountain range, the border of a neutral state or another insurmountable barrier for land forces. The fortress was now the entire territory defended by the enemy. Therefore, any offensive operation of the 20th century, like the storming of a fortress, fell into two main stages.

First, you have to crack the enemy's defenses.

Secondly, it is necessary to break into enemy territory through one or more breaches. For this purpose it is necessary, as soon as there is a breach in the defense, to introduce mobile formations into the battle. Their task - rapidly moving forward, bypassing the main enemy forces, threatening their flanks and rear, to close the ring of encirclement behind the enemy troops or press them to the sea, cut off supply routes, deprive the opportunity to continue the fight, go to the most vulnerable vital centers of the enemy country.

2

So, the first thing is to break through the defenses. During World War I, all the belligerent armies tried to break through the enemy front, but only some armies succeeded in a few exceptional cases. By and large the fronts both "dawned" at the beginning of the war on the borders of the great European empires, and held until the very end of the war, until one side ran out of vital resources or the desire to fight until victory.

During World War II, the German army captured vast territories by striking before the enemy had time to take up defenses or bypassing such defenses. The German army achieved astonishing success in the war against the Soviet Union, but only because the Red Army did not want to defend itself. It was always, from the very first day of the war, trying to attack.

But as soon as the Red Army, learned from bitter experience, went on the defensive, the German war machine immediately began to stall. Examples of this are the defense of Kiev, Leningrad, Moscow, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, Stalingrad, Kursk. And here the German army faced problems. It was catastrophically unprepared for war. The German army had neither the theory of defense breaching, nor the appropriate tool for such work.

But the Red Army in the first period of the war also not every time managed to break through enemy defenses. After the war, our strategists hid the plans for such operations with shooters resolutely cutting through the enemy's rear in the deep bowels of inaccessible secret vaults. They hid not only from their contemporaries, but also from future generations, passing off daring plans that could not be realized as battles of local importance.

And when there was a misunderstanding when composing the official version of the war, the strategists declared: yes, we put hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the ground here, burned millions of shells, lost thousands of tanks and airplanes. But we did not do it for the sake of breaking the enemy defenses, not to encircle and defeat the enemy, just our gigantic forces distracted the attention of small enemy forces, which were standing here in defense and did not interfere with anyone.

This is exactly what our great commanders did with respect to many of bloody battles of 1942 and 1943. Shamefully failed

offensive operations they after the war in their memoirs softly called incomplete, or even declared them distracting actions. The most vivid example is Operation Mars, which began near Rzhev in November 1942. The purpose of the operation was to encircle Army Group Center. The operation was carried out at Zhukov's insistence and under his personal leadership; it ended in a monumental failure and in Zhukov's memoirs it was called a diversionary operation.

3

But in the final stage of the war, the Red Army had mastered the art of cracking any defense. The recipe for success was as follows. It was necessary to concentrate 7-8 thousand guns on the breakthrough areas. Density at the breakthrough sites - 300-350 guns per kilometer of the front. The record - 468 guns per kilometer. Even before the concentration of artillery it was necessary to bring tens of thousands of tons of shells to the firing positions.

All this firepower was suddenly unleashed on the heads of the enemy. Artillery preparation at the final stage of the war was usually short, one and a half to two hours, or even less, but extremely intensive. Without any interruption the artillery preparation developed into artillery support. At first, the front edge of the enemy's defense was worked for a couple of hours, and the moment of completion of the artillery preparation became the moment of the beginning of the attack. In front went heavy breakthrough tanks, followed by heavy self-propelled guns, then - dense chains of infantry. The task of the artillery was to lay down a fire shaft of continuous bursts ahead of the advancing troops. The rampart of fire could be double. The point is that while from the first enemy trench to the depth of the enemy's defense rolled one shaft of fire, the enemy could wait out the artillery preparation in shelters, and then again took up firing positions to repel the attack. But the first shaft was followed by a second one. And then - tanks, self-propelled vehicles, infantry.

When the infantry with tanks and self-propelled vehicles of direct support moved several kilometers deep into the enemy's defenses, through the breach entered into battle tank and mechanized corps, and sometimes entire tank armies.

Ideally, it was necessary to make a "clean breakthrough", that is, to break the enemy's defense to the full depth so that the tank and mechanized formations did not waste forces to complete the breakthrough, and freely without obstacles went to the operational space.

4

The method is excellent, but it had serious disadvantages. First of all - a monstrous waste of material resources. During the war, the Red Army used mainly the following guns to break into the enemy's defenses:

- 76-mm ZIS-Z cannon (mass of a fragmentation projectile - 6.2 kg)
- ;
- 120-mm mortars (mine mass - 15.9 kg);
- M-30 122-mm howitzers (projectile mass - 21.7 kg);
- 122-mm A-19 cannon (projectile weight - 25 kg);
- 152-mm howitzers M-10 and D-1 (shell weight - from 40 to 51 kg);
- 152-mm ML-20 howitzers (projectile weight - from 43.6 to 56 kg)
- ;
- 160-mm mortars (mine mass - 41 kg);
- ;
- 203-mm. howitzers Б-4 (mass high-explosive shell - 100 kg, concrete-piercing - 146 kilograms);
- 280-mm mortars Br-5 (projectile mass - 246 kg);
- 305-mm howitzer Br-18 (projectile mass - 330 kg).

Each projectile requires a cartridge case and a charge. Shells, casings, fuzes and charges are transported in good and sturdy - i.e. heavy - wooden crates. Even one million shells, casings, fuzes, charges and packaging is in any case tens of thousands of tons. All this must be produced, using up thousands of tons of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, hundreds of tons of explosives, expending the labor of a huge number of people - what is the production of fuzes alone worth!

All this has to be loaded into wagons and delivered to railroad stations. Unload it from the wagons, load it into cars, send it to the front warehouses, unload it again. Then again to load, send to army warehouses and unload there. After that - corps, division, regimental warehouses. And only after that

the ammunition will get to the firing positions. Loading and unloading, as is customary, is done by hand.

So, tens of thousands of tons of ammunition had to be transported just for the artillery preparation in one offensive operation on one front alone. Just imagine what organizational efforts, expenses and labor input this requires.

5

The second serious disadvantage of this method of breaching defenses was that it required too long a time to concentrate forces and the most meticulous planning of combat operations. Logistics support, i.e. the supply of tens or even hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment and spare parts, was in itself a very complex operation. For example, during the preparation of the Vistula-Oder operation the volume of intra-front and intra-army transportation on the 1st Belorussian Front alone amounted to 923.3 thousand tons (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 2. P. 148). The preparation of a major offensive operation took at least a month and a half, which was spent on the transportation of materiel and training of troops.

And the enemy was not slumbering. He was striking at our troops during their concentration, good they were collected so much that it was impossible to miss - in any case you will hit someone. The enemy by many signs tried to determine the date and time of the beginning of the Red Army offensive, and if it succeeded, then at the last moment he quietly and quietly withdrew his troops to the second position^[12]. Only small detachments of guards, reinforced by tanks and artillery, remained at the front line. In this case, the power of the Red Army's artillery strike fell on almost empty trenches. Our troops, having spent tens of thousands of tons of shells, went on the offensive, but having passed a few kilometers, suddenly came under the razing fire of the main enemy forces.

To avoid this, Soviet commanders before each offensive conducted combat reconnaissance, probing enemy defenses with shell and bayonet. Combat reconnaissance was usually conducted on a wide front in order to avoid exposing breakthrough areas to the enemy before the offensive began.

6

Zhukov reported on how combat reconnaissance was conducted at the final stage of the war at a secret military-scientific conference of the top command staff of the Soviet Army Group in Germany in December 1945. The materials of the conference were declassified only 40 years later and published in 1985 in a special issue of the journal

"Military Thought. Here is Zhukov's account of a small episode in the course of the 1st Belorussian Front's combat operations during the Warsaw-Poznan operation:

In conducting a 30-minute artillery raid to support the operations of the special echelon, we used a great deal of artillery to do so, so that the enemy could not figure out our method of attack. 400,000 shells from the reserves which we had allocated for the breakthrough, we could throw into the action of this echelon and lose nothing.

It's not artillery training yet. It's just an overture. It is only a preliminary short fire raid to support the actions of a special echelon of troops. It is a kind of warm-up, for which a large amount of artillery is involved, but the consumption of ammunition is insignificant - only 400 thousand shells. The artillery works for only half an hour, throwing 13,300 shells every minute. This is the amount of ammunition that it is not a pity to throw away to support the actions of a special echelon without losing anything.

30 minutes of intense fire on the front line, then transfer of artillery fire into the depth of the enemy's defense, and at this point a special echelon of troops, generously reinforced with breakthrough tanks and heavy self-propelled vehicles, is introduced into the battle. This is combat reconnaissance.

The task of the special echelon was to determine by its actions whether the enemy kept its main forces at the front line or had withdrawn them to the rear lines of defense, holding the front line only by small mobile detachments. The actions of the special echelon allowed

clarify the outline of the enemy's front line of defense, identify the enemy's fire system and its minefields.

The artillery preparation for a defense breakthrough was prepared in several variants. Battle reconnaissance gave the front commander an answer to the question of which variant of artillery preparation would be more effective in a given situation.

Battle reconnaissance was conducted one or two days before the offensive. Or a few hours before it. Sometimes the offensive began right after the reconnaissance without any interruption.

400 thousand shells of different calibers is about 12-18 thousand tons of steel crashing into the ground, tearing the surface of the earth to shreds with a rumble and roar. That's hundreds of millions of screeching hot steel shards flying around. The artillery preparation was usually short but dense. While the artillery played the overture, the soldiers of the special echelon took their "hundred grams with a trailer".

At the moment of transfer of artillery fire into the depth of the enemy's defense through the first trench of our defense with a clang pass tanks IS-2 Guards heavy tank regiments breakthrough and self-propelled vehicles ISU-152 Guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiments. Following them from the trenches rises a special echelon. This echelon was not shouting "hurrah" - it was cursing everything and everyone with a hoarse mate.

In 1943, during the development of the IS-2, the most powerful tank of World War II, the 122 mm A-19 gun was chosen as the tank gun. The most powerful tank in the world had to have the most powerful tank gun. The A-19 was modified in accordance with the requirements of tank mounting and named D-25T. And the shells of that gun - see above - weighed 25 kg.

A self-propelled launcher was created to provide fire support for these tanks. The undercarriage and engine were the same as those of the IS-2 tank, but instead of a rotating turret, there was an armored wheelhouse, i.e. a box welded from powerful sheets of armor. By abandoning the rotating turret, the designers drastically reduced the horizontal aiming angles of the gun - for horizontal aiming the entire vehicle had to be turned towards the target.

However, the abandonment of the turret in favor of an armored box allowed to significantly increase the strength of the entire structure and reduce its silhouette.

While maintaining all weight and performance characteristics, it became possible to install an even more powerful gun in the armored deckhouse. And the choice fell on the outstanding technical creation of the XX century - the 152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20. The hybrid of the IS-2 tank and the ML-20 152 mm howitzer-gun was named the ISU-152.

The abandonment of the rotating turret in no way made the IMS-152 more vulnerable. The point is that these installations operated in close cooperation with tanks. The chain of tanks - in front. Self-propelled guns - the second wave. Tanks are a kind of spread fingers, which in the darkness felt the vulnerable place of the enemy. Self-propelled guns - a crushing fist. Having found the enemy, the tanks retreated to the flanks, giving way to self-propelled guns, and those directly nailed the revived firing points with shells weighing 43 kilograms.

During the war the German soldiers called the IU-152 "can opener" - *Dosenöffner*. German soldiers considered their tanks to be tins in situations when the villainous fate in battle brought them together with the IMS-152.

Behind the rampart of artillery fire, behind the heavy tanks and self-propelled vehicles in all major offensive operations invariably went that very special echelon.

CHAPTER 14

1

We're all literate now. We all understand what a special echelon is. But another hundred years will pass, and a historian of the XXII century will scratch his head: what is it?

He will open the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia", which was published by Voenizdat in 1976-1980 (that is, at the time when the cult of personality of Zhukov was in full bloom), but he will not find the answer. He will find the terms "special departments," "first echelon," and "second echelon," but he will learn nothing about special echelons.

Then the historian will open the "Concise Dictionary of Operative-Tactical and General Military Words (Terms)". This dictionary was signed into print on August 12, 1957, that is, at the very time when Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov was Minister of Defense of the USSR and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Moreover, at that time Zhukov was the winner in all the battles for power and the master of the situation. But the special echelon is not mentioned in this dictionary either.

The historian will have no choice but to turn to Zhukov's memoirs. But even there there is no explanation for this word combination, because Zhukov spoke about the special echelon at a secret meeting in 1945, and the memoirs were published 24 years later, and they were intended for the general public, who do not need to know about the special echelon.

2

The special echelon were the penalty companies and battalions. They were created in accordance with Comrade Stalin's order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. The order read:

Form within the army three to five well-armed barrier detachments, up to two hundred men each, place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and

to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot....

Barrier detachments operated from the very first day of the war, just in the summer of 1942, Stalin openly announced their existence and dramatically increased their number. At that time, the Red Army already had more than seven dozen general and shock armies, and therefore the number of barrier detachments numbered in the hundreds.

The same order created penalty companies within the general and shock armies and penalty battalions within the fronts. Penalty companies were subordinated directly to the army commanders. Each army could have up to a dozen or more such companies. For example, in 1942 the 54th Army had ten penalty companies; in the same year the 63rd Army (transformed into the 1st Guards Army on November 1, 1942) had eleven penalty companies.

Penalty battalions were initially created as part of the fronts and were subordinate to the front commanders. But soon they began to be created in armies as well. For example, in 1943, the 56th Army, in addition to penalty companies, had seven penalty battalions.

Penalty units had a permanent and a variable composition. The permanent staff included platoon, company and battalion commanders and their deputies, staff officers, company petty officers, and medical personnel. Brave, competent, strong-willed officers were appointed to command positions. The service was hard and risky, but it was highly valued by the command and generously paid. Successful service in these special units became a springboard in a commander's career, a direct road to high command positions.

The commanders of punitive units and units enjoyed enormous power. They had the right to apply to their subordinates all measures of influence, up to shooting on the spot for failure to fulfill orders, self-mutilation, escape from the battlefield, attempt to go to the enemy. *"The commander and military commissar of a punishment company in relation to the punished men enjoyed the authority of the commander and military commissar of the division"* (Krasnaya Zvezda. April 11-17, 2007).

Position categories of the permanent staff of penalty units were a step higher than in regular units: platoon commander -

captain, company commander - major, battalion commander - colonel. In addition, each platoon had not one officer, but two. In addition to the platoon commander, there was also a deputy. The staff category of a deputy platoon commander was senior lieutenant.

For all permanent staff of penalty units, every day of service counted for six. You serve a year, you get six. If you live. The length of service in the ranks for officers was halved, and the pay was doubled (Krasnaya Zvezda. April 11-17, 2007).

The officers of the permanent staff of the penalty companies and battalions, having completed their service in these special units, received unheard-of promotions. For the commanders of fine companies the next position was that of regimental commander, for the commanders of fine battalions that of division commander. This was a common practice; for example, the commander of the 8th separate penalty battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel A. Osipov, having surrendered the battalion, received a division (Krasnaya Zvezda. April 2, 2005).

It's only right. The experience of bloody battles of such officers is huge. They always acted in the most important directions, were allowed to the plans of very high command. Commanders of penalty companies and battalions received combat orders directly from the commanders of armies or even fronts.

If such a commander managed to subdue a company of penal officers, he could quite easily cope with a regiment of ordinary infantry. If he commanded a penal battalion, he could certainly command a division.

3

The variable composition of the penalty battalions, which were directly subordinate to the front commanders, were Red Army officers who were sent to the penal battalions to atone for their mistakes, misdemeanors and crimes by way of punishment. They were stripped of their military ranks and awards, dressed in second-hand, i.e. used, soldier's clothes. All of them were privates. As a reward, they could be promoted to the rank of a sergeant or sergeant.

Officers were sent to penalty battalions on the verdicts of military tribunals. If you served your time - get your officer rank back, screw on your uniform orders and fight until the end of the war.

victories. The term of service in a penalty battalion is from one to three months. Or until first blood.

If you shoot yourself or ask a comrade to shoot you lightly, both are shot on the spot. No trial. If you were wounded in battle, even on the very first day, it means that you have atoned for your guilt, your criminal record is expunged, you are evacuated to an officer's hospital: here are your orders, here are your epaulettes, you will rest, get back on your feet, go back to where you came from and don't come to us again.

However, for most of the soldiers of the punishment battalions, being wounded was a pipe dream. More often than not, instead of being wounded, death awaited them. Remember, from Alexander Galich:

*And nothing is dear to us but a
battlefield in the moonlight. They
said it would be till first blood, but
it was till death.*

4

Under the command of the army commanders were penalty companies and battalions, which were manned by guilty soldiers and sergeants, as well as prisoners of the NKVD Gulag. The term of service was the same - from one to three months. Or until the first bloodshed.

The order of assignment to these units was different - people were sent here not only on the verdicts of military tribunals. The commander of each division, which was in the rear, had the right to send any soldier or sergeant to the front to a punitive unit to atone for his guilt. The commander of each regiment that was fighting at the front had the same right. Without consulting anyone, without asking permission from anyone, he gave three months of punishment to a negligent soldier, and taught the rest.

Penalty companies and battalions were used on the most difficult and dangerous parts of the front. In each offensive operation they operated in the so-called special echelon, i.e. in front of the first echelon of the advancing troops, taking on the most fierce

enemy fire, clearing the way for the first echelon, trampling its paths through minefields.

High military ranks were given to the officers of the permanent staff of penalty units not only for special conditions of service. There was another reason for this: penalty companies and battalions were powerful combat units. In the permanent composition of a punishment company - 16 officers, including one operative of SMERSH counterintelligence (Krasnaya Zvezda, April 11-17, 2007).

Captain A. I. Timofeev served as a permanent member of the penalty company from February 3 to October 10, 1943. This period he was counted as 4 years and 8 months of service. He describes his company as follows: five platoons of one hundred men each, total in the company more than five hundred fighters. The company is constantly in combat. Another combat task is set - the company fulfilled the task, the wounded were taken to the hospital, the killed were buried, the order was given: to accept new replenishment - 224 men. All of them were urks (Military History Journal. 1996. No. 3. P. 50-54).

5

Major I. V. Kuzmichev, an employee of the Central Museum of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, collected and published in the magazine "Sergeant" (2000.

No. 1) information on penalty battalions and companies of the Red Army for the period 1942-1945. (Citizen Major, please accept my earthly bow.) Soduring the war, the penalty battalions in the Red Army were 65. 1,092 penalty companies. I'm not at all sure that the list is complete. And Major Kuzmichev himself does not insist on it.

Someone once started a rumor that during the war, 427,910 penalized men passed through the Red Army's penalty companies and battalions. This was done either by mistake or by malicious intent. At one time in one very closed educational institution I had to study military history. Not the one that was written for the general public. I never complained about my memory, and I learned the figure once presented to me firmly. We were given almost the same number, only there was one more zero at the end - that was the difference.

Stalin's order No. 227 on the creation of penalty units solved two problems at once. On the one hand, every big commander got in his hands free slave labor to fulfill any impossible tasks of the war. On the other side, sending to penalty units

In the course of the Soviet Union, the military's military service had a powerful educational effect on the rest of the Red Army. A simple and clear message to everyone at once: you guys, follow your commanders' orders. The one who did not show zeal, over there, in the special echelon is clearing the way to victory for you. Anybody can go there at any time. So, you try harder...

I cannot confirm the information that the real figure is exactly one order of magnitude higher than the officially announced figure. But everyone himself can estimate the number of soldiers who passed through the penalty companies and battalions.

First, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers were in and out of encirclement. They were passed through filtration camps. And then where to? That's right - to punitive units.

Secondly, millions of Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. Some of them managed to be released at the final stage of the war. Where to put them? That's right. The same place.

Thirdly, when the Red Army retreated at the beginning of the war, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers abandoned their weapons, scattered to the villages and settled there. Then the Red Army went on the offensive. All those who had settled down were raked back into the Red Army. What troops? The very same ones.

Fourth, 34 million men were drafted into the Red Army during the war. Many of these conscripts committed mistakes, misdemeanors and crimes. They were sent to punitive units mercilessly, simply by the decision of the regimental commander. And the regiments in the Red Army was apparently invisible, and each regimental commander was required to restore order and maintain discipline in the entrusted units and subdivisions. And every commander of a fighting regiment in the summer of 1942, Comrade Stalin gave the right to any soldier or sergeant, without asking anyone's permission, to put a couple or three months in a penalty company operating ahead of the fighting order of regiments and divisions. Do you think that the regimental commanders did not like Comrade Stalin and did not use this right?

Fifth, in the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR (as well as in the GULZhDS, GULPS, and further down the list we discussed in Chapter Eight) there were healthy, blue-painted men. How many of them there were, everyone can calculate for himself. A certain part of the prisoners

of the Gulag went through the punitive units. Do you think Comrade Stalin did not use this potential in the war?

All these masses of people do not fit into the figure 427,910. Whoever put it into scientific circulation made a slight error. Just one zero. The figure 427,910 does not fit with the number of penalty battalions and companies that fought at the front - it does not correspond to their number, nor to the turnover of the variable personnel.

Here is another almost unremarkable statistical figure, which does not clash in any way with the officially stated number of those who passed the punitive units. During the four years of the war, military tribunals convicted 2 million 530 thousand 663 servicemen of the Red Army. Of these:

- for counter-revolutionary crimes - 471,988 people;
- for war crimes - 792,192 people;
- 1,266,483 people for ordinary crimes.

This formerly top secret information was first published by Muranov A. I. and Zvyagintsev V. E. (Dossier on Marshal. Moscow: Andreevsky Flag, 1996. P. 137).

Anatoly Ivanovich Muranov - Deputy Minister of Justice, Head of the Military Courts Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Colonel General of Justice, State Counselor of Justice 1st Class, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation.

Vyacheslav Egorovich Zvyagintsev - Head of the Judicial Practice and Statistics Department of the Military Courts Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Colonel of Justice, State Counselor of 3rd Class.

This information is first-hand. This is the face of the liberating army from a somewhat different angle: two and a half million of its own criminals fought in the Red Army, not counting those who were brought to the war from the GULZhDZhDS, GUAS, Glavgidrostroy, GULAG and other similar organizations. In the Red Army, during the four years of the war, almost half a million counter-revolutionaries were detected and convicted - not counting those who went to the Germans and fought under Hitler's banners. Let us assume that the half million counter-revolutionaries identified in the Red Army during the war years were shot. But where did the other two million convicts go?

As we have already found out, not only those who were convicted at the front, but also those who were in camps, were sent to punitive units. In addition, the penalty companies and battalions were sent not only and not so much by the decision of the tribunals, but also by the decision of the commanders of regiments, brigades and divisions.

The Red Army was on the offensive all through the war. From the very first day. Even when it had to meet the enemy with an indestructible defense, it still attacked! In war, you have to constantly open up the enemy's fire system. If you do not reckon with the losses, then no one has invented a better way to open the fire system than reconnaissance by combat. Penalty units from the summer of 1942, that is, from the moment of their appearance, became the instrument with which commanders of all ranks, from Zhukov and below, on all fronts constantly probed the enemy's defense with a bayonet, and its minefields - with soldiers' boots.

6

Our generals and marshals did not tell us much about the penalized men. Or rather, they did not tell anything. They found ways to circumvent this sensitive subject.

Penalty battalions and companies were constantly used for combat reconnaissance. And since this is so, our multi-star memoirists in their truthful writings are accustomed to call these battalions and companies reconnaissance. Here, for example, is a fragment of a description of the Red Army's actions in the Berlin operation:

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was preceded by battle reconnaissance, which... was conducted on the 14th and April 15, 32 reconnaissance detachments with forces up to a reinforced battalion each (Military History Journal. 1980. No. 5).

This is acting Zhukov. To the left, the same way Konev conducts battle reconnaissance. To the right - Rokossovsky.

Since the penalty units participated in all the assaults, and in a special echelon (i.e. ahead of the first echelon), in the memoirs they were called not only reconnaissance units, but also assault units. It is both in meaning and in sound close. What is easier: take it and name it in

In my memoirs, for example, 361st separate punishment company of the 5th shock army 361st separate assault company. Let posterity sort it out. It will be all the more difficult for them to understand that in the documents the punitive units were usually called abbreviated - 39 Oshb, 612 Oshr.

And it is possible, composing a memoir, not to name numbers at all. Twenty years after the defeat of Germany, Army General Alexander Vasilyevich Gorbatov published a true memoir in which, among other things, he spoke enthusiastically about the daring actions of a squad of skiers. Forty years later, on April 2, 2005, the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" delicately made it clear: this squad of skiers was actually the 8th Separate Penal Battalion.

7

With all this in , let us once again evaluate Zhukov's memoirs.

"Memories and Reflections" of Marshal Zhukov, memoirs of other prominent commanders of the Red Army are the authentic military history of the Great Patriotic War, which should be studied to educate the new generation of Russian citizens (Krasnaya Zvezda. December 15, 2009).

Was it? The order to create penalty companies and battalions was signed personally by Stalin. But the regulations on the penalty battalions and companies were announced in the order of the USSR NKO № 298 of September 28, 1942, and this order was signed personally by Zhukov. That is, People's Commissar of Defense Comrade Stalin (he did not have a military rank at that time) gave the order - to create. That's all. And the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense General of the Army Zhukov turned Stalin's order into a full-fledged instruction to commanders of all ranks: who and whom to send to punitive units, for what and for what terms, what rights and privileges to give to the permanent staff of punitive units, how to use punitive units, and so on.

Zhukov was not only the author of the order № 298, but also the most important consumer of energy of penalty units. No one during the entire war maimed and laid in the ground as many penalized men as he did.

Many years after the war, Zhukov's memoirs were published. With each new edition they become more and more truthful. Ask Zhukov's admirers: in which edition Zhukov told about the barrier troops? In which edition of his memoirs even one phrase mentioned penalty companies and battalions? And they, September 1942, cleared the way for the first echelons of the advancing troops in ALL offensive operations without a single exception. Zhukov personally planned the use of special echelons, but for some reason he forgot to tell about it.

So are Zhukov's memoirs really the "authentic military history of the Great Patriotic War" that should be studied to educate the new generation of Russian citizens?

Key point

In one of the many offensive operations on one front of the Soviet-German war alone - and there were ten active fronts in the final phase of the war - Zhukov used 400,000 shells to support a special echelon. Zhukov stated that 400,000 shells, weighing from 6 to 330 kilograms each, was the amount that could be freely discarded, "without losing anything."

400,000 shells - this is only to support the actions of the special echelon. Can anyone imagine the amount of ammunition that was required not only for the diversionary actions of the penal officers, but for the complete breach of the defenses?

Imagine with what delight in 1949 Soviet marshals and generals took the news that the Soviet Union had created an atomic bomb.

One bump and you've got a clean break!

No more months of concentrating troops on bridgeheads! No need to have ten thousand guns on the breakthrough sites!

No need to spend tens of thousands of tons of shells to crack enemy defenses and support special echelon actions!

So, when Soviet strategists got their hands on nuclear weapons after the war, the task of breaking through enemy defenses dramatically.

has been simplified. Two or three nuclear strikes on the enemy's leading edge

- and you've got a clean break. The main thing is to use this breakthrough quickly. The main thing is not to allow the enemy to close these gaps in the defense. If the masses of tanks, motorized infantry and self-propelled artillery will break out into the operational space, hardly anyone will be able to stop them. And then - forward to victory!

In September 1954, the army exercise "Snowball" was held precisely to test these theoretical calculations in practice.

CHAPTER 15

1

Let's return to the Totsk range. The 7th Rifle Corps of the South Ural Military District had erected a field defense on the ground. The corps was withdrawn 5 kilometers from the defense area, leaving hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns and mortars at the positions, replacing soldiers in trenches and dugouts with cows, horses and sheep. On the prepared defenses it was planned to strike three nuclear strikes in succession, paving a corridor for the attackers. The second and third strikes were simulated by blowing up hundreds of barrels of gasoline, which were stacked in specially dug pits. The first nuclear strike was a real one.

Nuclear strikes are the battering rams that break through the walls of a fortress. They are breached in order for our troops to break through the suppressed enemy strongholds into the enemy rear, to break through the breach, through the epicenter of the nuclear explosion.

The exercise took place for one day only, September 14, 1954. The terrain was chosen to correspond as closely as possible to the typical Central European countryside: hills, hollows, forests, groves, fields, fairly high population density.

Mahovka village (173 households) - 4.5 km from the target center.

Orlovka (87 households), Ivanovka (62 households) and Elshanka-2 (143 households) - 5 km from the target center.

Village water wells are open, shaft type.

School in the village of Elshanka - 6.6 km from the center of the target.

The carrier is a Tu-4A bomber. The bomb is 38 kilotons, i.e. Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined and a little more than that. Dropped from an altitude of 8,000 meters. Detonation at an altitude of 350 meters.

Realism of doctrine as much as possible.

2

Although the actual military exercises at the Totsk range involved one corps, the headquarters and command and control bodies of one general army and one front, here a grand offensive operation of an entire front was being practiced, within which several armies - that is, a dozen or even two dozen corps - would be operating. Thus, at the Totsk range, corps exercises were combined with command and staff exercises of the army and the front.

According to the plan of the exercise, the "Westerners" created a powerful defensive line. The "Eastern" were preparing a defense breakthrough. The Eastern forces took part in the exercise:

- Management and front headquarters with a communications regiment. The front headquarters was formed from generals and officers of the management and headquarters of the Precarpathian Military District. At the head of the "eastern" front was the commander of the troops of the Precarpathian Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev. Chief of Staff of the front - Colonel-General VI Kostylev. Head of Intelligence of the front - Lieutenant General X. D. Mamsurov

- Management and headquarters of the 25th Army with a separate communications battalion. The army commander was Colonel-General P. A. Belov. In the first echelon of the operational structure of the 25th Army - 128th (real) and 15th (conventional) rifle corps. The 25th Army was tasked in the frontal offensive operation to break through the front of the "Western" and strike the main blow to Ulyanovsk, auxiliary - to Kuibyshev. Ulyanovsk and Kuibyshev seemed to be something like Dusseldorf and Cologne, and the Volga played the role of the Rhine.

The auxiliary strike was entrusted to the 128th Rifle Corps, which had the 12th Guards Mechanized and 50th Guards Rifle Divisions (real) in the first echelon, 51st Rifle Division (conventional) in the second.

Hull Reinforcement (real):

- The 10th Gumbinnenskaya Artillery Breakthrough Division of the RWGC (2nd Guards and 47th Howitzer Artillery Brigades, 154th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade, 16th Heavy Mortar Brigade);

- The 27th Guards Order of Kutuzov Army Cannon Artillery Brigade of the Moscow Military District;

- The 5th Guards Order of Alexander Nevsky Engineer-Sapper Brigade.

The offense was supported (realistically):

- The 140th Order of Kutuzov Bomber Aviation Division (armed with Il-28 front-line jet bombers);
- 10th Guards Voronezh-Kiev Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Assault Aviation Division (MiG-15 jet fighters);
- 119th Nevelsk Red Banner Order of Suvorov Fighter Aviation Division (MiG-17 jet fighters);
- 511th Yassky Independent Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment (Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft).

In total, more than three hundred combat aircraft took part in the exercise. Aviation formations and units came from the Odessa, Kiev and Transcaucasian military districts.

The nuclear strike was carried out on the second position of the enemy's defense. The first position was struck by artillery. The start of the fire attack was immediately after the shock wave and dust berm had passed. Density - 133 guns per kilometer of breach, duration of the fire attack - 25 minutes.

Density - lower than in the final phase of the last war, but larger caliber guns were used here

— 100-mm and 130-mm guns, 160-mm and 240-mm mortars, BM-14 and BM-24 multiple launch rocket systems. The artillery fire was becoming truly hurricane-like. In addition - and this is the main thing - the enemy troops defending the first position were to be affected by the nuclear explosion behind them.

The aircraft of the "eastern" at the time of the explosion should be in the air, fighters 30 kilometers from the epicenter, bombers — 100 kilometers away. The task: not to allow the enemy to quickly close the gap in the defense. For this purpose, a concentrated bombing strike was carried out with a density of 218 tons per square kilometer of cultivated area.

The defense breakthrough was carried out by striking the adjacent flanks of the two Guards divisions in the direction of the epicenter in order to make the most effective use of the results of the atomic explosion - that is, as the

as soon as possible to pass through the front edge of the enemy's defense along the resulting corridor. As the advancing troops reached the third enemy position, two more nuclear strikes of lesser power were launched in succession. These strikes were simulated.

3

On August 3, 1954, two Tu-4A bombers landed at the Vladimirovka airfield near the town of Akhtubinsk. The crew commanders were Major V. Y. Kutyrchev and Captain K. K. Lyasnikov.

Akhtubinsk is in the Astrakhan region, but from Akhtubinsk it's a short walk to Stalingrad, and from Astrakhan it's a long way to Astrakhan. But the closest to Akhtubinsk is Kapustin Yar, or Kap-Yar or Kapustino, our very first missile range. Because Kap-Yar and everything around it is a forbidden zone, carriers, charges, and personnel can be located here without risk.

On August 12, the crews began training flights. They were accompanied by IL-28R reconnaissance aircraft, whose task was to survey the parameters of the explosion.

On September 7, two nuclear bombs were delivered by special echelon to the airfield Vladimirovka.

On September 13, one bomb was suspended under each of the two carriers.

In the early morning of September 14, both carriers started their engines. The crews of the planes did not know who would fly. Full readiness - both. At 5:41 a.m., the head of the 71st Air Force Range, Air Force Major-General V. A. Chernorez gave the order to take off. A. Chernorez gave the order for takeoff to Kutyrchev's crew.

At 6 a.m. Chernorez reported to the head of the exercise Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov on the takeoff of the carrier. In flight, the carrier was accompanied by two IL-28R reconnaissance aircraft. Several squads of MiG-17 fighters, changing on the route, guarded the carrier and reconnaissance planes with the order to shoot down without warning any aircraft that dares to approach the carrier.

The second carrier, with the bomb suspended and engines running, waited on the airfield until the first carrier gained altitude. The second carrier was then ordered to shut down its engines,

However, the second crew had to stay in the airplane until the moment the bomb exploded at the Totsk test site.

And it's a long, dreary wait.

4

Major Kutyrchev: "I see the target!"

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov: "Carry out the task. Major

Kutyrchev: "Roger. I'm working."

At 9 hours 33 minutes and 10 seconds, the atomic bomb quietly slipped out of the carrier's bomb hatch and with a slight whistling sound, headed toward the ground. Forty-eight seconds later, it reached the target altitude.

And rumbled.

Austrian writer Robert Jung will publish his famous book about American and Western European atomic scientists in four years. He will call the book "Brighter than a Thousand Suns." This is apparently the most figurative, shortest and most accurate description of a nuclear explosion. This is exactly what tens of thousands of participants of the "Snowball" military exercises felt. A dazzling, incredibly bright flash for dozens of kilometers illuminated the area with a dead-white light that could be remotely compared to the sparkle of electric welding.

At the point of the explosion there was a fiery glowing area of spherical shape, horizontal size of 713 meters. And it shook violently. It shook as if a hundred-meter steel pile had been driven into the with a single blow. It shook the earth's firmament with hills and a river, with ravines and fields, with forests and groves, with villages and churches, with tanks and guns. Tens of thousands of human souls were shaken. It was as if the earth shifted from its place, went out from under our feet, went like a wave in the sea.

The first striking factor of a nuclear explosion is light radiation. The name is not quite accurate. A nuclear explosion is a temperature of millions of degrees. It is not only light, but also thermal impulse, which ignited instantly dried trees and bushes, paint on tank armor and thatched roofs in neighboring villages, which blackened, shriveled and sprinkled leaves in distant groves.

Immediately after the light pulse, overtaking its own sound, crushing and breaking everything in its path, tearing off the turrets and throwing up the tracks of fifty-ton tanks, blowing away armored personnel carriers and artillery tractors, came the shock wave. The speed of the shock wave at the initial stage is supersonic, and that is why the rumbling, eardrum-shattering roar is somewhat behind, delayed.

The terrible temperature of the explosion instantly vaporizes moisture over dozens of square kilometers, the ground is crushed, turning into radioactive dust. That is why the shock wave is followed by an elastic, cutting dust shaft 200 meters high.

The explosion burned millions and dispersed billions of cubic meters of air, so in the epicenter there was a vacuum. And this void, like a vacuum cleaner, pulled into itself all those millions of cubic meters of dust that had just been scattered and scattered in all directions. The fireball, pulsing, boiling and shuddering, as if reluctantly turned into a huge, half the sky, bright cloud, spewing dazzling red-black whirlwinds. The humming purple flames from below were propping up and pushing up a satanic mess of smoke and fire. The cloud changed shape and color. Crimson tones shimmered into dark maroon, then ashy gray and blue-black. The cloud was rapidly gaining altitude, sucking up a column of soil and dust from the ground and dragging it along with it.

That's where the artillery struck!

This is where aviation shone with its power! The strike was carried out not by links, not by squadrons, but by regiments! Simultaneously - three regimental strikes by bombers: to the left of the explosion, to the right and behind it! At 9 hours 55 minutes on the 21st minute after the explosion 39 bombers IL-28 and 6 fighters MiG-17 at an altitude of 7 kilometers jumped through the barrel of the radioactive cloud, through the dust column of the atomic mushroom!

The bombers carpeted the bombs. These were not individual explosions, but the simultaneous lifting of hundreds of tons of soil blown off the surface of the ground. Three regiments of jet attack planes and three more regiments of fighters followed. It came in waves over the very ground with a deafening whoosh and roar. They pounded, sparing no barrels, from hundreds of automatic cannons on everything that could still survive in this man-made hell. The bursting of artillery shells and

of aerial bombs merged into a stunning symphony of war, a hymn to the indomitable might of our valiant army!

And as soon as the artillery fell silent, radiation reconnaissance patrols on tanks rushed to the epicenter, breaking through the brushwood and pockets of fires. At 10:13, 40 minutes after the explosion, they were in the epicenter. And they gave the go-ahead!

And then two Guards divisions of the 128th Rifle Corps went into battle. At 12 o'clock the advanced detachments of the "Eastern" reached the epicenter of the explosion.

5

The terrain in front of them looked very different from what it had been a short time ago. No landmarks. Nothing to recognize. A desolate, bleak field.

All that remained of the oak woodland was black ash - charred stakes. Combat vehicles - ours and those of our probable opponents - were melted and mangled. There were no trenches and shelters - the top layer of the earth as if moved. Everything was leveled. The sight was terrible (Krasnaya Zvezda. July 9, 1992).

The ground became loose, as if it had been plowed by tractor-celinists and then sifted. The ground smoked. Closer to the epicenter, the ground was molten - it was covered with a vitreous crust of molten sand. The ground crunched and broke like ice. On the melted ground were torn tank turrets, armored personnel carrier hulls crumpled like rough wrapping paper, and bizarrely bent cannon barrels.

The breach in the Westerners' defense was surprisingly clean. There is no one to stop the advancing troops. Those who try to resist are subjected to hurricane artillery fire and repeated air strikes.

At 13:00, the "Easterners" launched a second, this time conditional nuclear strike on the reserves of the "Westerners".

At 13:40, using the corridor paved by the second blast, "the Easterners are rushing forward with renewed vigor.

At 2:40 p.m., the Easterners launched a third, also conditional nuclear explosion.

"The Westerners, covered by smoke, began to withdraw.

CHAPTER 16

1

Troop exercises at the Totsk range in September 1954 had a downside.

The key moment of the exercise was the dropping of the bomb. We have already become familiar with its characteristics in general terms, but we cannot pass by the carrier.

In 1954, the Soviet Air Force received the TU-16 jet bombers, known as "Tusha" in army parlance. These bombers were quite suitable for destroying cities, large industrial and transportation facilities deep behind enemy lines. However, all attempts to use the Tu-16 to strike at the strongholds of the conditional enemy on the front line of defense, when there are nearby troops, ended in complete failure - to ensure the required accuracy of bombing failed.

In March 1954 at the Totsk test site was held a series of training bombing raids. Dropped from the Tu-16 bolts (officially referred to as "dimensional-weight equivalents") did not want to lie next to the target. Deviations were different, sometimes up to two kilometers.

And then Zhukov ordered to use a slow-moving, obsolete, unsuitable for the real war Tu-4.

2

During World War II, the B-29, the most powerful strategic bomber of World War II, was created in the United States. It was created under the direction of the great aircraft designer Assen Jordanoff. (Brothers Slavs, we are so talented!)

During the war, the Americans bombed Japan and suffered losses, so at different times five B-29s made an emergency landing on the territory of the Soviet Union for various reasons. Comrade Stalin did not return these machines to his ally Uncle Sam. The planes were interned: we have a peace treaty with Japan, neutrality

and we can't break the treaty, so we won't give the planes to America until the end of the war.

Had there been a desire, it would have been possible to give them away, if only as a token of gratitude for four hundred thousand of the world's best military vehicles, without which the victories of the Red Army were impossible. How could the Japanese know what became of the airplanes that had bombed over Japan and gone over the horizon? But Comrade Stalin was principled.

In the meantime, the airplanes were dismantled. By order of Comrade Stalin, Tupolev began copying. Comrade Stalin somehow did not take into account that interned airplanes should not be disassembled. The fact that after the war the airplanes must be returned to the owner was also not taken into account. The Soviet Union strictly observed the principles of international law - but only as long as it was profitable for it.

The B-29 was copied, named the Tu-4, and Soviet industry began its mass production. However.

However, to copy means to lag behind: we are only trying to do what someone else already has, while they are creating something new, moving ahead. The B-29 was the pinnacle of the development of piston-engined combat airplanes. In the meantime, aviation was not just rapidly improving, but there was a revolutionary break in its development - the transition from piston engines to jet engines. This break can be compared to the transition from sailing ships to steam ships, and it took place at the moment when Tupolev began to fulfill Stalin's order.

The era of jet airplanes began during World War II. Immediately after the war, the time of piston engines on combat aircraft was over. They sang their song. When Tupolev only picked up a pencil to repeat what had been created in the United States under the leadership of the great Bulgarian, the very idea of a heavy bomber with piston engines had already completely outlived itself.

In the late 1940s, and even more so in 1954, the piston-engined strategic bomber seemed something like a sailing frigate with brass cannons amidst battleships. If there had been a war in the mid-1950s, then

no one would use airplanes with piston engines to deliver a nuclear charge to a real target.

But if the Tu-4 had been removed from the scenario played out at the Totsk test site, the whole idea would have instantly lost its meaning. What was demonstrated at those exercises stunned foreign observers, in a real combat situation was impossible to repeat: high-speed Tu-16 could not accurately bomb without the risk of hitting their own, and outdated slow-moving Tu-4 for war was not suitable.

In short, the magician Zhukov was demonstrating what he would never do in a real war. For such actions in the great and powerful, truthful and free Russian language there is a very clear definition: show-off.

3

The second point: in addition to the usual targeting techniques, the carrier's course on the approach to the target was marked with orange smoke. The target itself was marked with a white circle with a radius of 150 meters. In the center of the circle was a white cross. The size of the cross was 100 by 100 meters. The width of the stripes is 10 meters. In the center of the cross - corner reflectors.

Why all this? The answer seems obvious: to ensure the safety of the troops. It would not be good to miss during an exercise and throw a bomb where tens of thousands of people and thousands of vehicles are concentrated for an offensive.

Let's agree. Indeed, in a drill, it would not be good to throw something at your troops that would horrify even Hiroshima. But in war, would it be a good thing to hit your own? In war there would be no corner reflectors in the center of the target, no white circle and huge cross on the enemy positions.

It is easy enough to hit a city, an industrial or transportation hub, a seaport or a hydroelectric power plant, and a deviation of a kilometer or two does not play a big role: the city will be wiped off the face of the earth, the industrial giant will be destroyed and stopped, the mass of water from the reservoir will break through the dam and sweep away everything in its path. But how does an airplane accurately reach the leading edge? How to distinguish where are our own and where is the enemy? Here and there are trenches and trenches. And they're the same. And they're camouflaged. Except for the real ones

There are also false trenches and trenches dug there, both by the enemy and the enemy. Everything is gray and green there. There will be no circle, no cross and no reflectors.

In training, we aim at the center of the cross. And in war, where do we aim?

In other words, if the use of a slow-moving piston-powered Tu-4 in an exercise is a show-off, then the use of a circle and cross to mark the target is a double show-off, even a show-off squared.

4

But that's not all. Major Kutyrchev's crew failed to find the target on the first approach. The bomb was dropped on the second approach.

What enemy in war would allow a slow-moving piston airplane to circle over its leading edge?

Two of the best crews of the Soviet Air Force were chosen to drop the bomb. From August 12 (a whole month!) they flew the same route and threw the bombs into the same circle. After many attempts in the course of training, both crews achieved that the size-weight equivalent of a nuclear bomb lay with an average deviation of 40-50 meters from the center of the target. But in war, how could the best crew hit the target from such a height without dozens of preliminary training sessions?

By the way, the bomb turned out to be willful, with a temper. On September 14, 1954, it did not lie in the white circle - despite all the training. The bomb deviated from the center of the target by 280 meters in the northwestern direction.

5

Preparation for military exercises of this magnitude in the Soviet Army has always been called a ballet. Thirteen years after the events described above, yours truly took part in the Dnepr military exercise. True, this time they did without a real bomb. But the scale of the showmanship was almost the same as Zhukov's at the Totsk firing range.

In September 1967, a pontoon bridge across the Dnieper River was built during a training exercise. Both automobiles and railroad trains could go over the bridge at the same time. They were allowed to go over the bridge. The spectacle was amazing. But one detail spoiled the picture: the bridge was under a steam locomotive.

was sagging a lot, and under the cars it didn't sag at all. Why is that? Because the cars were empty. There was not a single open platform in the whole echelon. All the cars were covered. If you let empty platforms in, you'll spoil the impression. But if the cars are covered, it creates the illusion of a real loaded train.

Next to the train was a column of cars. But not a single car went next to the locomotive - under it the pontoon bridge was sagging so frighteningly. Cars went only next to the cars. Interestingly, the cars were driven not just any cars, but with booths to give the impression that they were also carrying something. But if the wagons and cars were really loaded, the bridge would have failed.

The Dnepr exercise was held in honor of the upcoming 50th anniversary of the October coup. The Soviet Union habitually played with inflatable muscles. The hint was that if we went forward, no Rhine would save you bourgeois. We will force any obstacle with all-armed and tank armies, we will immediately build bridges, including railroad bridges, in a matter of hours.

I shared these observations in my book "Stories of a Liberator". Some of those who did not take part in that ballet expressed doubts: is it possible to deceive unsophisticated spectators so brazenly?

It's possible, citizens. Everything is possible in our country. Everyone can see for himself: the pictures of that show-off exist in sufficient quantities, no one hid them. But the materials of the exercises in the Totsk camps are secret even after six decades: our strategists had something to hide here.

6

Problems at the Totsk test site began long before the exercises. Summer in the Volga region and the Southern Urals can be fierce. Every day the temperature in the dry steppe is well over thirty degrees. Tens of thousands of people are gathered in a giant camp. Training to the seventh sweat: ballet is ballet. Provide all clean water is impossible, so the first scourge was dysentery. It plagued the camp already in July. But not to cancel the event, which was prepared for many months, spending a monstrous amount of money, because of some dysentery.

By the way, someone announced that 45,000 soldiers and officers took part in the exercise, but the simplest calculations give a different result. 45 thousand - this is the offensive side. Let's not forget the powerful reinforcement of the 128th Corps, gathered from various military districts, including an artillery division, artillery and engineering brigades and many smaller units.

But in addition to the attackers there were those who had to stop them. Five kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion, the 7th Rifle Corps, consisting of two divisions with reinforcements, was on the defensive. The defenders in trenches, trenches and dugouts had not only to survive the nuclear explosion in the immediate vicinity, but also to *"to be in readiness to close the gap in defense created by a nuclear strike"* (Krasnaya Zvezda. July 9, 1992). Why is the whole corps not counted in the statistics?

In addition to the ground forces, three aviation divisions and a separate aviation regiment took part in the exercise. For some reason, they too were not included in the number of participants.

And everyone grabbed doses. The newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda was forced to admit:

As it later turned out, the soldiers who took part in the secret event, and with them local residents, received a considerable dose of radiation exposure (Krasnaya Zvezda. July 19, 1996).

Elementary precautions such as decontamination of equipment, weapons and uniforms were not applied. A huge number of people took part in the exercise. No special medical supervision of their health was established. Classified and forgotten, they lived as best they could, without any attention from the state.... Each of them gave a signature, vowing to keep silent about it for 25 years (Krasnaya Zvezda. July 9, 1992).

It was not a malicious slanderer who made it all up. This is reported by the central body of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Not everything at those exercises was done in a smart way. On the eve of the exercise, all the participants were given new uniforms and new shoes from the warehouses. Why? Let them win the day in the old, throw off, wash themselves, put on the new. But no, they changed into new clothes and shoes the day before. In the new uniforms the soldiers and commanders went through the epicenter of the nuclear explosion. Then in these pants, in these new gymnasers, in these squeaking boots they went to their garrisons. And soldiers and sergeants soon left for demobilization, because for most of them it was an early demobilization.

The participants were shaved as early as two months before the exercise and then cut continuously thereafter. Some medics believe that it would have been better to cut everyone's hair immediately after the exercise, wash them well, dress them in new clothes and shoes, and get them away from these cursed places as soon as possible. But it was impossible to quickly disperse tens of thousands of people and thousands of vehicles after the exercises, using the small railroad stations in the area of the Totsk range. The camp, gradually winding down, stood until the end of October. Immediately after the exercises, dysentery spread through the camp again. But suddenly the doctors realized that together with dysentery some other disease was spreading, which resembled dysentery in its symptoms but was not.

The sick were transported from the Totsk range to hastily deployed field hospitals in the Chkalov area. Because in Chkalov - the headquarters of the South Ural Military District and rear institutions, including the hospital base. In the deployment of field hospitals was not taken into account one nuance. On the morning of September 14, at the time of the carrier's approach to the target, the wind direction changed. After the explosion, contrary to predictions, the radioactive cloud carried not to the bare steppe, but in the direction of the city with the glorious name of Chkalov. Radioactive precipitation fell not as a continuous deck, but in spots, large and small. Everything seems to be clean, then suddenly in a couple of hundred kilometers from the epicenter in a lovely grove - radioactive strawberry meadow. Or a spring. Or a brook. And then it's clean again.

Radioactive dust was lifted to a great height by a red-hot mass of air in a strong wind (Military Historical Journal. 1991. № 12. P. 86).

So, those very field hospitals were placed between the Totsk test site and the town of Chkalov just on the path along which the radioactive cloud passed. And after the last regiments left, the tents of the huge camp at the Totsk test site were folded up and put in the strategic reserve.

7

Colonel General B. P. Ivanov, a participant of the exercise, testifies: "*The special group was in the epicenter in 40 minutes*" (Military History Journal. 1991. № 12. P. 85).

It is our custom: when we need to hide something, we use a term that can mean anything: special echelon, item 602, cargo 505, special group. What kind of group was in the epicenter 40 minutes later? The colonel-general did not explain this.

This was told 45 years later by the commander of the special group, former Soviet Army captain, Serbian nationality Mladlen Markovic. After World War II, the Soviet Union trained officers from Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other countries that fell under the control of the Soviet Union. There was a break with Yugoslavia. Officers returning home after studying in the USSR were jailed in Yugoslavia as Stalinist spies. Therefore, many stayed in the Soviet Union, took Soviet citizenship and enlisted in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Captain Markovich had a special role in the Totsk experiment. He was chosen because in the event of his death no one would remember him. Captain Markovich was given a group of prisoners who were kept under heavy guard. He was to teach them how to measure radiation levels. The captain was given unlimited rights and could shoot his men on the spot for any act of insubordination. This group of prisoners led by Captain Markovich was the first to visit the epicenter 40 minutes after the explosion. It was they who measured the level, authorized the advance of the main forces of the attacking side and returned to the camp.

I could not stand on my feet when the prisoners were taken away, whose fate I learned nothing more about. They put me on

I lay there for several days without any medical assistance. There was no examination of the degree of infection. I learned about the fact that my treatment was not part of the plans of the Totsk scenario 40 years later, when on request I received a photocopy of the archive service record, in which it is written in black and white that I was "at the disposal of the commander of the North Caucasus Military District" since August 7, that is, 37 days before the atomic explosion. That is very far from the place of those events.....

No wonder that for the next half-century my fate, as well as the fate of thousands of "test subjects", was cut according to official disinformation and lies, sealed with signatures of "non-disclosure". If you opened your mouth, you would immediately find yourself a state criminal. And the whole "state secret" consists in the fact that until today I have no apartment, that the army, where my youth and health remained, did not recognize my rights to treatment in its hospitals (Literaturnaya Gazeta. September 15, 1999).

It was not only people, but also equipment. The artillery fire modes were forced for the sake of showmanship. The load on each barrel exceeded the permissible limits, fired cartridge cases were welded to the breech blocks, and ejectors failed to work. By the end of the exercise we had to knock out the casings with a crowbar and reassemble the bolts, which literally fell apart after each shot. Of course, after such "exploitation" the guns had to be written off. The barbaric exploitation during the many months of preparation for the "ballet" affected tanks, armored personnel carriers, vehicles - not only tens of thousands of people, but also thousands of the most modern combat and transport vehicles were subject to mass decommissioning.

Beetle scientists cheerfully report that local residents have been withdrawn from the area of the explosion. We won't argue with that. But pigs, geese and chickens were left behind. They were all battered, mauled, burned, contaminated. After the exercises, women on the roads threw stones and clods of earth at the passing military columns, believing the soldiers to be responsible for their misfortunes.

After many years, Zhukov's defenders claim that the destroyed and damaged houses were rebuilt and the residents were reimbursed for their losses. This is exactly what is written in the official reports that have been filed in the archives. I would like to point out that we know how to make up reports, and it is better to ask those who have experienced such disasters about how our authorities deal with the consequences of natural and man-made disasters.

Key point

It would seem that with the advent of nuclear weapons, which made it much easier to break through enemy defenses, the need for the "special echelon" should have been eliminated. However, as we shall see below, Soviet commanders were not at all going to spare their soldiers and refuse to use the "special echelon" in offensive operations. In the new war, the "special echelon" were the units whose task was to hold the break in the enemy's defense created by the nuclear strike. The soldiers of the new "special echelon" would not have been envied even by the soldiers of the punitive battalions: in the war every punitive had a chance to survive, but staying near the epicenter of a nuclear explosion guaranteed inevitable death from radiation sickness.

Defenders of Zhukov have come up with excuses any of his "feats." Here, too, they remind us that the Americans also conducted exercises with the use of nuclear weapons and with the participation of troops.

That's right. Only there were no villages and open mine-type wells five kilometers and a school 6,600 meters from the epicenter of the nuclear explosion.

And in general, why did you, dear comrades, suddenly start to take an example from the Americans? They are villains, warmongers, bastards, vampires! They invented the Dulles Plan to destroy us, to corrupt us beforehand, to plant all the most base, vile, vulgar and disgusting things in us. If there were no Dulles Plan - we would have no bureaucracy, no debauchery, no prostitution, no drug addiction, no bribery, no boorishness, no theft, no drunkenness! That's it

that damned Dulles has ruined us all with his plan. Without his evil plans, we would all be smart, honest, kind and gentle!

So let the enemy do what they like. Let them chop their soldiers with axes. Why imitate the villains? Don't you have enough brains of your own to do the smart thing? And if you decide to compare us with the Americans, then at least provide our officers with housing. But Zhukov never managed to accomplish this feat, and it is clear why - he himself was provided with housing as under communism, according to his needs.

CHAPTER 17

1

In assessing the exercises at the Totsk test site, our propaganda usually adheres to one of two opposing points of view.

First: this is an outstanding achievement, and only the great Zhukov was capable of such a feat!

The second: this is a monstrous crime, and only the bastard Beria was capable of such an atrocity!

In other words, if it's an achievement, thanks to Zhukov, and if it's a crime, it's anyone's fault but Zhukov's.

Here are examples. Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Armored Forces Losik is delighted with Zhukov's accomplishments:

He essentially revolutionized operational and combat training. Under his leadership, in September 1954 at the Totsk test site, for the first time in the army research exercises with practical use of nuclear weapons were conducted (Krasnaya Zvezda. December 28, 1996).

And here's an example of the opposite point of view:

The choice of the test site was not wrong - it was criminal. It was difficult to find a more populated region than the area between the Volga and the Urals in one-sixth of the Earth's landmass. Just as it was difficult to choose more fertile soil for contamination or such a beautiful river as the Samara, which is 600 kilometers long and which, in the very city of Samara with a population of over a million inhabitants, flows into the best trunk river in Europe

- The Volga, a river in which the leaders of the country, who had come to learn, enjoyed bathing. After the explosion, it did not occur to any of them to refresh themselves in it.

Let us name the statesmen who played a decisive role in determining the location of the explosion: L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotov, G.

M. Malenkov (Literaturnaya Gazeta. September 15, 1999. The title of the article is "A nuclear strike on Russia was made by the Soviet army 45 years ago").

So, the nuclear explosion at the Totsk test site is a great accomplishment. Zhukov is the greatest military genius. It was he who chose the most picturesque places in Russia, the most fertile soils for the exercises. It was in his head came the great idea to test nuclear weapons on people. And he had no assistants, deputies or superiors. He did everything himself! Glory to him!

On the other hand, if you listen to our historians and propagandists, the nuclear explosion at the Totsk test site was a despicable crime. But Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov are to blame. And Zhukov is not on the list of scoundrels for some reason. Although Zhukov was officially the head of the exercises. Although Beria was arrested on June 26, 1953 - more than a year before the exercises - and shot on December 23, 1953 at 19 hours 50 minutes - almost nine months before them.

2

Let's open Zhukov's memoirs and read what the strategist himself says about the exercises in September 1954. He does not evaluate them in any way, does not recall anything and does not reflect on anything. There is nothing in Zhukov's memoirs about these exercises.

Zhukov's defenders flooded the Internet with calculations of radiation levels and graphs of the precipitous drop in those levels. Let us ask these citizens: why are the materials of the exercises classified? Does someone in the Kremlin still hope to use this experience 60 years later? Is someone still planning to hurl a nuclear bomb with Tu-4 and to break through the front?
"western"?

And why did the participants in the exercise make written promises to keep the secret for 25 years? Why keep it? Let's see, what could a participant in the exercise tell us? That there was one? So nobody hid it. Representatives of 16 foreign countries were present at the exercise. From concrete bunkers, they watched what was happening through dark glass periscopes. All of them were briefed before the exercise.

We are breaking through the defenses in the direction of the epicenter, so many tanks and so many guns. Three days later, TASS officially informed the world about the exercises. So what kind of secrecy are we talking about after that?

What else could a participant in the exercise tell us? That the bomb has monstrous destructive power? Who doesn't know that? Suppose one participant of the exercise blabbed: he told someone that the explosion creates a fireball, that the light radiation and heat pulse burns houses and trees, melts tank armor, that the shock wave crushes any building into splinters, flattens tank hulls and tears off turrets. Let's assume that the one who heard it told someone else, and eventually this information became known to the enemy intelligence. Question: is it really the enemies do not know this information?

Maybe Zhukov didn't want to give the Americans the great secret about the nuclear explosion's destructive factors? Well, they were the first to discover those factors without Zhukov.

What are we hiding? And for what?

I explain by example. The archives of the Totsk district hospital from 1954 to 1980 were destroyed. Allegedly there was no room for storage - they had to burn them. The exercise took place in September 1954. From that moment, from 1955 to 1980, exactly 25 years passed - a clean quarter. That is, for twenty-five years there was a place to store the archives, and with the onset of perestroika and glasnost it suddenly disappeared.

3

What was the value of the experience gained from the exercise?

All participants in the exercise made a written promise to keep silent for 25 years. All had false entries made in their personal documents that they were in the Far East, the Polar Regions or Central Asia in September 1954. Participants in the exercises were thrown out of the army by the thousands. Zhukov didn't need them anymore. The dregs of production. Cinder.

If Zhukov, having awarded tens of thousands of soldiers with radiation sickness, white blood disease and other abominations, had then ordered them to be treated, at least the doctors would have gained valuable experience. But no one treated the participants of the exercises.

If after the exercise the participants had been put through medical, radiation and chemical control, military medics and radiation and chemical defense specialists would have gained valuable experience. But this did not happen either.

If the exercise had been followed by decontamination of the terrain, equipment and weapons, other specialists would have gained experience. But there was no decontamination.

If the health of local residents was closely monitored, the doctors would also gain experience. It would be interesting to know what will happen in 10-15 years. Will local girls give birth to healthy children when they grow up? Will the boys of the next generation grow up healthy? But even these questions were not addressed, and the medical statistics obtained in the area of the exercises were mercilessly destroyed.

So who and what experiences were gained from those drills?

4

The main question is WHY? Who and why was it necessary to conduct nuclear weapons exercises at the Totsk test site in September 1954? What was their meaning?

Surprisingly, six decades have already passed since Zhukov committed a particularly grave crime against his own people, against his homeland, but no one has ever asked us these questions. The official version is as follows: the exercises were conducted in order to make sure in practice that it was possible to break through enemy defenses by using nuclear weapons, and to gain experience in such a breakthrough.

Let's agree. But let's ask a leading question: who are you talking about? Which enemy's defense in case of war did Zhukov intend to break through with nuclear strikes? Let's follow the sun moving across the sky from east to west, let's go through the likely recipients of such strikes. Let's cut off, like the petals of a daisy, unbelievable variants. Weed out the unlikely ones. Identify the likely ones.

Japan is located on islands, there cannot be a solid front there. If we think of landing an amphibious assault, we must not forget the lessons of the landing on the Kuril Islands in 1945: what is needed first should be loaded last.

Why land a , though? At the end of World War II, the Americans dropped a surprise or two from bombers on Japanese cities. The result exceeded all expectations. The Americans didn't touch the capital, but hit secondary targets. Four strikes were prepared, but two were enough. Japan surrendered after a couple of strikes. Therefore, if the Soviet Union was preparing a war against Japan, the experience of the Totsk exercises would have been useless. It couldn't be repeated here, and there was no point. Pick a couple of cities, drop nuclear bombs, and the Japanese would surrender.

Korea? At the time of the exercise at the Totsk test site, only a year had passed since the Korean War had ended. The Soviet Union had lost the Korean War. Stalin's idea was to make South Korea communist. Three years of brutal fighting yielded no result: where the war began in June 1950, it ended in July 1953.

The Soviet Union intended to "liberate" South Korea. It didn't. It was a loss. The Americans sought to prevent "liberation." And they did not. That is, they achieved their goal. After that, Soviet marshals and generals were no longer drawn to Korea. The natural conditions of Korea (highly rugged terrain) are radically different from the terrain on which the Totsk exercises were held. If the Soviets were going to use the experience of the Totsk exercise in Korea, the exercise should have been held in a very different location.

China? China at that time was our good friend and ally. Thousands of Chinese specialists studied at Soviet universities and institutes. Chinese officers learned the science of victory at Soviet military schools and academies. Soviet military advisers passed on to the Chinese army the experience of the recent war. Soviet engineers helped the Chinese to master the latest achievements of science and technology up to the point of building an atomic reactor in China - for peaceful purposes, of course.

Soviet technologies poured into China by the river. Soviet documents and drawings were used to set up production in China of ZIS-150 and GAZ-51 automobiles, Sudaev and Kalashnikov assault rifles (I have a Chinese "Kalash" with hieroglyphics hanging on the wall in my office), carbine Simonov, machine guns Goryunov, Degtyarev , and Degtyarev.

Shpagin, Shavyrin mortars, Petrov and Grabin guns and howitzers, T-54 and PT-76 tanks, K-61 artillery tractors and tracked floating transporters, Mikoyan and Gurevich fighters, Il-28 and Tu-16 bombers, mines and torpedoes, transport planes and parachutes, submarines and communications equipment, Raspletin and Grushin anti-aircraft missiles. It even came to the transfer of a set of technical documentation for Korolev's 8K11 operational-tactical missiles.

The technologies were transferred by way of fraternal assistance. Free of charge. Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov was the main and most zealous supporter of arming China with Soviet nuclear missiles. At Zhukov's insistence, on August 20, 1957, China was given the technology to produce the most advanced Soviet medium-range strategic missiles of the time, the 8K51. On October 15, 1957, an agreement was signed under which the Soviet Union was to transfer nuclear munitions production technology to China, and only after Zhukov was removed from the post of defense minister and expelled from the highest party organs did the Soviet leadership manage to evade this suicidal obligation.

Zhukov is called a genius of strategy. What would this genius do if he could figure out why China needs our missiles with a range of 1,200 kilometers? They won't reach America anyway. To hit Japan? Japan was fully disarmed at the time. In the event of a general nuclear war, the Soviet Union could hit Japan. The Soviet Union had the weapons. And how much would Japan need? It seems to me that Japan did not want to get something like Hiroshima again. Or maybe those missiles were given to China to settle territorial disputes with India? But what is the Soviet Union's interest in this? If the Chinese use our missiles to launch nuclear strikes against India, what good will it do us? If the Chinese suddenly want to fight their neighbors, let them fight the Indians with bamboo sticks. Both Chinese and Indians have enough people and sticks too.

One can only wonder what Zhukov's goals were in transferring operational-tactical and strategic missile production technology to China. No other targets, except for Soviet

military facilities in Siberia and the Far East, except Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk, Semipalatinsk and Blagoveshchensk, cannot be thought of for those missiles.

But let us return to the question of which enemy's defenses in case of war Zhukov intended to break through with nuclear strikes. For liberation campaigns in Iran and Afghanistan it was quite possible to do without breaking through the defenses with nuclear strikes. Turkey could be frightened with a nuclear strike, but it would have been possible to free it from the shackles of capitalism without such a strike. And if there was a plan to break through the Turkish defenses, the exercises should have been held in mountainous terrain. But Zhukov, I remind you, conducted the exercises in the Southern Urals, where the terrain resembled Central Europe: forests, fields, hills, streams, rivulets, rivers, groves, and quite a few settlements.

You can't send a rifle corps to America. The U.S. Navy was far too superior to the Soviet Navy. But even if you transfer a corps, how to supply it with tens of thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food, spare parts and everything else? And what will one corps do in America? And it was not about one corps at the Totsk exercises - we have already seen that the corps exercises were combined with command and staff exercises of the army and the front, that is, a grandiose offensive operation of the whole front was practiced. But the front could not even theoretically be moved to the territory of America.

It turns out that on the planet Earth the Soviet Army had nowhere to conduct an offensive front operation with the breakthrough of defenses by nuclear strikes. The only exception was the territory of Western Europe, where the main opponent of the USSR was West Germany. If after the liberation campaign in West Germany France would not surrender to the mercy of the Soviet Union, which is doubtful, it would have to break through the French defenses with nuclear strikes. Nowhere else. Nowhere but on the territory of West Germany could there be such a powerful field defense, which had to be crushed by nuclear strikes and super-powerful infantry corps.

But then the question arises: why should we tear up our defenses on the territory of West Germany?

5

Let us imagine that the damned West German revanchists attacked peace-loving East Germany, defeated its army and a half-million group of Soviet troops on German soil, went through Poland, defeating the Polish Army and Soviet troops in Poland, broke into the territory of the Soviet Union, defeated and pushed back the troops of the western military districts, but, having exhausted the offensive impulse, stood in defense. And now the Soviet Army, in order to expel the invaders from their native land, delivers nuclear strikes, breaks through the enemy's front with these strikes and through the gaps formed, i.e. through the epicenters of nuclear explosions, introduces infantry corps into the breakthrough....

Is that it? No, it's not. This option will not work. The leadership of the Soviet Union had no reason at all to let the West German revanchists onto our soil or onto the territory of our allies. The West German generals had no nuclear weapons, but the Soviets did. As soon as the insidious enemies attacked East Germany, as soon as they crossed the border of Czechoslovakia or East Germany, they should have launched nuclear strikes on West German cities. That would have been the end of the war. That would have ended the war. And there would be no need to break through enemy defenses.

Japan, I repeat, only two destroyed cities were enough to agree to any terms of surrender. Would not the West German revanchists have asked for peace after Hamburg and Cologne, Dusseldorf and Munich had been turned into radioactive wastelands? So why should the Soviet Army break through their defenses if the suppostat asks for peace? And would the suppostat attack, realizing that his cities were in the crosshairs of Soviet missiles and bomber aircraft?

Europe is not America. The Soviet Army had something to hit Europe with. And if two, three, five lost cities with millions of inhabitants were not enough for the damned aggressors, then crush ten cities! Or twenty!

Now, if the West German revanchists attacked us, there would be no need to pierce their defenses with nuclear strikes.

6

Option two. There were ground troops of the damned Americans on the territory of Western Europe. Four divisions! And three brigades! All in West Germany. Let's assume that they would hit East Germany with the intention of reaching Moscow and Stalingrad.

In this case, the Soviet Army had to act according to the first option: smash the cities of West Germany. And send a message to the West Germans in advance: if anyone dares to use your territory to attack us and our allies, you will be the first to get it. Until you throw out of your territory or kill the last American soldier on your soil, we will destroy your cities. With millions of inhabitants.

But even in this case, the war could not last long. And in this case, Soviet generals would not have needed to break through American defenses in East Germany, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, much less in the Soviet Union.

The Americans should have been politely informed that the nukes, disassembled (or assembled), could be in the Amazon jungle, the Cordilleras, or the Andes. The Cordilleras are our planet's greatest mountain system in terms of length. There are places to hide. We should have informed the Americans that our guys are already living in the beautiful cities of Argentina or Paraguay. If you, gentlemen, attack the Soviet Union, our guys for the same salary will carry the elements of charges to the U.S. territory, assemble them and fire them. There are a lot of possibilities here: a Liberian-flagged dry cargo ship enters the port of a big seaside city, and in the hold is a nuclear charge. And it goes off. How much does Manhattan need? That's why you'd better not attack us.

That's it. So why break through American defenses? It turns out that in the case of aggression from territory of the West there was no reason for Soviet divisions and corps to break through the German defenses of American, West German, or any other troops. There was a simpler and more radical way not only to stop aggression almost instantly, but also to prevent it reliably.

Those who are preparing for a defensive war have no need to break through enemy defenses with nuclear explosions at any stage of such a war. If Zhukov and Khrushchev were concerned about the threat of enemy invasion, they should have announced: we are so weak, so timid, so we will hit once. But with an axe. Between the eyes. And neither Paris, nor London, nor Bonn, nor Frankfurt, which is on the Main.

In the second half of the 20th century, it became possible to defeat the enemy without breaching his defenses. Let him defend himself! And we will destroy his capital with nuclear strikes, destroy industry and transportation.

But Zhukov did not need to destroy enemy cities, railroad junctions, ports and factories. He had to capture them. The task of the Soviet Army was not to defend the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia from the damned enemies by forcing the aggressor to peace. Our task was to capture Central and Western Europe. Only then should we break through the defenses of American, West German, French, British and other troops in Central Europe.

Breaking into the enemy's front with nuclear explosions is necessary only in a situation where we attack West Germany, not with the aim of neutralizing or destroying it, but with the aim of occupying it. For any other variants of war, except for a liberation campaign in Western Europe, the experience of the exercises at the Totsk test site was neither acceptable nor suitable.

Zhukov was preparing for the capture of West Germany and then France. No one especially and did not hide it in those years, as they do not hide it now. This is how some admirers of Zhukov enthusiastically write in scientific treatises: the terrain for the exercises was selected as in Western Europe.

<i>Key point</i>

Many historians urge me to write history only on the basis of documents. In this call, there is a holy belief that the compilers of documents have never lied. But here is just one example. Under Stalin, during the period of mass shootings, the formula was introduced "ten years without the right of correspondence." The person was killed, and relatives were informed that he was in jail. If they remembered about him after ten years, the answer to inquiries was: he died in custody of a runny nose. And the date of death was written from a lantern.

There are tons of documents. And all of them are official. They were issued by the most important governmental organizations, which existed for the sole purpose of strengthening socialist legality.

The exercises at the Totsk test site are another, and by no means the last, example of deliberate and massive falsification of documents. The authorities shielded themselves from the consequences of their crime with a double wall: the participants' obligations to keep silent and false records in their personal files.

The victims of Zhukov's nuclear fun were ordered to keep silent on pain of criminal prosecution. And when they were allowed to speak, they were demanded to document their participation in those events. But the documents did not record their participation. The documents testified that the participants of the exercises at that time were in Siberia, Altai or the Far East.

It is hard not to agree with my critics: one should write only on the basis of documents. But all the materials of the exercises at the Totsk test site, contrary to Russian law, have been classified for six decades. "*Some documents will remain inaccessible for centuries, if it concerns state or personal secrets,*" - this was stated on April 22, 2008 at the FSB Cultural Center by the head of the Department of History of Wars and Geopolitics of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Rzheshesky.

But is there any sense in keeping the documents of the exercises at the Totsk test site as a great state secret? Of course there is! The state has committed a crime against its own army and its own people, so it is interested in forcing historians to write history only with reliance on documents, to which in the

for the next fifty, a hundred, or even two hundred years.

- I mean, don't write anything.

But that's not enough. We are told that access to documents must be restricted for the noble purpose of protecting personal privacy. Is the concern of statesmen for the preservation of such secrecy justified? Of course it is! Zhukov is a great strategist, and there is no need for us to know about his personal contribution to crimes against his own people. Therefore, from this point of view, it is better to keep anyone away from the documents for centuries.

CHAPTER 18

1

But what did Zhukov need to liberate Western Europe for? For self-defense. To preserve the Soviet Union, which could not exist alongside normal countries for long. The planned, i.e. bureaucrat-run economy of our country could not compete with the free economic activity of hundreds of millions of free citizens - just as cabbies with horse-drawn carriages could not exist for long on the streets of Soviet cities after the appearance of cab cars with cages on their sides. The cabbies had to either break all the cabs or give way to the cab drivers.

The bureaucrat-run Soviet economy was in the position of a horse-drawn coachman chasing a cab car.

"Catch up and overtake!" - Comrade Lenin urged.

"Catch up and overtake!" - Comrade Stalin demanded.

"Catch up and overtake!" - Khrushchev was hysterical.

But a socialist economy is under no circumstances capable of surpassing the economy of the free world. Simply because the bureaucrat has no need to innovate. Simply because the bureaucrat manages not his own but other people's money. Simply because no one will ask him for inefficient use of people's money.

That is why bureaucrats are capable of any crazy ideas - for example, blocking the Volga with stupid dams near Gorky and Kuibyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad, flooding the fertile floodplains, blocking the way for sturgeons that have lived here for millions of years. Bureaucrats are capable of damming the Dnieper, turning the great river into a standing swamp, overflowing with filth, including radioactive waste.

The bureaucrats are capable of creating a Ministry of Land Reclamation, which will drain the upper swamps, which will dry up the streams and rivers that feed the Don and Kuban, the Volga and the Dnieper.

Bureaucrats are able to divert water from Central Asian rivers in such volumes that the balance between water inflow to the Aral Sea and its evaporation is disturbed. As a result, the Aral Sea dries up, its bottom turns into a salt desert, winds carry salt for hundreds and thousands of kilometers, and all living things in the near and far surroundings die.

Bureaucrats, contrary to common sense, can even organize the Winter Olympics in a subtropical climate, spending insane amounts of money. And they get away with it. No one controls them, except other bureaucrats. Therefore, a state with an unfree economy, in particular a socialist state, will never be able to catch up, let alone overtake a country with a normal free economy.

An economic system in which people put their own money into business and not other people's money will always be superior to the economics of socialism. Socialism, which exists next to normal countries, must either impose the same criminal and stupid way of development on all its neighbors, or perish, unable to withstand economic competition.

That is how Neanderthals could not coexist for long next to another more developed and successful breed of humanoids and were eventually displaced by Cro-Magnons, the direct ancestors of modern man, or assimilated with them.

Our native power had to secretly and explicitly harm the capitalists, seeking to eliminate all of them. Otherwise, sooner or later the country would have to perish or be incorporated into the capitalist system and the free market.

2

The leaders of the Soviet Union fought not only for power itself, but also for how to dispose of that power. If Lev Davidovich Trotsky had been at the helm, he would have led us one way. If Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin had been at the helm, he would have led us to the same abyss, but by a different road. Zinoviev had his own views on the choice of the method of national suicide, Rykov had his own. And Comrade Stalin had certain views on the path along which the country and all progressive mankind should develop.

But in 1953, Stalin was gone. Those who succeeded him faced the eternal question: what to do?

In 1917, the country chose its own special path. Not like everyone else's. We were proud of it: we are pioneers! We're taking an uncharted path! We are paving the way to the future for all mankind!

But for some reason no one wanted to follow our path voluntarily. Millions of proletarians all over the world did not hurry to follow our example, did not break the chains of slavery, did not overthrow their bourgeoisie, did not run to us in droves for a happy life. Under Lenin, under Stalin and after them we dragged many people after us - Estonians and Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Hungarians, East Germans and Romanians, inhabitants of Somalia and Ethiopia. They dragged them by force, or threats, or generous handouts, luring them into a bright future. Let's build a dam across the Nile to our detriment, and Egypt will go our way! Give the dictators of Indonesia a whole fleet and they will join us! We will crush Budapest and Prague with tanks, shoot the rioters, and the rest will happily follow the path we have trodden!

To be fair, it should be reported that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians were also not particularly eager to trample the road to the future. They also kicked and kicked like hell! On the uncharted path the peoples of our country managed to put only as a result of the bloody Civil War, in which Russia lost more people and material values than in the First World War lost all countries taken together, including Russia itself.

The uncharted path in the darkness concealed many dangers. Slightly to the right - we'll fall, we'll be lost! Slightly leftward inclination - still can not save! It was not in vain that Comrade Stalin fought so hard against various inclinations, including the right-left [\[130\]](#) - the Soviet Union was in a position of unstable equilibrium for all seven decades of its existence.

Example. After World War II, the Soviet Union had 16 union republics. The Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic bordered Finland. The border with Finland is a huge length. There were dense taiga, lakes, stony, rapids rivers, swamps. To control this

the border is extremely difficult. Taking advantage of the natural conditions so suitable for escape, the entire Finnish population slowly slipped away to Finland. Everything ended with the fact that on July 16, 1956 it was decided to reduce the status of the Karelian-Finnish Union Republic to an autonomous republic and to remove the word "Finnish" from its name. The reduction in the number of union republics entailed a change in the national emblem of the USSR.

If the other borders had been as convenient for withdrawal, the Soviet Union would have lost many more of its republics. The Soviet coat of arms would have to be changed much more often.

3

The same process was underway in the countries that became our forced allies as a result of World War II.

After the war, Korea was divided into North and South Korea. North Korea set about building a bright future. South Korea maintained a normal economic system. Understandably, people fled from the north to the south, leaving everything behind. Something had to be done about it. There were only two solutions.

One: refuse to build a bright future in North Korea. And then people wouldn't run away.

The second is to put South Korea on the right track. Make it not be a tantalizing example for the people of the northern regions.

Comrade Stalin chose, of course, the second solution. North Korea started a war against South Korea in order to ensure a happy life for South Korea as well.

And Germany, too, was divided into two parts. In East Germany - building a happy life according to Soviet models. Therefore, from September 1950 to October 1955, one million 219 thousand people left East Germany for West Germany. Since the spring of 1955, the number of those leaving began to increase rapidly from month to month.

The Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic, North Korea, and East Germany faced these problems because there was an opportunity to leave not to a foreign land: the Finns went to Finland, the Germans to West Germany,

Koreans to South Korea. All the others were held back by the sad fact that they had to leave not only for the unknown, leaving everything behind, but also for a foreign land, a foreign country. But even if people did not leave, it did not mean that they were eager to build a bright future in their homeland.

Therefore, the leaders who took power in the Kremlin after Stalin's death had to decide what to do. The decision had to be made very urgently. And there were still only two decisions: either to abandon the construction of a bright future, or to drag the whole of humanity behind them by force, so that the example of other countries and peoples would not seduce our people, would not force them to compare their happy life with the life of oppressed proletarians of neighboring countries.

At the very top of the Kremlin leadership, the positions are diametrically opposed.

Beria and Malenkov believed that we should gradually shake off the idea of building a bright future, returning to the number of normal states, stopping experiments on our own people. Bulganin and Khrushchev insisted that we should continue on the road to communism.

Everyone can see where we would have come if we had followed the path of Beria and Malenkov by the example of China. The backward, impoverished country, without abandoning the red banner, gradually turned to the path of economic freedom and became an economic, political and military superpower. This is exactly the path that Beria and Malenkov tried to turn the Soviet Union around after Stalin's death. And where we came, following Bulganin and Khrushchev, everyone can see by looking around. We came to the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the extinction of the population.

4

Developing the idea that the Soviet Union has been in a position of unstable equilibrium for all seven decades of its existence, some people compare the position of the Soviet Union throughout its history to the position of a daredevil walking without safety on a cable stretched over Niagara Falls. I strongly disagree this comparison. The fact is that a rope or

The cable has two ends attached to two sturdy bases. You can go forward, you can go back. You'll still end up somewhere.

But it is impossible to arrive at communism. It is impossible to reach a situation where everyone on our planet will have everything they need. I recently saw from the shore how the yacht of a fellow countryman was being refueled. A liter of diesel is one British pound. A pound and a half. A ton is a thousand pounds. Again, a ponytail. A hundred tons is over a hundred thousand pounds. I don't know how much fuel to pump into that boat, but it has a displacement of 13,000 tons, like two cruisers.

"Aurora" put together. This yacht has to be insured, it has to be repaired and painted, and the crew of the yacht itself, two helicopters, and a small submarine have to be maintained. And this countryman is not the only yacht.

It's a good thing we have such a rich country. Our people simply have nowhere to put their money. Our nation thanks its best people by providing them with a beautiful life. We make sure that the best people have a good life. But the needs of this citizen are not met. He is not satisfied with what he has.

Excuse me, but what would happen if every inhabitant of planet Earth started to satisfy their needs? Is it possible to satisfy all material needs of billions of people? After all, we are able to fully satisfy the needs of only a small group of our citizens. Therefore, I repeat: it is impossible to build a society in which everyone's material needs will be satisfied according to their needs, as promised by communist ideologists. Communism is impossible. In principle.

Therefore, the road to communism is not four quarters of the way along a rope stretched like a nerve. The road to communism is a steel rod of incredible length. For 70 years we've been walking, and we've never seen the end of the road. Because there is no end. And the further we went, the more the rod sagged and vibrated. After 70 years of great victories and accomplishments, after unheard-of efforts and sacrifices, food cards were introduced in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was marching at a breakneck pace towards communism. That is, to nowhere. And Beria was right. Beria was trying to quietly, without much

and bring the Soviet Union to the path of development of all normal countries with a victorious march.

Why look for a special way when there are well-trodden paths? Without the death and suffering of millions. Without starvation and mass shootings. No bloody experiments on your own people. After all, you can build a decent life without resorting to all that. Like in Switzerland, for example.

Why not go the way of Switzerland? What's wrong with it? There is no oil, no gas, no coal, nickel and manganese in this country. There is only economic freedom for the citizens.

5

Khrushchev destroyed Beria. Khrushchev published a million copies of Stalin's textbook on the inevitability of World Revolution as a result of World War III. But even this failed to crush Malenkov and all those who followed him. They continued to repeat like clockwork that the Third World War promises the ruin of mankind, and therefore it is necessary to turn away from the path of World Revolution.

And then Zhukov intervened in the dispute.

After Stalin's death, the situation looked quite simple. Armed forces and arms production would be reduced if the country turned from the path of the World Proletarian Revolution, and increased if the country did not turn from the chosen path.

Zhukov decided not to fold, and therefore immediately began to punch a simple idea: in the third world war can be won!

Germany was proposed to be neutral by Beria, the enemy of the people, but we will go another way. We'll make all of Germany Communist. We'll crack the defenses of West Germany with nuclear strikes, break into its territory, liberate the population. And at the same time, liberate France, Spain and Belgium. We will give a signal to the Americans: we do not touch you, do not hit our cities, or we will hit yours, we have something to hit you with.

After receiving the position of First Deputy Minister of Defense, Zhukov began practical preparations for the Totsk test site and the troops that would take part in the exercises. Zhukov conducted the exercises at the Totsk test site to prove that, despite the emergence of nuclear weapons, the victory of socialism in Western Europe would be possible

is possible! In the coming war we shall liberate West Germany as we liberated Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and other countries during the last war! Let's rush in on tanks and establish a happy life - like ours. Let's break the way of tanks through the enemy's defense front with nuclear explosions! The main thing is that West Germany, after it France, Spain and all other countries of Europe will follow our way.

September 14, 1954 Zhukov showed all doubters: this is how we break the defenses in West Germany, this is how we introduce troops through the epicenter and go forward. Even to the ocean.

Malenkov and his supporters were shamed.

September 14, 1954 was the beginning of the end of Malenkov.

September 14, 1954 - the beginning of a new stage in the struggle of the Soviet Union for the liberation of the oppressed proletarians of Europe and the world from the shackles of capitalism.

September 14, 1954 was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.

Key point

Western experts knew everything about the Soviet Union. They understood nothing.

For example, for decades the United States spent absolutely fantastic sums to determine the military budget of the Soviet Union. Scientific institutes worked on this, conferences and symposia of all kinds were convened, learned gentlemen wrote articles and books, defended dissertations, put forward and defended theories.

To determine the real value of Soviet military expenditures, US research centers spent, according to various CIA estimates, from \$4 billion to \$10 billion. This was the largest social science project in the history of mankind (Krasnaya Zvezda. August 20-26, 2008).

You have to keep in mind that in the 1970s and 1980s, a billion dollars was a much more impressive sum than it is today.

The Soviet Union's military expenditures did not only trouble the Americans. Other countries were also trying to solve this problem. Scientific research here, of course, did not have an American scope, but still millions were invested in solving this problem.

In October 1982, in Oxford, the owners of major British newspapers gathered leading Western Sovietologists for a private conference to discuss the prospects for the Soviet Union. I had just published a book about the Soviet Army in English, *Inside the Soviet Army*, the title of which can be translated into Russian as *The Soviet Army: A View from Within*. The book was a certain success, so I was invited to participate in the meetings. I am sitting, listening, yawning. The gentlemen of science offered no methods, but no one was able to calculate Soviet military expenditures. And then I was invited to express my thoughts. I stand up and declare: *Sirs, here is for you newspaper.*

"Truth." Read it, it says it all. No one is hiding anything: the peace-loving Soviet Union spends 17 billion rubles a year on military needs.

They say to me: it can't be that! I said to them:

What's the difference?

That's what they couldn't understand. They never understood it. It seemed to them that if the Soviet Union has a large military budget, it means it has powerful armed forces, and if it has a modest budget, it means the armed forces are weak. That's why they tried to calculate the real budget.

I explain to them that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state. This follows even from its name. They don't understand me: what's the difference? I explain with an example.

Let us assume that the rulers of the Soviet Union decided to move one motorized rifle division from Brest to the Chinese border. A motorized rifle division of that time means 10,815 soldiers and officers, 257 tanks, 117 BMPs, 194 APCs, 127 BRDMs, 2,413 vehicles, tactical and anti-aircraft missiles, artillery, mortars, and so on. If each railroad train

to load 40 cars each, it would take about 60 echelons just to transport the cars. And the way is both far and long - a quarter of the equator.

I ask: what, gentlemen, in your opinion, in this matter is the economic interest of the outstanding military leader Marshal of the Soviet Union, four times Hero of the Soviet Union (four times more Hero Stars than Stalin's!), Hero of Socialist Labor Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich, who is in charge of this very Soviet Union? Do you think he wants to get more money from the Soviet Army for transportation or less?

This question has put the experts in a dumbfounded stalemate.

The railroads of the Soviet Union belonged to the people and were managed by the Minister of Railways, Hero of Socialist Labor, Comrade Pavlovsky. And all the ministers were ruled by Comrade Tikhonov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, holder of nine Orders of Lenin. (Only heroes ruled over us.) And above the government stood the Communist Party headed by Comrade Brezhnev, a staunch Leninist.

Let us assume that the advisers and referents suggested to Comrade Brezhnev that he show some restraint and demand one ruble from the Soviet Army for the transportation of the division. If so, then Comrade Tikhonov, the head of the government, by order of Comrade Brezhnev, should have taken that ruble from the state budget and given it to Comrade Ustinov, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, holder of eleven Orders of Lenin. For the Ministry of Defense has no money of its own - only money given by the government.

The Minister of Defense will receive a ruble from the government, pay it to Comrade Pavlovsky, Minister of Railways, and Comrade Pavlovsky will return the ruble to the state (i.e., the government) as revenue received.

Now let's assume that Comrade Brezhnev decided to make a lot of money on this case. And let us suppose that, say, the referents told Comrade Brezhnev to rip off a hundred million rubles from the Soviet Army for the transportation of a division! In this case, the government of the Soviet Union

should take a hundred million out of their own pockets and give it to the Ministry of Defense. Let's not forget: the Ministry of Defense has no money of its own, only money given by the government.

The Minister of Defense will get a hundred million from the government, pay it to the Ministry of Railways, the Minister of Railways will happily report on the huge proceeds and transfer a hundred million to the state (i.e., to the government) at once!

I repeat the question: what is the difference between one ruble and a hundred million?

So: there was no difference. And there was no point in giving a ruble to the Ministry of Defense so that this ruble would return to the same pocket. That is why no one transferred any money anywhere.

Here experts jump up from their seats: so how much does such transportation cost?

My answer is that it is not worth anything. The work is done, but the value in monetary terms cannot be determined. And money is involved in that operation very conditionally. There is an order from the government to the Ministry of Railways: to bring so many cars here and to transfer so many people and cargoes over there.

It's the same for everything. The army needs nukes. It needs to enrich uranium. It needs centrifuges to spin. It needs a lot of electricity. For the sake of these charges, for the sake of this uranium, we dam the great Siberian river. We're putting millions of cubic meters of concrete into the dam body. Question: what is the economic interest of the government - to sell cement to builders expensively or cheaply?

If the government sells a ton of cement for a ruble, then it will be necessary to take the appropriate amount out of one's pocket and give it to the chief of construction. The chief will pay the state cement factories, and they will return the money to the state. If a ton of cement is sold for a hundred rubles, then the government will have to take out of its pocket a hundred times the amount, give it to the head of construction, who will pay the state cement factories, and they will return the money to the same state pocket.

Therefore, there is no point in arguing about the military budget of a socialist state. Most of the operations had no monetary value and could not have no monetary value. Wise experts refused to understand this.

Then I explained the state of affairs with a more understandable example. Here is an American battalion. It spends fuel, spare parts for vehicles, ammunition. Soldiers have to be armed, clothed, fed, treated, and paid money for their service. And weapons, ammunition, food, and fuel come from private firms, the price is determined by the market: this firm is ready to sell army pants at such a price, another firm is ready to sell them at such a price.

- half the price.

But here's the situation: the same battalion spent a whole week in the rain and wet snow, in the penetrating wind, in mud and cold, preparing defenses in the mountains of South Korea, digging trenches and trenches, building dugouts, driving in stakes, wrapping them with barbed wire. Hundreds of people worked for a whole week and did a huge amount of very necessary work. How much does it cost?

It costs nothing. The value of this necessary work cannot be expressed in money, because no one buys the results of labor.

In the Soviet Union, everything was organized this way. Work was done by state structures for state structures. The seller and the buyer were all the same state. In one person.

But even with this example, the experts could not get through. Then I gave the simplest domestic example. Imagine, I say, sirs, that your wife doesn't work. She's a housewife. The only money in the family is what you bring home. You decide to teach your wife to drive. Is it in your economic interest to charge her one dollar for every hour she drives or a hundred?

But even this example did not seem to help explain to them the essence of a socialist economy.

It was not only American experts who did not understand the essence of the economic system of socialism. There were some comrades in our country as well. One Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, General of the Army, Hero of Socialist Labor, holder of four orders of Lenin, was Chairman of the KGB, then took the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. At that moment (as always) our economy was not very good for some reason. So Comrade Andropov decided to

the problems of economics. He asked a question to very wise scientists: how much does a ton of steel really cost in the Soviet Union?

That's a killer question, for sure. A smart person would not ask such a question. But Comrade Andropov did not have outstanding mental abilities, so he decided to find out.

A conference of academicians and doctors of economic sciences gathered. They argued, fought, but the decisions were not ours.

Because there is no solution. A Soviet citizen doesn't need a ton of steel. He will not buy it. Dozens, hundreds, thousands and millions of tons of steel were obtained by state enterprises from other state enterprises by order of the State Planning Committee. This is the same situation as with the transfer of a motorized rifle division from point A to point B. It is possible to calculate how many railcars and locomotives are needed, for how many days, how much electricity and diesel fuel will be needed. But the cost of moving the division cannot be determined.

It is impossible to determine the value of what is not sold, what is transferred from one state pocket to another. It is only possible to calculate material costs and the costs of human labor: to weld a ton of steel, it is necessary to have so much ore, to waste so many tons of coke, so many tons of water, to use up so much electricity, to add so much to the molten mass of other metals, to use the labor of so many people with so many qualifications for so many hours. The economy of socialism was officially called *cost* economy. This is what they wrote in political economy textbooks.

Leaders, starting with Lenin, urged bureaucrats of all levels and ranks to be frugal. Comrade Stalin declared those who did not save money as pests and shot them. Comrade Khrushchev chased such people out of high positions. Comrade Brezhnev, at the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, read by syllables what the referents had composed: *e-ko-no-mi-ca must be e-ko-no-mi-ca!* The hall, suppressing a yawn, habitually beat its hands.

But a cost-based economy cannot be economical by definition. It cannot be economical, if it is even officially listed as a cost economy. A cost economy is not an economy at all.

That is why socialism always loses in economic competition with normal human society, loses inevitably and naturally. This is why the Soviet Union was doomed from the very beginning to economic backwardness and defeat. That is why it was not capable of coexisting alongside normal states. That is why the Soviet Union, like a knight at the crossroads, had three paths open before it:

1. to abandon socialism and return to the normal path of development;
2. to lose the economic competition and turn into a raw material colony of developed countries;
3. by any means to undermine the economy of competitors, up to defeating their armies, seizing their territories and establishing the same orders that are established in our country.

Our leaders did not want to give up socialism - in this case they would lose power. We could only hope for the defeat of the enemy.

Victory over normal human society, as we have just found out, could not be economic - it could only be military.

That's why the Soviet Union has built more nuclear submarines than the rest of the world combined.

That's why the Soviet Union built more tanks than all other countries combined.

That's why the Soviet Union had more airborne divisions than all other countries in the world combined.

This is why the Soviet Union collapsed and was crushed by the exorbitant mass of weapons produced.

CHAPTER 19

1

January 25, 1955 in the Kremlin opened the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The agenda: "On increasing the production of livestock products". A hundred years from now, some historian, who does not have our all-conquering sovok hardening, will yawn sadly and pass by this episode, without taking any notice. But you and I are hardy, beaten skins, we were born and grew up in that system. Even in our early youth we absorbed those mores with the very first mug of Zhigulevsky beer! We know what was behind such agendas.

So, there is a terrible shortage of bread, meat, milk, butter and all other foodstuffs in the country. It is urgent to increase their production. And how? Khrushchev solved the problem of bread production: the virgin steppes were plowed up, and there was so much bread that it was simply impossible to take it all out of those steppes. And the bread that was taken out had nowhere to be stored. While waiting for the construction of new elevators, they had to dump grain at the railroad junctions right on the ground. That is - in the mud. That is - in the rain and snow.

Nothing! Soon we will pave roads, build elevators, and we will have plenty of grain. But what about livestock breeding?

Nikita Khrushchev decided not to turn away from the Stalinist path. It is possible to provide the country with livestock products - it is only necessary to expand socialist competition! Between brigades! Between collective farms! Between districts, regions and republics! The leaders of agriculture should be awarded with certificates of honor! Photographs of the best brigadiers and kolkhoz chairmen should be posted on honor boards! Districts and oblasts that have achieved the highest results should be awarded with red banners!

And one more thing: to set tasks before the creative intelligentsia: to glorify the labor of cattle breeders in poetry and prose! In movies! In heartfelt songs! In ballet and opera!

This is the general course of our great party!

Such was the beginning of that plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Introductory part. Speech warm-up. But the main speeches were not about honorary diplomas and red banners. The main speeches were about the fact that the entire Soviet people, inspired by the decisions of their native party, is confidently, seven-mile strides into a bright future. And here, you see, there are some people who propose to turn from the Leninist-Stalinist path! Give land to the people! Cancel taxes on fruit trees, on cows and pigs! Allow collective farmers to have not one cow, but two! This is not our way, comrades, not our way! Those who propose such a thing should be driven from the top of power!

2

The main issue on the agenda of the January 1955 plenum was allegedly the question of animal husbandry. In reality, the main task that the organizers of the plenum set themselves was to remove Comrade Malenkov from power. A preliminary decision had already been made. The first deputy head of the USSR government and the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin, during breaks in the sessions, called other military commanders into his office one by one and informed them that at the end of the plenum Malenkov would be removed from the post of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and he, Bulganin, would take his place, freeing the place of the USSR Minister of Defense. It was planned to appoint Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov as Minister of Defense.

Marshals one by one went into Bulganin's office. Opinions varied. Zhukov? Wouldn't Vasilevsky be better? Some agreed without objection, realizing that the issue has already been resolved. When the turn came to Admiral Kuznetsov Nikolai Gerasimovich, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, he spoke in the spirit that if the decision was made, then it was too late to express any opinions. However, if Zhukov were to be appointed Minister of Defense, he should point out that in matters of fleet leadership he should pay attention to the opinion of sailors as people more knowledgeable in naval affairs.

Bulganin thanked Kuznetsov and let go. Bulganin told Zhukov: Kuznetsov against you.

Zhukov did not forgive such things.

3

On January 31, 1955, on the last day of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev addressed the audience:

I shall say a few words about Comrade Malenkov's position on the question of our policy in Germany. You now know what line Beria was pursuing: he proposed to abandon the course of building socialism in the GDR. I must say directly that at that time Comrade Malenkov was completely together with Beria on this question.....

Now about Comrade Malenkov's speech at a meeting before the electorate on March 12, 1954, where he made a theoretically erroneous and politically harmful statement about the possibility of "the death of world civilization" if the imperialists unleash a third world war. With his incorrect statement about the death of civilization Comrade Malenkov confused some comrades....

The multiplication and further development of all that has been accumulated by our party, largely depends on who stands at the helm and how he pursues the line outlined by the party, how to carry out the precepts of the great founder of our party and the Soviet state Lenin and the faithful successor of his cause Stalin (Malenkov A. G. About my father Georgy Malenkov. M.: NTC Technoekos, 1992. C. 115).

So, Khrushchev accused Malenkov of deviating from the line of Lenin and Stalin. It turned out that Malenkov was not a firm enough Leninist-Stalinist. And there is no way to keep such a leader in top positions.

It was a rout. The criticism was followed by organizational reprimands: February 7, 1955 Malenkov was removed from the post of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He remained a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he was assigned the post of deputy head of government, but the slide downward began.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, a staunch associate of Khrushchev, became Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Having risen to this position, Bulganin vacated the place of the USSR Minister of Defense. On February 9, 1955, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR.

After all, it was thanks to Zhukov that he was able to convince doubters that victory in World War III was possible! After all, it was thanks to Zhukov that Malenkov, who expressed doubts about the correctness of the Lenin-Stalin path, was removed from power!

Thus, it was thanks to Zhukov that we were able to keep our country on the right track of building the most just society and fighting the oppressors of the working class all over the world!

4

The exercises organized by Zhukov and conducted under his leadership at the Totsk test site were a resounding success and outstanding results. All those who began to lose faith in the victory of the proletariat as a result of the coming Third World War, were ideologically defeated and shamed. All those who piously believed in the possibility of liberating Western Europe from the shackles of capitalism by cracking the front with nuclear strikes and the breakthrough of tank masses into the lands of the enemies, received a convincing confirmation of their correctness.

The ideological defeat allowed to kill the doubters and at the organizational and administrative level. Malenkov was removed from the management of the country's economy. Immediately all those who supported him were removed. The main task was to remove the most ardent and brightest, and the rest would shut up and run to the camp of the winners.

The exercises at the Totsk test site allowed Khrushchev to sharply strengthen his position and now to boldly carry out his great plans. Stalin's textbook clearly states: The October Revolution was the beginning of the World Proletarian Revolution and the base for its development. Exactly so - the base!

It is time to move from words to deeds! It is time to produce Kalashnikov rifles in the millions and tens of , and ammunition for them in the billions. It is time to distribute them to Asian, African and all other fighters against capitalism. Production of such quantities

of machine guns and cartridges required a sharp increase in the production of special steel, copper and lead. And the production of steel, copper and lead required a sharp increase in the production of coal, coke, iron ore and electricity. This, in turn, required an increase in the production of automobiles, excavators, bulldozers. And to produce a lot of cars, excavators and bulldozers, it was necessary to sharply increase the production of steel, copper and lead.

But we're not behind the price! We won't just produce assault rifles! We'll build tanks by the tens of thousands. The freedom fighters will get them in any quantity! And machine guns! And cannons! And mortars! And fighter planes and bombers! Arm China! North Korea! Indonesia! Arabs! Negroes! Give us a base for the development of the World Revolution!

After Stalin, the country could go one way, and could go another. The voices of the leaders were equally divided. Neither side could overpower the other, even using the most dastardly techniques, such as the sudden arrest of Marshal Beria.

The balance was broken by Zhukov. On the scales he decisively threw a three-pound weight, which gave a decisive advantage to those who demanded not to turn away from the path of Lenin-Stalin, from the path that led to the victory of the proletariat on an international scale. Zhukov paid with the health and lives of tens of thousands of soldiers, officers and civilians, but managed to prove that in the third world war can be won. The main thing is to have plenty of the most modern weapons.

Even half a century later, we have not appreciated Zhukov's outstanding personal contribution to solving the dispute between the leaders. His main merit is that he did not allow the country to stray from the path of the World Revolution. Thanks to him, we followed this path for almost four decades - until our legs broke under the incredible weight of accumulated weapons.

5

The exercises are conducted in order to test all preliminary calculations and estimates in an environment that is as close to the real world as possible. The exercises at the Totsk test site made it possible to identify a certain weakness in the whole scenario of the forthcoming defense breakthrough. We strike

nuclear strike on enemy positions, but our troops are too far from the epicenter. By the time they reach the epicenter after the explosion, the enemy can close the gap in the defense, and then we will not be able to break into the capitalist lands and liberate our brothers - the workers of other countries suffering from the oppression of the capitalists. And the children of the workers are starving, dreaming of a piece of bread - they are waiting for the liberators. And if the bourgeoisie quickly close the breaches in their front after our nuclear strikes, the liberation will be thwarted.

And if immediately after each explosion, helicopters in the epicenter?

Zhukov decided: the success of the exercises to consolidate! He ordered to prepare next year's ballet according to the same scenario. Everything is the same as last time, only in reality through the epicenter of the nuclear explosion will be advancing not one corps, and as many as two! The adjacent flanks of the two corps will strike through the epicenter!

And another thing: immediately after the explosion, fifteen to twenty minutes later, a paratrooper regiment should be dropped into the epicenter from helicopters. The soldiers would entrench themselves, repel the enemy's attempts to close the gap, and at that time the corps strike groups would come up from the front.

The place is the same. You can't think of a better place than the Totsky Proving Ground. The landscape, if you stretch your imagination, looks like Bavaria.

Zhukov reported to Khrushchev. He agreed. He gave instructions to Chkalov and Kuibyshev: we will repeat the big concert in a year, get ready.

Comrade Pavel Korchagin, the first secretary of the Chkalov Regional Committee of the CPSU, immediately ordered to hitch his personal car to the first passing train. It is not far to Kuibyshev. The Samara River originates near Chkalov, which used to be Orenburg, and flows directly to Kuibyshev, which used to be Samara. The railroad main line is along the Samara River, then to the right of it, then to the left. Halfway there is that damned Totsk polygon.

Comrade Korchagin went from the station to his neighbor, the First Secretary of the Kuibyshev Regional Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Mikhail Trofimych Efremov: what shall we do?

It was decided: Korchagin would address Khrushchev first - his arguments were weaker. The second, as if independently of Korchagin, does not

showing that they are in cahoots, Efremov will turn.

Korchagin returned to his home in Chkalov, called Khrushchev, reported on the overfulfillment of the industrial production plan, on the successes in agriculture, on the growth of communist consciousness of workers, peasants and labor intelligentsia, smoothly moved on to the combat readiness of the troops of the South Ural Military District, which as a result of the exercises held at the Totsk test site unimaginably increased. And in conclusion, we should be careful to say that we could have stopped there, because some negative aspects had come to light.

— What are the moments? - Khrushchev inquired.

— Our people are distrustful. They are told not to eat apples, not to dig potatoes. But they, our people, are told not to eat apples.

— Are there some who believe that cabbage and cucumbers from vegetable gardens should not be eaten?

— Nikita Sergeyevich, there are such people. They don't eat it themselves - they take it to the market. So that good things don't go to waste. Or they give it to the state - no one canceled the procurement plan.

— What other moments?

— We reported that all cattle from the dangerous area were moved to safe places before the exercise. But where is safe? In addition to several villages within five kilometers, there are also settlements ten and twenty kilometers away from the firing range. Cows can be driven from hundreds of yards, but how to drive pigs? They are fat, on short legs. And where to put chickens, geese, ducks? That's why a lot of animals are beaten by the explosion, and those that are not killed are sick. It's impossible to keep the cows that were driven away from diseases. They nibble the grass. How and to whom can you explain where the grass is good and where it is radioactive? As a result, some unconscious citizens express some signs of discontent.

Khrushchev thought about it and decided that it was still necessary to hold the exercises. If we choose another place, we will have two contaminated test sites. It would be better to hold them in one place. He informed Comrade Korchagin about it.

And then the next day the first secretary of the Kuibyshev regional committee of the CPSU, comrade Mikhail Trofimovich Efremov, called. Efremov reported on the overfulfillment of the industrial production plan, on successes in agriculture, on the growth of communist consciousness of workers, peasants and labor intelligentsia, and then smoothly moved on to the combat readiness of the troops of the Volga Military District, which as a result of the exercises held at the Totsk training ground had increased inconceivably.

In conclusion, Efremov expressed full support for the idea of holding another exercise of the same kind. That's right! We need to learn how to fight back against the enemy! There are negative aspects, but we are not used to it. The Samara River flows into the Volga right near the central part of Kuibyshev. It will carry some radioactive isotopes into the Volga, but not much. The Volga is a wide and full-flowing river.

There are hundreds of thousands of people in the city. The population of Kuibyshev is steadily approaching one million. The city is closed to any foreigners, because in Kuibyshev concentrated plants of incredible power and extreme secrecy. In Kuibyshev our most important aircraft factories, here also rocket production is unfolding. The production of airplanes and missiles requires light metals of special strength. We produce them right in Kuibyshev. The level of air, water and soil pollution has exceeded all conceivable limits, so some increase in the radioactive background will not spoil the picture much and will not interfere with the city.

The point is different: right under the building of the regional committee of the Communist Party, right under the office of its first secretary, there is a top secret bunker of Comrade Stalin. In the event of war, this bunker will be Comrade Khrushchev's central command post. The war, if the capitalists unleash it, will be atomic. And the First Secretary of the Kuibyshev Regional Committee asked the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee whether it was reasonable to contaminate the area of the central command post with radiation in peacetime.

Khrushchev promised to think about it. He did not reply to the First Secretary of the Kuibyshev Regional Committee immediately, but only two weeks later. But he immediately called Zhukov and ordered the next military exercises with practical use of nuclear weapons to be held elsewhere.

Zhukov objected: there was no other place like it.

Khrushchev suggested it: Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.

Zhukov had no other arguments. I had to come up with another one on the fly: if held elsewhere, planning and preparation would take more than a year.

Khrushchev cut it off: to be held in two years.

7

In July 1955, another plenum of the Central Committee was assembled. Until July 1955, only those who had been at these heights under Stalin had been members of the Presidium. This plenum was remarkable already because comrade Alexei Illarionovich Kirichenko was included in the Presidium of the Central Committee. For the first time after Stalin's death, a new person who was not in the highest echelon of leaders under Stalin entered the Presidium. Comrade Kirichenko had been on Khrushchev's team before the war.

On July 12, 1955 the Plenum decided to convene the XX Congress of the CPSU in early 1956.

Immediately after Stalin's death, Beria and Malenkov were in favor of condemning Stalin's personality cult and choosing a new direction for the country's development. Bulganin and Khrushchev were in favor of preserving the cult of Stalin and preserving socialism.

Beria was thrown from the top of power and destroyed. Let us not forget that he was not thrown down and killed because he was an executioner - everyone there was an executioner - he was killed because he wanted to turn from the path of socialism. Malenkov was removed from the leadership of the economy. Both were accused of treason against the great cause of Lenin-Stalin. Now that Beria and Malenkov no longer posed a danger, it was possible to use their ideas. Not all of them, but only some.

Khrushchev decided to crush Stalin's cult of personality. Crush it, but still lead the country into a bright future along the path of Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin.

Don't turn around.

IVAN STEPANOVICH KONEV. Born in 1897. In the First World War - junior non-commissioned officer. During the Civil War - commissar of an armored train, commander of a brigade, commander of a division, chief of staff of the army of the Far Eastern Republic.

After the Civil War he graduated from the special faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. He was a corps commander, commander of the 2nd Separate Far Eastern Army.

On November 26, 1935 he was promoted to the rank of commander. February 22, 1938 - the rank of komkor.

8 February 1939 - the rank of commander of the 2nd rank.

In 1940, Stalin recertified the entire top command staff and introduced new military ranks that were in no way related to the old ones. As a result, Komkor Zhukov, for example, was promoted to the rank of General of the Army, and Commander 2nd Rank Konev was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General.

In early 1941, Konev was appointed commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. In May 1941, on Stalin's orders, he secretly deployed the 19th Army in the district and personally led it.

On June 13, 1941, the 19th Army, like a number of other armies, began a secret advance into the western parts of the country. The war caught the 19th Army in echelons. All of Stalin's plans were disrupted, and the echelons of the 19th Army, some units of which had already been unloaded, were urgently deployed to Belorussia, where the main forces of the Western Front were surrounded and defeated.

On September 11, 1941 Konev was appointed commander of the Western Front, on September 12 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel-General. On October 2, 1941 German troops struck on the flanks of the Western Front. On October 7, Wehrmacht strike groups joined together near Vyazma, closing the encirclement ring around the main forces of the Western Front. Four Soviet armies - 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd - fell into the encirclement. They consisted of 19 rifle divisions and 4 tank brigades. Different sources give different information about how many Red Army soldiers and commanders were captured, but in any case more than 600 thousand people were captured.

The way to Moscow was open.

However, the Germans made a fatal blunder: Goebbels reported the grand victory over the radio, and - incredibly, but it is true!

- from a German radio broadcast, the Soviet leadership learned of the mortal threat to Moscow. Truly incredible efforts were made to transfer any reserves to the Moscow direction. To defend Moscow were thrown military schools and units of the people's militia, staffed by untrained and unfit for military service people of older ages. On October 16, panic broke out in Moscow, accompanied by looting and pillaging.

Colonel-General Konev, commander of the Western Front, was removed from command. The fate of Army General Pavlov, who commanded the Western Front in the first days of the war, awaited him: arrest, personal responsibility for the defeat, trial by military tribunal and execution for the edification of others.

There are several versions of Konev's rescue from imminent arrest and execution. According to some sources, Zhukov interceded for Konev, according to others - Beria. Whatever the case, on October 10, 1941, Colonel-General Konev was removed from the post of commander of the Western Front and appointed deputy commander of the Western Front.

October 17, 1941, for the defense of Moscow from the north-western direction from the Western Front was allocated Kalinin Front, and Konev was appointed commander of this front.

In the Battle of Rzhev, Konev's troops suffered huge losses without achieving any successes. In August 1942, Konev was reappointed commander of the Western Front. The troops suffered unparalleled losses in the grand offensive operations, which ended without results. February 27, 1943 Stalin for the second time removed Konev from the post of commander of the Western Front as failed in his duties.

Removed from the Western Front, Stalin appointed Konev commander of the North-Western Front, whose offensive operation Konev immediately failed. Stalin again removes Konev and appoints him commander of the Steppe Military District. The name of this district is misleading: in fact, the Steppe Military District was a super-powerful strategic reserve - the most powerful ever created in the history of warfare.

The Steppe Military District was located behind the two Soviet fronts that were defending the Kursk Bulge.

9 July 1943, the Steppe Military District was transformed into the Steppe Front and on July 17 was put into battle. August 26, 1943 for distinction in the Battle of Kursk, Stalin awarded Konev the rank of General of the Army. Meanwhile, the front came to the Dnieper and forced it with a move. In October 1943, the Steppe Front was renamed the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

On February 20, 1944, Konev received the Diamond Star of the Marshal of the Soviet Union for distinctions in the Korsun-Shevchenkovo operation. On March 26, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, developing the offensive, were the first to reach the western border of the Soviet Union and entered the territory of Romania. By Stalin's order, on that day Moscow saluted the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front with 24 artillery salvos from 324 guns.

In May 1944, Stalin put Konev in the main direction of the war, appointing him commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In July and August 1944, the front's troops break through into Poland, forcing the Vistula River in one of the sections and occupying the Sandomir bridgehead.

In January 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front break into German territory. In April, the two fronts conduct the Berlin Operation, after which the 1st Ukrainian Front launches a swift attack on Prague.

Konev was a kind man. Once Air Chief Marshal Golovanov asked him: Why, Vanya, why do you beat your generals with a stick? Konev replied that if you beat a general's face, he will realize the mistake and correct it, and if given to the tribunal, the general will be shot.

And you can't argue with that: it's very logical; indeed, it's better to beat up a general. Many of us were fond of it. Marshal of the Soviet Union Eremenko Andrei Ivanovich was very bold, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Moskalenko was not behind him. But Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov was not like that at all. Zhukov was more fond of shooting.

After the war, Konev was Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces in Austria, then Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces.

In 1951, Stalin removed Marshal Konev from his high posts and sent him to command the Pre-Carpathian Military District. After Stalin's death and Beria's arrest, Konev was appointed chairman of the Special Judicial Presence, which tried Beria and sentenced him to death.

In September 1954, the 128th Rifle Corps, reinforced by an artillery division, artillery and sapper brigades, supported by the actions of three aviation divisions, operated at the Totsk range. But the actions of the corps were controlled by the commander of the 25th Army from the deployed for the duration of the exercise command post with a communications center, and the actions of the 25th Army - the commander of the front "eastern" from his command post. Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev and a group of generals from the management and headquarters of the Precarpathian Military District commanded the eastern front.

Konev, as well as the leader of the exercises Zhukov, did Khrushchev a great favor. By his actions, he showed doubters: look, here I am commanding the front - just as I commanded in the war. Only now we have such power in our hands that no enemies are afraid of us now.

After the exercises, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev and the generals who had worked with him during the exercises returned to their official duties in the Prykarpattia Military District. But it was clear to all those who are familiar with the procedures in the Soviet Army: Konev would not be in exile in Prikarpatya for long. Waiting for him in the near future a rapid ascent up the career ladder.

And also those who were around him.

MAMSUROV KHAJI-UMAR DZHIOROVICH. Born 15 September, 1903. Ossetian. In the summer of 1918, at the age of 14, he voluntarily joined the Red Army, was a fighter of the detachment of the Vladikavkaz sovdepartment, the Mountain Red Hundred of the 11th Army, and an operative group of the Tersk Cheka. After the Civil War he held command positions in the Red Army cavalry.

In 1935, Mamsurov underwent special training. In those days, persons who were secret informants were divided into sekup and seksotov, that is, secret commissioners and secret employees. Mamsurov was appointed as a secup of Special Department "A" of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, agent alias - Xanti. Special Branch "A" was engaged in the physical elimination of those who hindered the great cause of building communism throughout the world.

In August 1936, Xanthi was promoted to advisor (actually, commander) of the 14th Corps of the Spanish Republican Army. The corps was just about to be formed. It was the world's first subversive corps; Mamsurov created it and successfully led it.

For organizing and conducting a simultaneous sudden massive strike of sabotage groups on the airfields of Italian and German aviation Major Mamsurov was promoted to the rank of colonel (the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Red Army was introduced later), was awarded the Order of Lenin, which since its establishment was officially considered the highest award of the Soviet Union and in those days was valued especially highly. Ernest Hemingway personally knew

"Macedonian" Xanthi and used him as a prototype for one of the characters in the novel For Whom the Bell Tolls, not realizing that he was a major in Soviet military intelligence.

In 1938-1941, Colonel Mamsurov was the head of Department "A" (from 1940 - 5th Department) of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.

In May 1941, numerous groups of internationalist saboteurs - Germans, Poles, French and Spaniards - were transferred to Belorussia. Mamsurov was at the head of the task force of the General Staff in the area of Brest and Baranovichi. He was to direct the transfer of sabotage groups to the German rear and coordinate their work.

Hitler thwarted these plans. Internationalist saboteurs could have been relied upon if the Red Army had been successfully advancing, but in an atmosphere of general collapse, panic and flight, the reliability of mercenaries was doubtful, so their mass dispatch to the rear of the enemy was canceled.

On July 4, 1941, Colonel Mamsurov by order of Stalin personally participated in the arrest of the commander of the Western Front Army General Pavlov, who was slandered, him for the defeat of the front, and then shot.

10 In July 1941, Mamsurov was appointed head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western direction. In August, he was appointed head of a special task force of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, which was in charge of sending reconnaissance and sabotage groups (consisting not of internationalist soldiers, but of Soviet citizens) into the enemy's rear and organizing the guerrilla movement on the Western, North-Western and Leningrad fronts.

Since January 1942 Colonel Mamsurov was sent to the front at his personal request, commanded a cavalry division, was deputy commander of the 7th Cavalry Corps. Since August 1942 - Head of the Southern Headquarters of the guerrilla movement. From November 1942 - Head of the Operations Department (planning of combat operations) of the Central Headquarters of the guerrilla movement. November 13, 1943 - promoted to the rank of major-general and the post of deputy head of the 2nd Department of the GRU.

In the same year, at his personal request, he returned to the front, was given command of the 2nd Guards Crimean Order of Lenin, twice Red Banner, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky Cavalry Division, which he commanded until the end of the war. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for successful carrying out a number of daring raids on the enemy's rear. At the Victory Parade he commanded a battalion of the composite regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

After the war, Major General Mamsurov graduated from the General Staff Academy and was appointed commander of the 27th Mechanized Division of the 38th Army of the Precarpathian Military District, then was commander of the 27th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army of the same district.

On August 3, 1953, Mamsurov was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. In September 1954, during the exercises at the Totsk test site, he served as chief of intelligence for the Eastern Front.

In 1955, Mamsurov was appointed commander of the 38th Army of the Pre-Carpathian Military District.

CHAPTER 20

1

The exercises at the Totsk test site had a tremendous impact not only on the internal political processes in the Soviet Union. By inviting representatives of fraternal socialist countries to the exercises, the Soviet leaders did not simply want to demonstrate our military might to them; they wanted to show our determination to defend the ideals of socialism with arms in hand and to hold the socialist countries tightly in a fraternal embrace.

Exactly seven months after the exercises at the Totsk test site, on May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was signed. It was signed by the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. The bourgeois created the aggressive NATO bloc in 1949, while we created our defensive alliance only in 1955. Here it is, the proof of our peacefulness. That is not all: when concluding the Warsaw Pact, our leaders immediately announced that they were ready to dissolve this military bloc at any time if the bourgeois dissolve NATO. This is another evidence of peacefulness: we are ready to dissolve our military alliance, but the damned bourgeois do not agree to the same step. Who is the aggressor in this case?

The reason for the conclusion of the treaty was the accession of Germany to NATO on May 9, 1955: ostensibly in response to this step we are creating our own defensive military alliance. But there is no escaping the question: why did we wait so long? After all, it is strange: we are creating our defense alliance in response to another country joining NATO. Although it would be logical to create our defense alliance not in response to the strengthening of NATO in 1955, but in response to the creation of NATO in 1949. What is the point?

The fact is that neither in 1949 nor later, until his death, did Comrade Stalin need any Warsaw Pact at all.

Let me explain by the example of Poland, in the capital of which the treaty was signed.

2

Let us start from afar. On June 13, 1939, the district and regional military committees of the Soviet Union instructed to return Finnish reservists to the Red Army and send all of them to the Leningrad Military District.

On August 23, 1939, Stalin and Hitler divided Poland with the hands of Molotov and Ribbentrop. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, assuming responsibility for unleashing World War II. On September 17, Red Army units entered Poland.

11 November 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov signed an order to create the 106th Rifle Division in the Red Army. A division as a division. Another one. True, not like all the others. The division was manned by Finns and Karelians, who had been drafted into the Red Army since June and gathered in the Leningrad area. Because of the shortage of commanders of these nationalities, the leadership of the new 106th Division was staffed not only with Finns and Karelians, but also with Russians.

On November 23, 1939 on the basis of the 106th Infantry Division the formation of the Finnish Corps began. The commander of the corps was Red Army commander Aksel Moiseevich Anttila. The commissar of the corps was brigade commissar Egorov Filipp Ivanovich. The chief of staff was Kombrig Romanov Fyodor Nikolayevich.

The corps was to become the nucleus of the army of the FDR - the Finnish Democratic Republic. There was no such Republic yet, but Comrade Stalin had already prepared a government, punitive organs and armed forces for it. As the head of the FDR government and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Stalin appointed the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Comrade Kuusinen Otto Wilhelmovich.

The post of Minister of the Interior of FDR was taken by Comrade Tuure Lehen. In 1925-1926 Comrade Lechen worked illegally in Germany under the agent alias Langer and prepared an armed uprising of the proletariat not only in that country but also in Czechoslovakia and Austria. In 1927 Comrade Lechen was appointed chief of the Central Military-Political School of the Communist International. The school trained saboteurs from many countries of the world. The main direction of training was the forceful seizure of power in the event of a favorable situation.

During the Spanish Civil War, Comrade Lehen held the position of chief of staff of an international brigade and fought in a sabotage corps commanded by a certain Xanti, that is, the already known to us colonel of Soviet military intelligence Mamsurov. In 1939, Comrade Stalin placed the master Soviet spy and saboteur, Comrade Lehen, as Minister of the Interior of the Democratic Republic of Finland.

Lieutenant General of the People's Army of Finland (at the same time - the commander of the Red Army) Anttila Aksel Moiseevich became the Minister of Defense and commander of the 1st Corps of FDR.

What should the FDR army wear? There was no problem with uniforms. The Red Army had just captured rich booty in Poland, including the mobilization depots of the Polish Army. The FDR fighters were dressed in Polish overcoats, spoiling their insignia and replacing them with newly invented ones.

Only Comrade Stalin secretly formed the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Comrades Kuusinen, Lehen and Anttila, only Comrade Voroshilov formed a corps for the liberation of Finland, and immediately, as if by order, a shell flew from Finnish territory and exploded on our soil!

"Ah, you are so!" - said Comrade Stalin. - "You have decided to attack the Soviet Union! So you shall be struck back!" And immediately it was announced that the peoples of Finland had risen, that the rebels had formed their own government and army, that they were fighting for the liberation of Finland from the yoke of the capitalists. The head of the FDR government, Comrade Kuusinen, appealed to the government of the Soviet Union for help. A treaty of mutual assistance was signed, and the head of the Finnish Democratic Republic, Comrade Kuusinen, forgetting that now he was no longer a nomenklatura worker of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks), but the head of a free sovereign state, put his signature on the treaty in the letters of the Russian alphabet. The Red Army extended its hand of friendship to the rebellious people of Finland.....

There was a hitch in Finland. The liberation was thwarted. But it is interesting to see what the heroes of this story did on June 22, 1941.

Major General Anttila, former Minister of Defense of FDR, became deputy commander of the 34th Rifle Corps of the 19th Army. It was the most powerful rifle corps of the Red Army - 5 divisions, including one mountain rifle corps. The corps was commanded by Lieutenant-General R. P. Khmelnitsky - a general for special assignments of Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov. The corps as part of the 19th Army was secretly moving to the most advantageous direction of the coming war of liberation - the Romanian. The 19th Army was commanded by Lieutenant General I. S. Konev.

Former FDR Minister of the Interior, Comrade Tuure Lehen, in May 1941 headed the NKVD sabotage and intelligence network in Karelia and the Baltic.

Otto Kuusinen, former head of government and foreign minister of FDR, was appointed deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1940 and became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) in February 1941. On October 16, 1952, he became a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Immediately after Stalin's death he was expelled from there, but on June 29, 1957 he was given the post of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Kuusinen died "on active duty" at the age of 82.

But, you may ask, what does all this have to do with the Warsaw Pact, concluded on May 14, 1955? It has everything to do with the Warsaw Pact.

3

In the spring of 1940, the color of Polish officers was exterminated. The extermination was led by Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, Commissar of State Security, 3rd rank.

In recent years, several articles and even books have been published in Russia that express a timid doubt: did our valiant Chekists really commit a crime? They are so kind and affectionate. Or maybe it was the Germans after all?

Let us dispel these doubts. On May 22, 2008, the Russian Chief Military Prosecutor's Office refused to hand over to Poland the cases of mass shootings of Polish officers. The reason for the refusal: the majority of the volumes are classified as "secret" or "top secret". Of the 187 volumes of the case, the Polish side was handed over 67 volumes, as the rest.

"contain state secrets". On January 26, 2011, the Russian Supreme Court declared the classification of the case materials lawful.

That's it. There's nothing more to argue about. Let us ponder: why are the documents classified? What secret is guarded by the Supreme Court of Russia like a camp dog? Whose atrocities are being covered up by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office?

If the crime was really committed by the Hitlerites, all these documents should have been presented to the judges of the international tribunal in Nuremberg as early as 1946. But for some reason they were not presented, and the accusation put forward by the Soviet Union, in which responsibility for the mass shootings of Polish citizens was attributed to officers of the German army, fell apart. The accusation was based on the conclusions of Soviet commissions, falsified documents and the testimony of dubious witnesses, which were easily refuted by the lawyers of the accused. As a result, the international tribunal did not support the Soviet prosecution, and the Katyn episode is absent from its verdict.

If the crime was committed by the Nazis, why should the Soviet Union then and Russia now hide the traces of Nazi crimes? Let us take the position of those who blame the Nazis for this crime and assume that it was the Nazis who committed this heinous war crime. Then it turns out that the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation conceal documents incriminating Hitler's executioners, and thereby obstruct justice against the Nazis. Then it turns out that the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation are accomplices of Hitler's executioners.

Jokes aside: the documents on the execution of Polish officers were classified by the leadership of the Soviet Union and remain secret and top secret by order of the Russian leadership. They are
- an admission of our guilt.

But we digress. So, in the spring of 1940, the Soviet secret police exterminated the color of Polish officers. On November 2, 1940, Comrade Stalin instructed Comrade Beria to begin preparations for the formation of a Polish division on the territory of the Soviet Union, manning it with captured Polish soldiers and surviving officers.

In November 1939, a Finnish division was created in the Red Army and immediately turned into a corps. The division, and later the corps, was created for the sake of liberating Finland.

I have no idea: why did Comrade Stalin need a Polish division in the Red Army? Against whom to fight? Stalin shared Poland with Hitler. Hitler was a loyal friend, Comrade Stalin did not expect an attack from Germany. Why would he need a Polish division?

4

The main thing in preparing for the creation of a Polish division was to secretly check everyone's trustworthiness, and an official decision could be for the time being. Many Polish soldiers and surviving officers believed that Hitler and Stalin were equally to blame for the partition of Poland. Such people should be identified and not taken into the Polish units being formed on Soviet soil.

And some people thought that Hitler attacked first, so he was the main culprit, so we should fight against Hitler. It didn't matter who the alliance was with. The devil himself. Those who thought so should have been identified and kept on the books until the right moment.

The right moment came at the beginning of June 1941. A top secret decision to create a Polish division was made on June 4, 1941. The division was given the number - 238th Rifle Division of the Red Army. The deadline for readiness was July 1, 1941.

The number and name of the Polish division did not differ from the Soviet divisions. The documents said: 238 SD. That's all. Any spy, having obtained a document on the formation of another Soviet division, would have yawned in the palm of his hand: nothing special.

And the special thing was that the formation of the Polish division was a violation of the treaty with Germany "On Friendship and Border". The special thing was that on November 2, 1940, that is, even before Comrade Molotov's trip to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler, Comrade Stalin had already firmly decided to violate the treaty with Hitler and attack him. The Polish division was no longer needed for anything else.

I'll say more. For decades, Soviet propaganda has said that before the war, peace-loving Comrade Stalin was tormented by sadness:

as if not to give Hitler an excuse to attack. So: the formation of Polish units in the Red Army is not only a pretext for Hitler, but also a good reason to attack in order to pre-empt a Soviet strike.

And the strike was planned. The readiness of the Polish division by July 1, 1941 says something. I believed that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany on July 6, 1941. In recent years, after the publication of works by other researchers, primarily Mark Solonin and Vladimir Beshanov, my confidence in the accuracy of this date has somewhat weakened, and I am now inclined to reconsider my point of view.

I now believe that Stalin had planned to attack earlier.

5

On June 22, 1941, Hitler thwarted Stalin's plans and everything went downhill. Stalin had to ask for help from the United States and Great Britain. And since that was the case, he had to recognize the Polish government in London.

This entailed new difficulties. If the Polish government in London was recognized, the Polish units to be formed had to take any captured Polish soldiers and surviving officers, not only those chosen by the Soviet comrades from the NKVD. It was decided to form a Polish corps consisting of two divisions (10,000 men each) and a reserve regiment (5,000 men), the headquarters of the corps and the reserve regiment at the familiar Buzuluk station, one division to be formed at the Totsk range, the second at the Tatishchev range.

It is interesting to note that from the side of the Red Army General Staff the formation of Polish units was led by Major-General of Tank Troops Panfilov Alexei Pavlovich. To the Polish commanders he presented himself as the authorized representative of the General Staff of the Red Army for the formation of Polish units. This was true. But not the whole truth. In addition, Major-General of Tank Troops Panfilov was Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, and since October 1941 - the head of this glorious organization, uniting the fighters of the secret front.

The Polish side insisted on forming a powerful army. Comrade Stalin fought back stubbornly.

In the fall of 1941, the Soviet Union was on the brink of destruction. Having defeated the Western Front, commanded by Colonel-General Konev, the German army rushed to Moscow. October 16 in the capital there was an unprecedented panic, accompanied by looting of stores, public institutions and private apartments, fires, murders, mob violence, mass burning of documents and the flight of leaders of different ranks. Black clouds of smoke from the burning of documents and the real threat of capture hung over Moscow. At the same time, captured Polish soldiers, surviving officers and generals were eager to fight, but Stalin stubbornly did not want to form a powerful Polish army. And why?

And because Stalin wanted not just a Polish army, but a submissive Polish army.

Most Polish soldiers and surviving officers held both Hitler and Stalin equally responsible for the partition of Poland and the outbreak of World War II. If you arm such an army, how can you control it? Stalin did not need such an army. And he answered that he had nothing to feed and arm a large Polish army.

In August 1941, the Soviet Union and Great Britain occupied Iran, and even then Churchill suggested: if you, Sir Stalin, have nothing to feed the Polish army and nothing to arm, take it to Iran, I have for the Polish army and food, and uniforms, and weapons.

In the summer of 1942, General Anders' Polish units were sent from the Soviet Union to Iran. On Soviet territory remained those soldiers and officers who were ready to fight against Germany on any front, in alliance with anyone - even with Stalin himself. From these soldiers and surviving officers a Polish division was formed. For her found and food, and uniforms, and weapons. The standards of allowances were the same as for the Soviet Guards divisions.

Soon the Polish division was deployed into a corps, then into the 1st Polish Army. There was a shortage of officers (remember the mass shootings the spring of 1940), and Comrade Stalin generously shared the following

command personnel: in October 1944, 11,513 Soviet officers and generals fought in Polish units.

In 1945, the Polish Army had two armies (1st and 2nd), a tank corps, an aviation corps and other units. Once again, Comrade Stalin found for them the most modern airplanes, including the Yak-3, Il-2 and Pe-2, and the most modern tanks, including the IS-2 and T-34-85.

6

Control over the Polish army was organized quite simply: young Polish officers were trained by Soviet military schools, paying special attention to their political trustworthiness. And in the highest positions Polish officers and generals were systematically and persistently supplanted by officers and generals of the Red Army.

Here are a few examples.

On May 9, 1938, Kombrig Korchits Vladislav Vikentyevich Korchits, Chief of Staff of the 19th Rifle Corps of the Red Army, was arrested. He was under investigation until January 20, 1940. The investigation was conducted, as it was expressed in official documents of that time, with the use of physical measures. That is, with beating with a rubber hose, burning the heels on an electric stove, sawing off the teeth with a file. Hunger, cold, overcrowded stinking cells, and teeth slaps from the guards - this was a free supplement.

In January, Vladislav Korchits was released from NKVD custody and reinstated in the ranks of the indestructible and legendary Red Army. In May 1940, at the time of recertification of the top command staff, Kombrig Korchits was promoted to the rank of colonel - that is, he was lowered one step below the level at which he had been before.

From the first days of the war Colonel Korchits successfully commanded the 245th Infantry Division. On August 4, 1942 he was promoted to the rank of major general. In September 1942 he was appointed Deputy Commander of the 34th Army, in December - Chief of Staff of the 1st Shock Army.

In April 1944, Major General Korczyc was ordered to accept the position of Chief of Staff of the 1st Polish Army. In September

The same year he became Chief of Staff of the Polish Army. On October 27, 1944, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and the position of commander of the 1st Polish Army.

From January 1, 1945 Korczyc was Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. On July 11, 1946, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel-General by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1545. The resolution was signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich.

Colonel-General Korczyc remained Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army until January 18, 1954. All three general ranks were conferred on him by decrees of the USSR government. All three decrees were signed personally by Stalin. In 1954, Colonel-General Korczyc returned to the Soviet Union and retired from the reserve.

Another example. In 1938, Major Poplavsky Stanislav Gilyarovich was expelled from the Red Army and appointed director of the pig farm "Kultura". It was a pig farm "Kultura".

In 1939 Poplavsky returned to the army and was appointed chief of the operations department of the 162nd Infantry Division headquarters. During the war he commanded a regiment. In January 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Poplavsky was given command of the 185th Rifle Division. In the same year he became a colonel, on February 14, 1943 - major general. In June 1943 he was given command of the 45th Rifle Corps.

In September 1944, Major General Poplawski was appointed commander of the 2nd Polish Army, then commander of the 1st Polish Army. In the same year he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. In 1945 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After World War II, Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General Poplawski was Commander of the Land Forces of the Polish Army and Deputy Minister of National Defense of Poland. On July 11, 1946, by decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

№ 1545, signed by Stalin, Poplavsky was promoted to the rank of colonel-general.

Poplawski has been a member of the Polish Sejm since 1947, and a member of the Polish parliament since 1949
- Member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PORP).

While serving in the Polish Army, as Deputy Minister of National Defense of Poland, Poplawski was promoted to the rank of General of the Army - Soviet Army on August 12, 1955. The rank was conferred by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The decree was signed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov.

There are plenty of examples of this. Here is the third. In September 1943, Comrade Stalin appointed Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Mostovenko Dmitry Karpovich as commander of the Armored Troops of the Polish Army. He came from the town of Uryupinsk. He did not speak Polish. On July 11, 1946, by the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR № 1545 Comrade Stalin awarded Mostovenko the rank of Colonel-General of Tank Troops. In July 1947, Stalin ordered Colonel-General of Tank Troops Mostovenko to return to the Soviet Union, where he commanded the tank units of first the Odessa and then the Belorussian Military Districts.

And here is an example of not a single, but a group appointment of Soviet officers and generals to senior positions in the army of a neighboring state. In September 1944, the command of the 6th Air Army of the Red Army Air Force was transformed into the command of the Polish Army Air Force. The directorate of an entire army, staffed by our Soviet citizens, suddenly became Polish, although no one could even speak Polish there.

The commander of the 6th Air Army, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Aviation Polynin Fyodor Petrovich became the commander of the Air Force of the Polish Army. Fyodor Petrovich came from the Saratov region. It is not very far from Uryupinsk. I would like to say: comrades, what kind of Poles are you?

Saratov's Fyodor Petrovich commanded the Polish aviation until 1947. On July 11, 1946, by the same decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR № 1545, signed by the same comrade Stalin, Polynin received the rank of Colonel-General of Aviation. He then returned to the Soviet Union and continued to serve in high positions in the Soviet Army Air Force until 1971.

In addition to commanders in the Polish Army, there were also Soviet "advisers" in other state structures. For example, on March 6, 1945, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank, among other positions, was given one more - adviser to the NKVD of the USSR at the Ministry of Public Security of Poland. Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov knew a lot about bringing order by mass shootings. He gave good advice. He was a savvy adviser.

It should be added that the advancing Red Army was followed by NKVD troops. Their task was to protect the rear. They guarded the rear by carrying out raids and punitive operations. They also went through Poland.

So on the one hand - extermination of all who resist, on the other - appointment of natives of Uryupinsk and other native Russian cities to the highest command positions in the "liberated" countries.

But that's not all. The liberation of each country meant that from now on Red Army troops would be on its territory. This was also the case in Poland. On its territory during the war, on April 21, 1945, the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky was deployed.

In 1949, Colonel General K. P. Trubnikov, Rokossovsky's deputy, became commander of the SGV, and Rokossovsky was promoted to the rank of Marshal of Poland and the post of Minister of National Defense of Poland. In 1950, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Poland Rokossovsky became a member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party. Since 1952, Rokossovsky has been Deputy Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers.

Marshal of Poland Rokossovsky spoke Polish to the extent necessary to fulfill his official duties. But there were also absurdities. Rokossovsky was elegant, polite, tall, statuesque - just handsome. (By the way, of all Soviet commanders who commanded fronts in the war, he was the only one who did not allow boorishness in relations with subordinates). Perhaps that is why there was a tale among the military about how once Marshal of Poland Rokossovsky received from secretary.

some paper, glanced at it, and briefly ordered, "Sort it out and come in."

In Polish it meant, "Take off your clothes and come in."

The Polish army lived by statutes copied from the Soviet statutes. The disciplinary regulations stated that the order of the superior was the law for the subordinate. The Polish Marshal had to apologize and explain to the pretty woman that he meant something else entirely.

I don't rule out that this is just an anecdote, but it is quite true. In a foreign language or in your own language, which you have long forgotten, you can say such things.

7

And now let's think: why did Comrade Stalin conclude the Warsaw Pact in 1949? With whom? With Marshal Rokossovsky of Poland? With Colonel Generals Korchitz, Poplavsky, Polynin? All of them were personally promoted by Stalin. He might not have given them ranks. He could have just as easily removed the ones he did. He could have summoned them from Poland and sent them anywhere - even to Kolyma to drive a wheelbarrow, or to a pig farm, or to a firing squad.

From August 17, 1937 to March 23, 1940, Kommdiv Rokossovsky was kept in the Inner Prison of the NKVD GUGB. Two and a half years of investigation - torture investigation. 9 teeth were knocked out, three ribs were broken, were smashed with a hammer. And to top it all, a death sentence. With execution. Rokossovsky was shot twice. With blank cartridges.

So why would Comrade Stalin make a pact with Rokossovsky? He could have had the rest of his teeth knocked out, all his ribs broken, his fingers smashed, and then shot - with live ammunition.

But we don't have to shoot him. You could put him in charge of the Kultura pig farm. And all the other comrades could be treated in the same way - they were already familiar with such treatment, and not at all from overheard conversations.

But Poland is a special case. Poland has been fighting against Germany since the first day of the Second World War. Poland has been our ally in World War II since 1941.

In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria things were much simpler. Here, any citizen could be declared an accomplice of the Nazis with all the ensuing consequences - no one would be able to justify himself. And the troops of Hungary and Romania were fighting against the Soviet Union - here everyone could be put to the wall without going into details. I am not even thinking about East Germany.

And in all these countries the Red Army visited. And then the NKVD troops. And there were Soviet garrisons, and appointed there our advisers in all government structures. Therefore, Stalin had no need to conclude military alliances with the governments of the conquered countries: everything was under control.

But if Stalin had no need to conclude the Warsaw Pact, why did Khrushchev need it? After all, in 1955 in the same Warsaw sat the same member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PCPSU, deputy head of government, Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Poland.

Khrushchev needed the Warsaw Pact for two reasons.

First, the brotherly countries should have shown that after Stalin's death the friendly embrace of the Soviet Union has not weakened. As we all followed the Stalinist path, so we will continue to do. Everyone could be convinced of this during the exercises at the Totsk firing range. To dispel the last doubts, Khrushchev decided to bind the peoples of brotherly countries also legally.

Secondly, Khrushchev needed the Warsaw Pact as a bargaining chip: we announced that we were ready to dissolve the Warsaw Pact Organization if the bourgeoisies dissolved NATO.

But if NATO is dissolved, the voluntary defense alliance of Western countries will disintegrate. And if the Warsaw Pact Organization is dissolved, nothing will change: all the countries from which the Red Army "forgot" to withdraw after World War II will remain under the full control of the Soviet Union.

<i>Key point</i>

We know how to humiliate our neighbors, that's right.

In 1955, Khrushchev decided: The commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries would be a Soviet marshal, and the chief of the joint staff would be a Soviet general. Always. No options.

This is a flower. It would be an insult to any country if Khrushchev had said: comrades, brothers, the defense ministers of all your countries will be directly subordinate to the USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, the chiefs of staff of your armies will be subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky. Ministers of a sovereign country cannot be subordinate to a minister of another country.

But Khrushchev went even further. He decided: let the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states be the first Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, let the Chief of the Joint Staff be the first Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. That is, the ministers of formally independent states will not report directly to our minister, no! Your ministers will report to our deputy minister. The chiefs of your most important staffs will not report directly to our Chief of the General Staff, but only to his deputy.

Khrushchev had only to choose a candidate for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. The choice was simple and singular. Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev judged Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria. Well done! Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev was the commander of the "Eastern" front during the exercises at the Totsk firing range. Well done again! He should be in command of our brothers in arms.

Konev was returned from the Precarpathian Military District and appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Commander-in-Chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

The situation is as follows.

Polish Minister of National Defense - Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky.

He reports to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev.

The First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev, reports to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

Such is the brotherhood of arms.

The combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries were similar to the 1st Corps of the Finnish Democratic Republic, in which the commander was supervised by a political commissar with a non-Finnish surname Egorov, and the combat operations were planned by a Red Army commander named Romanov.

CHAPTER 21

1

The day after the Warsaw Pact was signed, on May 15, 1955, the State Treaty with Austria was signed in Vienna by representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France. Austria and Germany were a single state during World War II. After the defeat in the war, Germany and Austria were divided and occupied by the armies of the four powers.

Ten years had passed since the end of the war. The heads of the Great Powers decided to withdraw American, Soviet, British and French troops from Austrian territory and to sign a treaty according to which Austria became a neutral state - that is, from now on it could not join military alliances and was deprived of the right to have foreign troops on its soil and to take part in any military conflicts other than the defense of its territory.

It's clear, simple, straightforward. Signed, troops out. More than fifty years have passed since that treaty was signed. Austria lives and thrives, without threatening or disturbing anyone.

Two months after the signing of the treaty with Austria, on July 18, 1955, an international summit meeting on Germany opened in Geneva. After the defeat of the Third Reich, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France divided Germany into zones of occupation. In those zones, where there were American, British and French troops, life after the war quickly returned to normal, the economy was restored, the standard of living of the population rapidly increased. And where the Soviet troops were stationed, "the first socialist state on German soil in history" emerged. It is clear that Germans from the socialist state ran to West Germany.

The leaders of the four powers met in Geneva to decide what to do next with Germany. The Soviet Union was represented at this meeting by comrades Khrushchev, Bulganin and Zhukov.

The American delegation was led by President Dwight Eisenhower.

In 1945, Eisenhower and Zhukov were the big military bosses. They met in Berlin as allies who had defeated Germany. In the summer of 1945, Eisenhower visited the Soviet Union. On August 12, 1945, he stood on the podium of Lenin's Mausoleum between Stalin and Zhukov.

Now, meeting in Geneva, Zhukov and Eisenhower were no longer allies. There was another difference, the thought of which must have hurt Zhukov's ego: he, Zhukov, remained a big military chief, and Eisenhower became President of the United States. "Eh, does not appreciate the leadership of the country commanders."

- that's probably what Zhukov thought.

2

In 1955, a mutually acceptable solution to the German question could not be found. At the meeting in Geneva, the American delegation insisted on holding free elections in West and East Germany, after which the Germans themselves were to determine the policy of their countries and their attitude to the existing military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). This proposal was supported by France and Great Britain, but it was unacceptable to the USSR: the Soviet leaders were well aware that in such a scenario the East Germans, dissatisfied with the communist regime, would definitely favor reunification with West Germany and joining NATO.

The Soviet delegation, on the contrary, sought to preserve the division of Germany into two states. To demonstrate the USSR's "peace-loving" intentions, the Soviets proposed the adoption of the so-called "plan for collective security in Europe" that they had developed. The plan envisioned the conclusion of a multilateral treaty (with the participation of the GDR and the FRG), the participants of which were to undertake to renounce the use of force in resolving international disputes; at the same time, the military blocs that existed in Europe were to be dissolved, foreign troops were to be withdrawn from the continent, and American military bases in Europe were to be eliminated. Only under such conditions

The Soviet Union was willing to consider the unification of Germany.

Why was the decision on Austria made quickly and without problems, while the former Allies failed to reach an agreement on Germany? After all, Austria was as much a part of the Third Reich as Bavaria or Prussia.

3

Response to this question becomes obvious, if we only to turn our perceptive eye to the map of Europe. The ousted Churchill in his speech, which for some reason is considered the beginning of the Cold War, drew attention of the honorable public to the sad fact that "from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, across the continent, the Iron Curtain has been lowered". Let us let us let us this line on map from the Baltic from the Baltic to the Adriatic, but let us call it not the Iron Curtain, but the advanced frontier of the socialist camp. In front of us are the armed to the teeth forces of imperialists and revanchists. Now let's highlight Austria, which has become neutral. And we will shout with delight: by becoming neutral, Austria has cut the strategic front of our likely adversaries into two parts.

Neutral Austria stretches from east to west, separating Central and Southern Europe. And beyond neutral Austria further west lies neutral Switzerland. If the Soviet Army begins a liberation campaign in West Germany, our marshals can not fear for their flanks. The right flank of the theater of operations is covered by the Baltic Sea, the left by two neutral states.

If we manage to build our naval bases in Libya, Egypt, Syria, and, best of all, in Yugoslavia, it will be possible to fight safely on the Mediterranean Sea and its shores without fear of a rapid and powerful transfer of American and other troops from the countries of Central Europe - neutral Austria lies in their path. That is why the Kremlin leaders agreed to the treaty with Austria without objection.

Why did the former Allies fail to reach an agreement regarding Germany? Because that Khrushchev and

Zhukov wanted all of Germany. The whole of Germany. Not peaceful, neutral, fed, prosperous, but our native, brotherly, proletarian Germany.

If the enemies are in front of us, we will crack their defenses in West Germany with nuclear strikes, throw our corps and armies into the breaches, and they will follow the sun to the ocean. The scenario is quite realizable, proven by the bomb explosion at the Totsk test site. This military conflict will be a limited nuclear war, which may not go beyond Central Europe.

We will defeat the enemy, the revanchist, gun-rattling, two world wars Germany unleashed. This will be forgiven and forgotten. But if Germany becomes united and as a united country remains a member of NATO, the Kremlin leaders will have to give up liberation campaigns in Western Europe, because it will cost us too much to crack the defense of a NATO member state with nuclear explosions.

And Zhukov was preparing precisely to crack the defense, and precisely in Central Europe.

4

On July 20, 1955, Eisenhower and Zhukov met. The conversation was translated and recorded by Oleg Troyanovsky, the future Soviet representative to the UN. The record of the conversation is kept in the Russian State Military Archive (Fund 41107. Inventory 1. Case 58. Sheets 2-13). During the conversation, Zhukov stated that he had "*conducted many exercises using atomic and hydrogen weapons and had personally seen how deadly these weapons are*".

Here Georgy Konstantinovich slightly twisted his soul: he conducted exercises with the use of atomic weapons not many times, but only once, and with the use of hydrogen weapons neither he nor anyone else in the world has ever conducted, neither before Zhukov, nor after him. There were many tests, but no one had ever thought of organizing a military exercise using megaton-class charges.

Further in the conversation, Zhukov expressed deep concern for the fate of the planet should the U.S. and the USSR exchange nuclear strikes of equal strength:

If in the first days of the war the U.S. had dropped 300-400 bombs on the USSR, and the Soviet Union, for its part, had dropped the same number of bombs on the U.S., one can imagine what would have happened to the atmosphere (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 40).

That's how peace-loving our Minister of Defense was. Zhukov terribly did not want to destroy the atmosphere of our beautiful planet, so he lucidly explained to the uncomprehending U.S. president that an exchange of nuclear strikes of equal strength could lead to unpredictable consequences.

However, Zhukov's statement about the possibility of an exchange of nuclear strikes of equal strength was also a lie: in such an exchange of strikes, if it had occurred, the forces of the parties would have been unequal.

At the time of the meeting between Zhukov and Eisenhower, the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command was operating the B-36 intercontinental strategic bomber, a hybrid of piston and jet aircraft. The B-36 was originally built with six piston engines. Then it was modernized by adding four more jets. This increased the maximum speed to 685 kilometers per hour. The B-36 could take off for the United States, bomb any point in the Soviet Union, and return home without refueling. American industry produced 384 of these airplanes.

The Soviet Union was encircled on all sides by American military bases - in Norway, Great Britain, Spain, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Japan, South Korea and the Pacific Islands. Therefore, the B-36 bombers were guaranteed cover by fighters, which could rise from airfields scattered around the Soviet Union, and in addition - from aircraft carriers. The B-36 bomber was not afraid of anti-aircraft artillery fire - it flew very high.

In February of 1955, the U.S. Air Force received the first the first intercontinental B-52 jet bombers with a combat radius of 7,210 kilometers. Like the B-36, they could take off in America, bomb targets in the

any point of the Soviet Union and return back. The B-52's maximum speed is 957 km/hour, its maximum bomb load is 31 tons, and its flight altitude is more than 14 kilometers. In 2013, as I write these lines, B-52 bombers are still in US service.

At the time of the conversation between Zhukov and Eisenhower, the United States, in addition to three hundred B-36s and a few of the first B-52s, had in service jet bombers B-47.

This type of machine had no intercontinental range

- Or rather, it was, but only one-way. However, the presence of many American bases around the Soviet Union minimized this inconvenience: it was possible to keep such aircraft at a safe distance from the Soviet Union, at the right moment to transfer them to forward airfields, refuel them, hang bombs and send them on a flight with a return to the bases of Great Britain, Norway, West Germany, Turkey or South Korea. In total, by the time production ended in January 1957, the U.S. industry had produced more than two thousand machines of this type.

In addition, U.S. aircraft carriers at the time of meeting between Zhukov and Eisenhower had already received deck attack aircraft Skyhawk, which among other things could be carriers of nuclear weapons.

And the Soviet Union had no intercontinental means of delivering nuclear weapons at that time.

5

Behind Zhukov's touching concern for preserving the atmosphere was the Soviet Union's nuclear impotence. Zhukov was bluffing, playing with inflatable muscles. The Soviet Union did not have 300-400 strategic nuclear charges at the time, and even if it had, it would have been impossible to deliver them to targets in the United States. Both Tu-4 piston bombers and the first Tu-16 jets that entered service could theoretically deliver nuclear bombs to America, but only one way - there was not enough fuel to return.

The difference was that in the event of war, American bombers, invulnerable to antiaircraft artillery fire, would be covered by their fighters, while the Soviets had

The Soviet Union had no bases around the United States, so Soviet bombers would have to operate without cover. But even if it was possible to recruit suicide bombers to heroically perform such a suicidal task as a one-way flight, then to break through the U.S. air defense system piston Tu-4 even theoretically could not. And jet Tu-16 - too.

So why did Zhukov argue about the unpredictable consequences of an exchange of nuclear strikes of equal strength, if there was no force in the Soviet Union at that moment to launch such a strike?

If Zhukov's interest was to save the planet from destruction, he had to explain to Eisenhower in a friendly manner that he did not intend to give away military secrets, how many charges and carriers we had, he would not reveal, but let the American people know: you will destroy us, but outside the Soviet Union we have already hidden a few charges just in case. After you launch nuclear strikes against us, our guys, who already live in other countries, will carry elements of the charges on their shoulders through Canada and Mexico, assemble them and detonate bombs in your cities. Does that Chicago guy need much? Just imagine how your skyscrapers will fall in different directions from the epicenter of the explosion.

Zhukov could have used a stronger scare: "We are so fearful, that's why we have already accumulated the necessary stocks in the United States. In disassembled form. If we have to, we'll assemble them and hit them, without any missiles or bombers. So don't, uh. don't be the first to attack, or you'll get your asses kicked.

But Zhukov was not sad about the fate of his country and the entire planet. Zhukov was preparing a breakthrough of Soviet tanks into West Germany and further to the ocean. For this it was quite possible to get a nuclear strike from the ally of West Germany from across the ocean, so Zhukov and tried to dissuade Eisenhower from the defense of Europe. They say that whatever happens here, America should not get involved in the fight. And if you are on us 300-400 atomic bombs, we are on you as much - how could we not ruin the planet.

It was thrown out casually, while discussing a completely different issue. It was thrown with confidence, as if it were a matter of course: you have 300-400 bombs, and we have the same number of bombs. Who could

to think that this player at that moment did not have a single trump in the deck, not a single penny behind his soul, and holes in his pockets.

In the modern Russian language, there is an absolutely accurate phraseological turn of phrase to describe such a situation: to take the pontoon. Could the U.S. president have expected Zhukov to behave like a petty cheat?

6

Khrushchev's and Zhukov's pontifications cost our people too much. It was not enough for them to tell the whole world that the USSR had as many charges and carriers as the USA. Khrushchev went even further.

In 1963, Voenizdat published the book "Military Strategy". The author's team included one Marshal of the Soviet Union (Sokolovsky), one colonel-general, three lieutenant-generals, five major-generals and ten colonels. The book was turned in for typesetting on April 18, 1963. The imprint of my copy of this book indicates that this edition is the revised and enlarged edition. Consequently, there was an earlier edition.

Marshal Sokolovsky headed the General Staff of the Soviet Army for eight years. In 1960, he gave up his post and took up his pen. His co-authors in general and colonel's epaulettes crowned with scientific degrees and titles. The book is amazing. Here is just a small fragment on page 393:

In our country, the problem of destroying missiles in flight has been successfully solved by Soviet science and technology ...

It is interesting to note that the problem of missile defense in the West is still far from a final solution.

So we have the final solution to the missile defense problem, but the Western fools don't!

This revelation was printed in April 1963, and there was, I repeat, an earlier edition. Without Khrushchev's permission, without his personal order, no general under such "ponts" to sign would not become . And to Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky had no reason to sign such nonsense. Everyone who served in the army knows that initiative is punishable, especially in a matter like this. Why should Sokolovsky seek adventures on his own head?

The authors of the book wrote their revelations about missile defense in our country and in the West not for sensationalism and not in pursuit of popularity among readers - circulation in the Soviet Union was determined not by reader demand, but by the plan, and the circulation of the book was often set before the author took up the pen.

Such brazen disinformation of such a level could be thrown in only in a centralized order and only on the orders of the top leadership of the country.

And then the U.S. military attaché's aide went into a store military bookstore on Old Arbat, buying up there and the experts in Washington tasted every word. И And then all of a sudden this! B Soviet Union has solved the problem of missile defense of missile defense! The final solution has been found! The author's team is as serious as it gets.

So what do you get? If America strikes the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will repel the missile strike. And if the Soviet Union strikes America, America has nothing to repel the missile strike. Whoops!

And how could the Marshal and his team not believe it? The Soviet Union was having great success in space! Congressmen, scratching their heads and grumbling, allocated billions of dollars for military expenditures, and America launched grandiose missile defense projects.

Our deza and ostentation worked for tactical success. The enemies believed Zhukov's statements about 300-400 Soviet nuclear warheads on American heads, believed in the reality of Khrushchev's threat of "Kuzkin's Mother", believed in our "successes" in creating missile defense.

In the long run, from a strategic point of view, it was such Khrushchev-Jukov-Brezhnev-Andropov ponzi schemes that fueled and promoted the arms race.

But a normal economy could withstand such a race, but a socialist economy could not.

CHAPTER 22

1

On the night of October 29, 1955 in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, at 1 hour 31 minutes under the bow of the line ship "Novorossiysk" there was a powerful explosion. From the port side along the keel formed an indentation of 190 square meters with a deflection of up to three meters. From the starboard side in the underwater part due to the explosion there was a hole of 150 square meters - the hull of the battleship was penetrated from bottom to top. Through through are eight steel, including armored decks - which is eight stories.

The battleship Novorossiysk was the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the most powerful warship of the Soviet Union. Its total displacement was 29,100 tons. Armor: deck - 111-135 mm, deckhouse - 280 mm, turrets - 240-280 mm. Main caliber - 10 guns of 320 mm caliber. Speed - 28 knots. Crew - 1,576 men.

Immediately after the explosion, a battle alarm was declared on the battleship. The emergency parties of "Novorossiysk" entered into a vigorous struggle for the life of the ship. A few minutes later, emergency parties from neighboring cruisers came to their aid. In 30-35 minutes after the explosion tugs caught the wounded battleship and stern forward pulled into shallow water, but arrived at the "Novorossiysk" Black Sea Fleet Commander Vice Admiral VA Parkhomenko order to ground the battleship on the shoal canceled, and evacuation of personnel not engaged in the fight for the survivability of the ship, prohibited.

The ship was slowly sinking nose forward. After two hours Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko changed the assessment of the situation and ordered the battleship on a tugboat to go aground. But it was too late. The battleship had already jammed its bow into the ground. In addition, the left bow anchor was not raised, it held the ship firmly. The vice-admiral returned to shore and ordered the evacuation of the crew.

But this order was also too late. At 4 hours 13 minutes "Novorossiysk" sharply swung to the right, slowly returned to the original position, fell on the left side and at 4 hours 15 minutes overturned upside .

In the navy there is a special term for such a situation - overkill, .e. keel over.

All day the bottom of the battleship flaunted right off the shore.

"Novorossiysk" was sinking extremely slowly - only at ten o'clock in the evening it was completely hidden under water. On the alert, the personnel of the electromechanical part of the ship had to be at battle stations - that is, inside the armored hull. Divers heard the groans of the sailors locked in the armored coffins for three more days. Only nine men were rescued. According to different data from 604 to 617 officers and sailors died, including 58 people from the emergency parties from four neighboring cruisers.

The result: the most powerful ship of the Soviet Union, the flagship of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet squadron died in the main base of the Black Sea Fleet in 130 meters from the shore, having the proper seven feet under the keel: the depth at the place of anchorage was 16 meters, the draft of the ship - 10.4 meters. At this depth, the masts and superstructures of the ship should have prevented it from turning over completely, but the bottom of the bay was not solid ground, but 30 meters of viscous mud.

"Novorossiysk" died in the presence of the entire fleet command staff, the struggle for survivability of the flagship of the squadron was personally led by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vice Admiral Parkhomenko.

2

The cause of the Novorossiysk's sinking has forever remained a mystery, although many versions have been put forward.

The first assumption of the Government Commission: explosion of ammunition. This version was rejected immediately after it turned out that all the shells were intact, and pieces of the battleship's steel plating were bent inward, i.e. the explosion was outside.

And then the experts of the Government Commission decided that a German mine had exploded under the ship's hull, which had been left in the bay since the war. So it was reported to Moscow. The highest leaders of our Motherland immediately agreed with the conclusions of the commission.

It is clear that the news reports did not report on the battleship's destruction. Instead, the newscasters, choking with excitement, ranted about the fact that the miners of Donbass, having taken up the labor watch, had produced an incredible amount of coal in excess of the plan, and the farmers on the virgin lands had gathered unprecedented harvests.

The case of the destruction of the "Novorossiysk" was classified and closed. And soon something incredible happened, even by the standards of our great Motherland.

Already at the beginning of 1956 (i.e. only three months after the disaster!) it was decided to liquidate the materials of testimonies collected by the Government Commission (Drogovoz I. Big Fleet of the Country of Soviets. P. 245).

I understand the reason given by the authorities for the destruction of the archives at the Totsk district hospital after a nuclear weapons exercise at a nearby test site. There was allegedly nowhere to store the archives and they had to be burned. What is not clear here?

But the circumstances of the loss of the line ship "Novorossiysk" was investigated by the Government Commission, which was headed by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Colonel-General of Engineering and Technical Service Vyacheslav Alexandrovich Malyshev, Hero of Socialist Labor, twice winner of Stalin's prizes of the first degree (closed assignments) (Zalesky K. Zalesky. A. Stalin's Empire. Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow: Veche, 2000. C. 296). Was there no place in the Soviet Union where the evidence collected by the commission could be stored?

By the way, a year after the documents were destroyed, Malyshev himself died before he reached the age of 55. But let's not be overly suspicious. Malyshev was the first to head the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building. And behind the faceless phrase "medium engineering", if anyone does not know, in the Soviet Union hid the production of nuclear weapons. Malyshev supervised the creation, testing and production of nuclear charges. We already met Vyacheslav Alexandrovich on the pages of this book - during the exercises at Totsky

He was responsible for the technical aspects of preparing the triumphant "big concert" in front of thousands of spectators. In his short life, Vyacheslav Alexandrovich received considerable doses of radiation, and this explains his premature death.

But I would like to know how Malyshev himself assessed the destruction of the evidence collected under his leadership. And who could order the destruction of the documents collected by the commission headed by the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers? Malyshev was subordinate only to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Bulganin. Bulganin was subordinate to the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Nikita Khrushchev.

The order to destroy the documents of the Government Commission could only be given by one of these three - Malyshev, Bulganin, Khrushchev. There was no one else. And it is doubtful that Malyshev himself would dare to do such a thing. Why would he? He collected them himself and then destroyed them himself? Older comrades would be interested: what are you hiding there, Vyacheslav Sanych?

That's why, it seems to me, the case was like this. Three statesmen got together, drank fire water for three and decided: burn it all to hell, Vyacheslav Sanych. Happiness is the ability to forget bad things.

3

And I really didn't want to remember some facts. There was more than one explosion. There were two. Thirty seconds apart. Those who managed to escape testified to that. That was evidenced by the nature of the damage to the bottom. One explosion could not make both a 150 square meter hole on the starboard side and a powerful 190 square meter dent on the side, breaking the keel. This strange circumstance Malyshev's commission tried not to notice. If they had noticed it, it would have been impossible to come up with an explanation.

Sevastopol bays after the war were cleared many times, both by trawling and by blowing up powerful charges. The parking place of the flagship was cleared in a special order, launching divers for inspection of water area. During ten years after the war on the

The "battleship barrel No. 3", where the "Novorossiysk" perished, was hit 134 times by the battleship "Sevastopol" and 10 times by the "Novorossiysk" itself, and nothing happened to them. But if any mine had been there, it should have failed long ago due to corrosion and discharging of power sources.

And that's not all. The fact is that the power of the two explosions sharply exceeded the power of any mine known at the time, and even two together.

It is necessary to recall some moments from the biography of Vyacheslav Alexandrovich Malyshev to appreciate the blunders of the commission headed by him. Malyshev became People's Commissar of Heavy Engineering - that is, Minister - at the age of 36. That same year he became a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. In 1940, Stalin places Malyshev as deputy head of government of the Soviet Union. In May 1941, Stalin becomes head of the Government of the USSR, and Malyshev automatically becomes Stalin's deputy. Malyshev was only 38 years old at the time. Throughout the war, he was Stalin's deputy head of government and at the same time People's Commissar of the Tank Industry.

Comrade Stalin, as is well known, did not forgive mistakes and blunders. Malyshev survived because he made no mistakes. We can judge how Malyshev managed the Soviet industry in general and the tank industry in particular by the pace of evacuation of industry from threatened areas in 1941 and the sharp rise in production in the Urals and Siberia, by the quantity and quality of Soviet tanks produced during the war. I do not take into account the price paid, because the inviolable principle was in force: we need victory, one for all, we will not stand behind the price.

During the war, Stalin awarded Malyshev the Gold Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor and the rank of Colonel-General of the Engineering and Technical Service, awarded two Stalin Prizes of the first degree and the highest military orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov of the first degrees. Malyshev did not fight at the front, but Stalin granted weapons designers and their production managers military ranks and combat orders on a par with the

generals who commanded divisions, corps, armies and fronts - they deserved it.

After the war, Malyshev (with short interruptions) remained his deputy in the government until Stalin's death. After Stalin's death, Malyshev became the first deputy head of the government, simultaneously (until February 28, 1955) heading the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.

Cut me into small pieces with knives and sprinkle salt on me, but I will never believe that such a person could make conclusions that do not fit with the obvious facts. Malyshev Vyacheslav Alexandrovich, having a clear idea of the nature of damage and the power of explosive devices, could not sign the act that the cause was the explosion of a single mine, which could not be here, which, if it was, could not explode, and if it did explode, it could not sink a whole battleship, causing huge damage on both sides.

But it was the explosion of a single German mine from World War II that was named by the Government Commission as the cause of the battleship's destruction. It follows that the commission deliberately overlooked inconvenient facts and falsified conclusions.

4

It was clear to anyone who had at least a cursory familiarization with the circumstances of the Novorossiysk's destruction that the official version of its destruction was untenable. Therefore, immediately after the destruction of all witness testimonies, two unofficial versions were thrown in. Both of them had the same beginning: it was a purposeful sabotage. However, the endings of these versions are different.

The first version: the crime was committed by Italian saboteurs. The second version: the crime was committed by British saboteurs. Let's see.

"Novorossiysk" - is Italian battleship "Giulio Cesare,

"Julius Caesar." After the end of World War II, the fleet of defeated Italy was divided among the Allies. Italian naval officers allegedly could not allow the pride of the Italian Navy to sail the seas and oceans under the sickle and hammer flag. Italian submarine saboteurs supposedly could not.

putting the government and their navy commanders on notice, carried out the sabotage on their own initiative and with their own forces.

Everything here is logical and clear. But there is a small discrepancy that spoils the whole picture: the battleship "Julius Caesar" was not the pride of the Italian fleet.

It was laid down on June 24, 1910, and joined the Italian Navy before the outbreak of World War I. While it was being built, the great maritime powers made a powerful technological leap forward. Already at the time of entry into service, the new "Caesar", on which the paint had not yet dried, was a ship obsolete. In the First World War he took part, but never met the enemy. In 1928 it was transferred to the training ships. The need forced it to modernize and make it combatable again. "Caesar" fought in World War II, but January 5, 1942, in the midst of the war, was withdrawn from the fleet, anchored and turned first into a training ship, and then in a floating barracks - so it was more useful.

In 1943, after Italy's withdrawal from the war, the Caesar made it to Malta, where it was interned by the British. In Malta it stood for five years with minimal crew on board, without preservation, repair or maintenance.

The Soviet Union received the Caesar in February 1949 in a deplorable condition. The mechanisms were worn out and rusted, and there was no technical documentation. During six years of service in the Soviet Navy, the battleship had to undergo factory repairs seven times. The Soviet Union had no ammunition of 320 mm caliber. One ammunition, received from Italy, had served all the terms and had to be scrapped. But the most important thing was that the age of battleships, as well as piston bombers, was over. No one in the world built any more battleships.

When the Italian navy was divided, the Americans got a battleship "Littorio", which was indeed the pride of Italy. It was superior to the "Caesar" in sailing characteristics (had a speed of 30 knots) and significantly superior in armament and defense (total displacement of 45 thousand tons, main caliber - 9 guns caliber 381 mm). "Littorio" was 26 years younger than "Caesar" - it entered the

was commissioned on May 6, 1940. The Americans considered the Littorio obsolete, scrapped it and soon cut it up for metal.

The British got another pride of the Italian Navy - the battleship "Vittorio Veneto" of the same class as "Littorio". It entered service on August 2, 1940. The British, as well as the Americans, considered a battleship with such characteristics, built 8 years ago, fit only for metal.

And only the leaders of the Soviet Union, having received a rusty battleship in February 1949, did not cut it up for metal, although "Caesar" entered service almost 35 years ago. Although its design did not take into account the experience of either World War I or World War II. Though it was twice a training ship and once a floating barracks. Instead, "Caesar" was cleaned and painted, it was named "Novorossiysk" and declared the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet squadron - for nothing newer and more powerful, equal even to the long outdated "Caesar", for all the years of Soviet power the socialist industry could not build.

The Soviet Union's navy inherited four battleships from Tsar Nicholas. One of them suffered such a terrible fire that its turrets had to be removed and installed in coastal forts to protect Kronstadt, Sevastopol and Vladivostok, and the hull had to be cut up. The second battleship was mangled by a German dive bomber during the war and could not be restored. The two remaining, "Sevastopol" and "October Revolution", July 24, 1954 were transferred to the class of training ships, that is, battleships were no longer listed as battleships.

Thus, Novorossiysk was the last battleship of the Soviet Union.

Italian saboteurs had no reason to sink the rusty battleship, which in 1955 was already 41 years old. Nor did "Caesar" oceans, but more and more sick and treated. The "Caesar" was not worth the money spent on its constant repair, it was not even worth the paint with which it was painted. "Novorossiysk" had no reason to sink. In a year or two it would have been cut up for metal anyway.

"Novorossiysk" became a famous ship only because of its gruesome demise. If it weren't for that fact, no one would ever have heard of it.

would not have remembered. The Italian saboteurs had no motive to commit the crime that was imputed to them.

5

The British, on the other hand, had a motive. In the Soviet Union, for the cannons

"Novorossiysk" was developed with atomic shells. This frightened the British. If the "Novorossiysk" approached Britain from the Atlantic Ocean and launched one or more nuclear strikes, the prevailing westerly winds in the Atlantic would spread radioactive dust all over the south of Britain. To prevent this, the British admirals decided to blow up the battleship "Novorossiysk", but in such a way that its nuclear charges explode as well. So that the city of Sevastopol would be gone too!

Here is how the actions of British saboteurs are described by one author I respect:

Their aim was to blow up battleships Sevastopol and "Novorossiysk", which had on board 305-mm and 320-mm atomic shells. According to the plan of the organizers of the sabotage, the result should have been a double atomic explosion, which would have destroyed all or almost all the ships of the Black Sea Fleet squadron. From the city of Sevastopol and from the port nothing would be left at all. But at the same time "Novorossiysk", which became on October 28 to regular anchorage of battleship "Sevastopol", accidentally took on a double blow, and shells with atomic warheads did not detonate (Drogovoz I. Big fleet of the Country of Soviets. P. 248).

The version is bold, but it also has weaknesses. World War I began with two pistol shots in the provincial town of Sarajevo in the Austro-Hungarian Empire: the first was fired at Archduke Franz Ferdinand Karl Ludwig Josef von Habsburg, the second at his wife, Princess Hohenberg. These two shots were followed by billions of others: great and small powers clashed in mortal combat and tormented each other for four years. Millions died on the battlefields and three great empires - the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian - collapsed,

The power of the European ruling dynasties was forever undermined and the conditions for the outbreak of World War II were created.

The double atomic explosion with the destruction of Sevastopol, the squadron and the main base of the Black Sea Fleet could also be a small detonator of great events. We can purely theoretically assume that in Italy saboteurs on their own initiative and by their own efforts decided to create what could be the beginning of the third and last world war. However, with regard to Great Britain, even purely theoretically, we cannot assume such a thing. Private initiative in a matter of such importance is completely ruled out. If something of this kind was planned, it would be only at the level of Her Majesty's government.

Did the British government have a good reason for such an action? Did the Novorossiysk pose a real threat to Britain?

Let's imagine a scenario: in peacetime, the Novorossiysk hangs around in the Atlantic Ocean and at some point receives an order to shell the British coast. Nothing good could come out of this idea. World War II showed that battleships without air cover are extremely vulnerable to air strikes. If "Novorossiysk" in peacetime went on combat duty in the Atlantic, it would have been constantly monitored. At the outbreak of war, it would have been sunk, prevented from approaching the coast.

And how long can an obsolete battleship stay away from its bases in areas dominated by enemy fleets, which have aircraft carriers, bases and coastal airfields? After all, in peacetime no one even made attempts to take this ship to the Atlantic Ocean.

Another scenario: war broke out, and "Novorossiysk" headed out of the Black Sea.... Let me ask you, who will allow an obsolete battleship to break through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles? And if it does break through, who will allow it to pass through the Mediterranean Sea, which is dominated by the fleets of the United States, Great Britain and France? And if it passes the Mediterranean Sea to the west, who will let it enter the Atlantic through the Strait of Gibraltar, which is securely covered by Britain from Gibraltar, an overseas territory of the United Kingdom to the south

Who will allow this boat to sail around Spain and France and come within cannon shot distance of the territorial waters of the "ruler of the seas"? Who would allow this trough, having circumnavigated Spain and France, to come within cannon-shot distance of the territorial waters of the "ruler of the seas"?

6

Let's just say that the rulers of Great Britain to destruction "Novorossiysk" still decided, the battleship British saboteurs sank, and no one guessed whose handiwork it was. Could the security of Great Britain have been improved as a result?

Under Stalin, the Soviet Union built from 1,195 to 1,296 Tu-4 bombers, according to various sources. Each of them had the potential to carry nuclear bombs. These airplanes, as we have found out, were obsolete. But why obsolete "Novorossiysk" scared Britain so much that they decided to sink it, and hundreds of bombers Tu-4 didn't scare them? "Novorossiysk" to Britain in case of war could not even theoretically reach Britain, and Tu-4 could well suddenly appear even in peacetime, or during the war.

A cannon shell, when fired, experiences tremendous dynamic and thermal stresses. Therefore, the walls of the projectile must be very thick, and the explosive charge must be small compared to the weight of the projectile itself. In creating a nuclear projectile. to create a nuclear projectile. to decide a lot of of technological puzzles. Not not the least of which is the problem of maintaining an acceptable thermal regime of a nuclear charge at the enormous temperature at the moment of firing. With a bomb, everything is much simpler - there are no loads, and in terms of dimensions it can be much larger, and therefore more powerful. Let's assume that this is the British sank "Novorossiysk", which even theoretically during the war could not reach British shores, which had relatively weak nuclear charges. But there were hundreds of bombers Tu-4s, which that that could reach Britain, that could carry much more powerful bombs. Could it be the British rulers after after the destruction

"Novorossiysk" would you feel better?

12	November	1952	on November, 1952	made
first	flight	Soviet strategic	bomber Tu-95.	12
August 12	1953	on August 12, 1953	B	

The Soviet Union tested the world's first hydrogen bomb RDS-6 with a TNT equivalent of 400,000 tons. The Americans detonated a ground-based stationary device that could not be transported by any means of transportation to the target on enemy territory, while the Soviet Union created a bomb that could be delivered to the target by a bomber.

In 1954, the Soviet Union completed tests of the Tu-16 bomber. It was adopted by the Air Force and then by the Navy. Bombers Tu-16 armed regiments, divisions, and then the entire aviation corps. To America on this machine will not reach America, but all those in Europe, do not envy. Parts and compounds, which were in service with the new jet bombers, could deliver anywhere in Europe one or, if necessary, several nuclear warheads. And Tu-16 and Tu-95 could lift and deliver to Britain not only a conventional nuclear bomb, but also ten times more powerful hydrogen bomb RDS-6s.

The ubiquitous James Bond should have known that the Soviet Union was in the process of completing tests of the 8K51 missile, which could deliver a nuclear charge anywhere in the UK from East Germany.

So why would the British sink the Novorossiysk? Were British strategists really so stupid as to risk a nuclear war by destroying an obsolete battleship that neither hindered nor threatened Great Britain, while leaving intact much more powerful and truly threatening to Great Britain nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery?

7

And who said there were nukes on the Novorossiysk?

The first Soviet production nuclear bomb, the RDS-4, weighed 1,200 kilograms and had a body diameter of one and a half meters. This was acceptable for bombers and for the first Soviet medium-range strategic missiles. But the Navy had no means of delivering charges of such mass and dimensions. The designers were tasked with creating a nuclear charge for the Navy.

The carrier of the nuclear charge at that moment could be a torpedo or an artillery shell. It is clear that the torpedo was chosen. With a torpedo it is easier: here both the volume and weight of the charge can be much larger. And there are no huge thermal and dynamic loads: the torpedo's propeller spins, and it moves to the target by itself.

A nuclear-tipped torpedo could be used on any submarine or surface ship, from a cruiser to a torpedo boat. And a cannon shell could only be used by a Soviet battleship - only one Soviet battleship. The 320 millimeter caliber cannons stood only on the Caesar, and nowhere else. Was there any point in investing huge amounts of money in developing nuclear shells for the Caesar if it was to be decommissioned in the foreseeable future? Was there any point in developing 305-mm nuclear shells for the Sevastopol and the

"October Revolution", if since July 24, 1954 they were no longer in the fleet's combat service?

In order to give the fleet nuclear weapons, it was necessary to somehow fit a nuclear charge into the hull of an ordinary navy torpedo with a diameter of 533 millimeters. Yuliy Borisovich Khariton coped with this problem, and the T-5 torpedo with the RDS-9 nuclear charge was created, which became an outstanding technical achievement of the Soviet military industry. This charge was unsuccessfully tested on October 19, 1954. The first successful test took place on September 21, 1955.

If the wise British decided to ward off the threat of a nuclear strike, they should have struck first of all not at the aged Caesar, but at Soviet submarines and their bases in the northern seas. It was Soviet submarines that in the near future would have the ability to launch nuclear strikes, if necessary, against the ships and coastal facilities of the United States, Britain, and their allies in the Atlantic.

At the same time, it was necessary to destroy Soviet strategic airfields. Why do we assume that the aged Caesar posed a threat to Britain, while the outdated Tu-4 bombers with nuclear bombs on board did not? Why didn't the latest Tu-16, M-4 and Tu-95 pose a threat? Why were the wise British not afraid of Soviet atomic torpedoes, the charges for which had already been tested and were soon to enter service with the navy?

Information for reflection: in the Soviet Union, for the first time it was possible to place a nuclear charge inside an artillery shell of caliber 452 mm, and not at all in 305-mm or 320-mm shells. This 452-mm RDS-41 nuclear projectile was not intended for the Navy and was not put into production. The first successful test of RDS-41 took place on March 16, 1956 - after four with half months after the demise "Novorossiysk."

Thus thus in 1955 no nuclear projectiles on the "Caesar" did not have any, no one developed or created them. And certainly there were no 305-mm nuclear shells on the "Sevastopol", because it, like the "October Revolution", had been transferred to the class of training ships a year earlier.

It follows from all this that it made no sense for the British government and the British admirals to make any sense to sink the battleship "Caesar" and even more so "Sevastopol", which at that time was no longer officially a battleship. The imaginary British saboteurs had no motive for the crime, just like the Italian saboteurs.

Key point

After the sinking of the "Novorossiysk", the place where it was moored was examined again and several rusty unexploded mines from the war were immediately found. This is the proof: the "Novorossiysk" was blown up on an old German mine!

However, what miracles do not happen in life! Already in our time, a statesman sank to the bottom of the same Black Sea and - oh wonder! - found there two ancient amphorae! And, shining, showed them to the journalists who had gathered on the shore in advance. What a lucky find! And most importantly, where? Right by the shore, where divers have been diving for decades. How lucky a man is!

But quick bloggers immediately saw a strange detail: the amphorae, after lying at the bottom for a couple thousand years, turned out to be clean and even shells have not overgrown. And on the web they were amicably ridiculed as

statesman and the PR men and women who serve him.

I mentioned this case in order to bring us to a simple conclusion: old rusty mines found at the site of the Novorossiysk explosion are not proof of the official version that the battleship was blown up on a World War II mine. They could have been laid out on the bottom in a convenient place for search, like those amphorae. Or they might not have been laid out - just written in the act. Who saw those allegedly found mines?

CHAPTER 23

1

I would I would I'd really I'd like to, that
the perpetrator explosion

"Novorossiysk" turned out to be Italian macaroni or malicious British saboteurs. But it 't. And I'm sad. Sad, because I have to agree with the version, the rumors of which already then, in 1955, swept across the Soviet Union in a wave: Novorossiysk" was blown up by ours.

Many decades later, Oleg Sergeev, a naval engineer and candidate of technical sciences, once again studied all the circumstances of the Novorossiysk's destruction and repeated, but with mathematical calculations, what had been guessed before: the crime was the work of the KGB. It is clear that Sergeyev had a lot of enemies and detractors. Here is an example of how not even he himself was beaten, but his predecessors, who expressed the same idea, though without such convincing evidence:

Such statements can only be made by those people who believe like children in tales about the "arbitrariness" of the state security organs, which "got out" from under the control of the Party, about all kinds of "conspiracies" that arose in the depths of this department and other nonsense of this kind. In real life, from the first to the last days of their existence, the organs of the VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-KGB have always been nothing more than executors of the decisions of the leaders of the criminal organization of the Bolshevik (or Communist) Party. And in order to prevent individual Chekists from "breeding their own ideas", vigilant supervision of the "organs" was carried out by the Party Security Service - a top-secret organization, the very fact of whose existence is still little known (Drogovoz I. Big Fleet of the Country of Soviets. p. 249).

What can you say to that? Nothing. Everything is right. But let's not talk about the KGB, not about some abstract monster, but about the KGB.

specific people. Such an action could not have been carried out without the permission of the Chairman of the KGB, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov. It could not!

But why, pray tell, should Ivan Alexandrovich sink this aged "Novorossiysk", corroded from keel to keel^[15]? Why? He has no reason to do so! So with the opinion in the quote above, I agree completely. I did not serve in the KGB, I served in the GRU. The decision to send me to agent extraction was made by responsible comrades from the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee of the CPSU, located in Moscow, on Staraya Square, in house No. 4. After a long conversation, a very big boss from the Central Committee hinted that everything was under control, that the Central Committee knew quite a lot about me (as about any other GRU officer).

All GRU officers, as well as all KGB officers, including the most important leaders, were under the control of the Communist Party. I know this well from my own experience.

But the opinion stated in the quote does not contradict the version that the explosion was carried out by the SCB forces! Moreover, it confirms this version! Let's read the objection again:

...organs VCHK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-KGB. always were no more than executors of the decisions of the leaders of the criminal organization of the Bolshevik (or Communist) Party.

That's right! The criminal organization has made a decision. Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, the Chairman of the KGB, Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army, had no reason to blow up the Novorossiysk - he had no reason to do so. But he is "*no more than an executor of the decisions of the leaders of the criminal organization*". He was ordered to do it - he did it. But the leaders of the criminal organization had reasons to blow up the Novorossiysk - and good reasons.

But could our leaders really go to the trouble of killing ordinary sailors for the sake of their own career goals?

Why not? Not even a year after Zhukov mutilated the lives of tens of thousands of ordinary Soviet soldiers to please Khrushchev for the sake of his career objectives. Why shouldn't he or Serov drown more of them

a few hundred sailors to accomplish important national goals?

Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Kuznetsov Nikolai Gerasimovich interfered Zhukov, interfered with Khrushchev, he should have been kicked out in disgrace, kicked out so that he could never again interfere in the construction of the fleet. And instead of him to put an obliging spineless lackey in admiral's epaulettes.

2

Let's, uh. let's see what has become c
to the individuals involved in the disaster.

Black Sea Fleet commander Vice Admiral Parkhomenko, who had
canceled the order to put on aground
wounded battleship

"Novorossiysk" and prohibited the evacuation of personnel not engaged in the fight for the survivability of the ship, December 8, 1955 was removed from his post, demoted to rear admiral and appointed first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. In 1960 Parkhomenko was restored to the rank of vice-admiral. He finished his service as head of the Navy's Emergency Rescue Service - he headed the emergency rescue service of all four fleets of the Soviet Union and all flotillas. A man whose erroneous decisions and orders led to the deaths of many people during the Novorossiysk disaster should only be put in such a job.

Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko took over the Black Sea Fleet in July 1955. Before him, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov had commanded the Black Sea Fleet for four years. Then Gorshkov was appointed First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, was ill for a long time, so essentially performed his duties.

By a strange coincidence, Admiral Gorshkov was appointed to the Government Commission to investigate the circumstances of the sinking of the Novorossiysk. A disaster in the Black Sea Fleet and the only sailor in the Government Commission

- the same one who just surrendered the Black Sea Fleet. That is, a person very interested in ensuring that the shortcomings and omissions of his leadership were not revealed. Wasn't there an admiral from another fleet?

3

The criminal case on the destruction of the battleship "Novorossiysk" was not opened, no one was tried - after all, at the trial, albeit closed, could reveal something undesirable. Then the most interesting thing happened. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov was removed from his post, demoted to vice-admiral and expelled from the armed forces with the humiliating wording "without the right to work in the Navy." No charges were brought against Kuznetsov. Many years later, Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov wrote to the Central Committee:

On February 15, 1956, I was summoned by the former Minister of Defense, and within 5-7 minutes, in an exceptionally rude manner, was announced to me the decision to reduce me in military rank and dismiss me from the army without the right to reinstatement. After that no one called me for a formal dismissal. Some representative of the personnel department (even without me) brought and left the dismissal documents at my apartment. <...> Not being fully aware of the reasons for my punishment, I asked to be acquainted with the documents concerning me, but never got the opportunity (Krasnaya Zvezda. May 21, 1988).

Kuznetsov later recalled:

They tried to literally crush me. Without a summons to the leadership of the country, without giving explanations and without even presenting documents on my release, I was excommunicated from the Navy. Marshal Zhukov in a rude, inherent in his form announced that I was removed from my post, demoted to the rank of vice-admiral. To my question, on the basis of what and why it was done without my summons, he, grinning, replied that it was not necessary at all (Krasnaya Zvezda. July 24, 1999).

Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov was appointed People's Commissar of the Navy back in 1939. At that time.

Zhukov was only a commander. Kuznetsov entered the war as People's Commissar of the Navy and ended the war in the same position. In our history only three people had the rank of Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet. Kuznetsov is the first of them. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union is a complete analogy of the army rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

But to compare Kuznetsov and Zhukov is even indecent. Kuznetsov was an educated man. He graduated from the Naval School and the Naval Academy. Suffice it to say that Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov was fluent in English, German, French and Spanish.

And Zhukov's education was inferior. And so it is written in his autobiography of June 13, 1938 - "*low, studied for three years in a parochial school*". Then the cavalry courses, where Zhukov was taught to swing a saber. Zhukov kicked out of the armed forces Kuznetsov, who was equal to him in military rank. Let everyone imagine what lies behind the words "in an extremely rude form". Zhukov expelled Kuznetsov, demoted in military rank by as much as three steps. If Zhukov spent "5-7 minutes" to expel the Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet from the armed forces, he did not spend so much time to decide the fate of some major generals and rear admirals.

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko, who was on board the Novorossiysk and supervised the rescue efforts, was demoted in rank by one step, but not expelled, and four years later was restored in rank.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, who was not present at the scene of the tragedy, who had been absent for several months due to illness, is downgraded three ranks and dishonorably expelled. This is like being demoted from Marshal of the Soviet Union to lieutenant general.

But the most interesting was the fate of Admiral Gorshkov. He commanded the Black Sea Fleet for four years, until 1955. If the death of the "Novorossiysk" was the fault of a German mine, which was not disarmed at the parking place of the fleet's flagship, then who was to blame but the Black Sea Fleet Commander Gorshkov? If the epaulettes of Admiral Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union Fleet were torn off,

who has not fulfilled the duties of the Navy Commander-in-Chief for several months, what should be done with Admiral Gorshkov, who has been fulfilling these duties?

That's right! Gorshkov gets a promotion!

Gorshkov was First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for several months; after Kuznetsov was ousted, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, i.e. Zhukov. In this position Gorshkov lasted without a few days for 30 years. In the war Gorshkov did not become a hero, but in peacetime, like Marshal Grechko, he would become twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Under his leadership, a gigantic fleet would be built, which had nowhere to base and repair.

Under Gorshkov's leadership, a motley fleet will be built. The Americans created one good cruiser and put it into production: easy to repair, easy to provide spare parts, easy to train crews. Gorshkov had four different types of cruisers entering the fleet at the same time. In total, during Gorshkov's tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the fleet received ships of 45 different types.

American ships were armed with 10 different types of missiles. And in the Soviet Union, the number of different types of shipboard missiles was three times as many!

In the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorshkov was as guilty as Zhukov himself.

Key point

Refusal to initiate criminal proceedings on the fact of the terrible disaster and destruction of documents of the Government Commission — is proof of the guilt of Khrushchev and his gang. No other arguments need be sought anymore.

I am not deliberately delving into the details of the sinking of the Novorossiysk, nor am I entering into disputes on this subject. I am only drawing the attention of the honorable public to the strange rise of Gorshkov and the equally strange fall of Kuznetsov.

Why was Kuznetsov, who was absent from duty, punished so harshly if Gorshkov, who was present, was given an incredible promotion for the same deeds?

Yes for the fact that Kuznetsov in February of that very 1955 cautiously spoke out against Zhukov, and Gorshkov always and everywhere did only what was required by the leadership at the moment.

CHAPTER 24

1

Zhukov was on a roll. Zhukov was preparing to break the enemy's defenses not only in Central Europe, but also in Moscow. Within the Garden Ring. Until the last and decisive battle for the Kremlin, Zhukov energetically strengthened his position, assertively, if not brazenly, expanded the limits of his power. He attacked on many fronts at once.

On the first front, the goal of the offensive was to remove the Frontier Troops from the Interior Ministry and subordinate them to the Ministry of Defense - that is, to put them under Zhukov's control.

At all times, the Border Troops have been part of the State security agencies. Protecting the country from spies, saboteurs, bandits, smugglers and other undesirable people trying to sneak in was a secondary task for the Border Troops.

People were running away from socialism. Therefore, the main task of the Border Troops was to keep those who tried to escape out of the country. That is why the Soviet Union had the most powerful Frontier Troops in the world, armed with warships, planes, helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and mortars.

They will argue that we have the world's longest border, which is why our border troops are so powerful. We reject this objection. Lenin called Russia a "prison of nations," but Tsar Nicholas II had roughly the same length of borders, but they were guarded by a separate corps of border guards, the maximum number of which was recorded in 1910 and was then 36,709 people. If we place these people along our sea and land borders, we get a very thin chain. If we remember that these people do not stand at the post 24 hours a day, if we remember that not all of them keep watch at the border, and some of them also have to cook porridge, change horseshoes, and command, we get a very pathetic picture.

The separate corps of border guards was created by Alexander III in 1893. There was no earlier one either.

2

Let us turn to Russian and Soviet literature. In Soviet literature we find many images of courageous border guards. And movies how many were filmed about border guards:

"The border is locked", "Outpost in the mountains", "Blue Arrow", "Ordered to take alive", "Here goes the border"

But the main characters are not on book pages or on the screen. The main characters are in real life. What is only Nikita Fyodorovich Karatsupa and his dog Indus. (Indus was not the only dog of the legendary border guard, Karatsupa had seven of them. When another Indus died in a fight with enemies, Karatsupa named his new assistant with this name. After the establishment of friendly relations with India, the name of heroic dogs in publications about Karatsupa's exploits was changed: they were Indus - became Ingus).

In 20 years of service on the border, Karatsupa destroyed 129 and apprehended 338 border crossers. When we were told these figures, it was assumed that the infiltrators were spies and saboteurs trying to infiltrate our country by animal trails to set fire to crops, pour poison into wells, blow up bridges and tunnels. And somehow it did not occur to us that the intruders were, first of all, our native Soviet people who were trying to flee the country.

For us, Soviet people, Karatsupa was a role model and a romantic hero like d'Artagnan. But in Russia, the very "prison of nations," there were no such people as Karatsupa,

— neither in real life nor in literature. We will not find in the great Russian literature any mention of control and trace strips, faithful border dogs, treacherous intruders and valiant defenders of the border. Under Czars Alexander III and Nicholas II, the rule was that if you didn't like the "prison of the peoples", you could go wherever you liked, even to Switzerland, like Comrade Lenin, or to America, like Comrades Trotsky, Bukharin and Gorky. Having seized power over the "prison of the peoples", Lenin increased the number of border guards several times. This is with

He introduced a proud phrase into the Russian language - "the border is locked!" It was under him that the border really became an insurmountable barrier.

But that is not the main thing. Under Alexander III and Nicholas II, the border guards were subordinate to the Ministry of Finance: their main task was to protect the country's economic interests. While the Civil War was going on, there were no borders in the country - there were fronts. But in 1920, when the war had largely subsided, the Border Troops were subordinated to the Special Department of the VChK. Since then, the border guards have always been part of the punitive system of the dictatorship of the proletariat - VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB.

The army is not tasked with customs control at borders. The army is not tasked with fighting spies and smugglers. The army is not peculiar to the task of suppressing the escape of citizens from their own country. But Zhukov, having accepted the post of Minister of Defense in February 1955, called his First Deputy Chief of General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky and ordered to prepare a report to the Central Committee of the CPSU demanding the transfer of the Border Troops to the Ministry of Defense.

3

There was another armed force in the Soviet Union that was not subordinated to the Ministry of Defense - the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. No normal country in the world has an analog to the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; these troops were created only where a happy life was being built in our image.

The main task of the Internal Troops is to suppress popular uprisings, fight against guerrillas, guard prisons, camps, the great construction sites of communism built by the hands of prisoners, transport prisoners around the country and search for fugitives. In addition, the Internal Troops guard the most important state facilities - government offices, powerful power plants, strategic stockpiles, plants for the production of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, and transportation facilities.

All of these functions, especially the prison and vulture functions, are alien to the army. The army cannot catch blatants in back alleys, it cannot search and escort them, it cannot break up fights and pacify them

the zones that went crazy. He can't! That's not the army's line of work! That's not what the army's for!

The Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had another function that was not enshrined in any decrees, laws, statutes or regulations, nor was it proclaimed anywhere or in any way. This function was to be a counterweight to the Soviet Army.

There was a KGB regiment in the Kremlin. In the suburbs of the Moscow region was the Dzerzhinsky Special Purpose Motorized Rifle Division of the USSR Interior Ministry's Internal Troops^[16]. This division is quite unusual. At the time when Zhukov became Minister of Defense, the Dzerzhinsky Division had five motorized rifle regiments and eleven separate battalions - a total of 18,000 soldiers and officers. The division was staffed completely, down to the last man. Personnel - selected. The division had floating tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers.

The task of the Dzerzhinsky Division was to protect the leaders and maintain order in Moscow. The system of protection of the leaders was duplicated: protection of the Kremlin and the leaders themselves by personal bodyguards was the job of the KGB, and suppression of popular unrest, protection from the crowd was the job of the Dzerzhinsky Division of the Interior Ministry. If the KGB plots a coup, the Interior Ministry will defend the leaders. And if the MVD decides to change the power, the leaders will be protected by the KGB. If the Soviet Army rebels against the proletarian power, the KGB and the MVD will stand against it with a common front. That is why the Dzerzhinsky Special Motorized Rifle Division had tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery.

In addition to the Dzerzhinsky Separate MFD, the Internal Troops of the Interior Ministry had dozens of divisions, brigades, and separate regiments. Interior Ministry divisions were located in all major cities, including Leningrad, Minsk, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Khabarovsk, Baku, Krasnoyarsk, Gorky, and Irkutsk.

The internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are divisions, brigades, regiments, educational institutions, hundreds of thousands of people in arms, boots and epaulettes. But all this huge force did not obey Zhukov. Could he put up with such an outrage?

I couldn't! And he did not put up with it. He called the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky, and ordered him to write memo to the Central Committee demanding that the Internal Troops be withdrawn from the Interior Ministry and subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.

This meant that Zhukov decided to put on the shoulders of the Ministry of Defense also vertuhai service.

4

Here is one case that vividly illustrates Zhukov's ambitions at that time. It is taken from the book by Era and Ella Zhukov "Marshal of Victory" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1996), which published the memoirs of Major Sergei Petrovich Markov, who was Zhukov's chief of security when he was Minister of Defense. Here is what Markov tells about on pages 268-269 of this book:

In 1955, during Marshal Zhukov's trip to the Northern Fleet, when he was traveling by car, he was taken along an uncoordinated route - they wanted to shorten the route. As a result, the motorcade ended up in the border strip - a border guard was serving at the barrier. Sentry introduced himself to Marshal: "Sentry post border guard so-and-so. Zhukov told him: "Open the barrier for passage. The sentry replied: I have no right, the passage is forbidden. Then the marshal said: "Call your superior." The sentry explained that the phone is 500 meters away, and he has no right to leave the post. Zhukov asked the sentry what his actions would be if they did pass. The sentry said: "I will be forced to use weapons: the first shot upwards is a warning shot, and the next one will be fired at the wheels of the automobile."

After that, Zhukov immediately thanked the sentry for his excellent service, and the escort made the appropriate indoctrination. The motorcade left for the military base along the previously established route.

Some time later, an order signed by the USSR Defense Minister Zhukov came from the Defense Ministry to the Northern Frontier District Directorate, which noted the excellent service in protecting the state borders and commended the sentry for his competent and decisive actions.

The case is egregious. Everything in this excerpt is surprising - and above all, the fact that it was published by Voenizdat. Did the people who let it go to press not realize that this is not a praise of Zhukov, but an exposé?

5

Sentinel - a person inviolable. The inviolability of a sentry consists of:

- in the special protection by law of his rights and personal dignity;
- in a sentry's subordination to a strictly limited circle of persons: to the watch commander, to the assistant watch commander and to his officer in charge;
- the duty of all persons to obey without question the sentry's orders as determined by his service;
- in authorizing him to use arms in cases provided for by statute.

These are the embossed lines of the Statute of Garrison and Guard Service of the Armed Forces of the USSR. These principles were established as early as Peter the Great. A sentry on guard duty is not subordinate to officers, generals, Zhukov or Khrushchev.

But in the case described there was a slacker at the post. A sentry had no right to let anyone near his post. A sentry had no right to introduce himself to anyone, not even Zhukov. A sentry had no right to answer questions, even if he was asked by the Minister of Defense. This is categorically forbidden. Here is a simple, clearly defined by the statute scheme of actions of a sentry: "Stop, who is coming?", "Stop, back!", "Stop, I'll shoot!", a warning shot up, then - at the intruder. And why did the sentry decide to shoot at the wheels in case of violation, if the statute requires to kill indiscriminately all violators after a warning shot?

But what is most surprising is Zhukov's behavior. At the time of this idiotic incident, he had already served in the army for four decades, including in the Imperial Army. Had he not been taught the most fundamental basics of service there? Does Zhukov not see that what he sees before him is a slacker and a vicious violator of the regulations?

But Zhukov himself is good. Didn't he know that you can't talk to a sentry? If you want to talk - call the chief of guard, the chief of guard will remove the sentry from his post, then talk to him. If you want to pass through the barrier, again, you should solve the issue not with the sentry, but with the head of the guard.

And Zhukov's orders sound absolutely strange: "Open the barrier for passage", "Call your superior". I repeat: a sentry is subordinate only to the chief of the guard, the assistant chief of the guard, and his watch commander. It is important to emphasize the word "his". There are several sentries in the guardhouse, but only the sentry who is responsible for the protection and defense of the given object can be posted and removed from his post. No one but these three persons has the right to order the sentry. Did Zhukov not know this?

All of Zhukov's actions in this situation are illegal. The Statute is a law approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the slacker Zhukov publicly violated one of the basic laws of military service. There could be only two reasons for this:

1. Zhukov was a completely illiterate man even in the most fundamental matters of military service.
2. Zhukov deliberately demonstrated to his entourage that he did not intend to obey the laws of the country.

6

And that's where it gets interesting:

Zhukov here announced a commendation to the sentry for excellent service.

How dare he? Who the hell is he? Zhukov is the Minister of Defense. The Border Troops are not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

Any superior has the right to reward and punish only those who are subordinate to him.

Zhukov announced a commendation to a private of the Frontier Troops, but this is nothing but an official statement that the Frontier Troops are subordinate to Zhukov. And the sentry should have been indignant: don't pretend to be a superior, I don't need your gratitude, I am not your subordinate.

But that's not the end of it. Let's read the amazing passage again:

Some time later, an order signed by the USSR Defense Minister Zhukov came from the Ministry of Defense to the Northern Border District Directorate, which noted the excellent service in protecting the state borders and commended the sentry for his competent and decisive actions.

Let's get into it. The entire border is divided into 10 districts. Zhukov sent a written order to one of these districts. I repeat the question: who is he to send orders to the Border Troops! The most piquant thing is that Zhukov sends the order not to the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops, Major General Pavel Ivanovich Zyryanov, but directly to the Northern Border District, ignoring the command of the Border Troops.

Let us imagine that someone from outside - for example, from the Ministry of Agriculture, to which the Soviet Army is not subordinate - sent an order to the commander of, for example, the Prikarpatya Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev. Konev probably wouldn't have tolerated such a thing. And neither would Zhukov.

It doesn't matter what the order is. What matters is that someone from outside is trying to command someone else's troops.

7

Zhukov sent orders not only only B the troops, that that were that didn't report to him. He gave orders to Serov himself.

As soon as Zhukov became defense minister, KGB chairman and Zhukov's old friend Ivan Serov sent him five folders of denunciations.

Zhukov's chief of security, Major Markov, continues the story on the same page:

When Zhukov familiarized himself with the dossier, followed Serov's command to dismiss from the KGB bodies the former head of security during the war, N. X. Bedov, his deputy, M. M. Ageyev, the former commandant of the dacha, B. S. Ermishin and some other officers who, as it turned out, were involved in falsified denunciations of Zhukov.

Zhukov is Minister of Defense. Serov is chairman of the KGB. The KGB is not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. So why could this happen: "a command was given to Serov"?

Zhukov could have asked: Vanya, you're an old friend, you're a tournament for these bastards. But Zhukov is in command. What's there to command? All the guards of the leaders are from the KGB. A Chekist's job is to snitch. Serov will kick them out, but won't the new ones snitch on Zhukov?

Serov Ivan Alexandrovich Serov pretended to be a fool very fond of pretending, but was not so simple to Zhukov to give all the material collected on him and reveal all his snitches in the entourage of the Minister of Defense.

CHAPTER 25

1

So, Zhukov insisted on the transfer of the KGB and MVD troops under the control of the Ministry of Defense. Khrushchev resisted, clearly realizing that if all the armed men in the country came under Zhukov's control, the country's top leadership would be completely defenseless.

Zhukov, meanwhile, was destroying the foundations of the state system on yet another front. From its earliest days, the Red Army had been under the complete control of the Communist Party. The Communist Party kept the Red Army, which after the war became the Soviet Army, on two leashes-stretch ropes

- like holding both sides of a beast of prey.

On one side are the Special Departments. On the other side - commissars. The special departments of the Cheka-GB recruited snitches at all levels of the military hierarchy. The higher the level, the higher was the density of snitches among its inhabitants. High-ranking commanders were covered with GB snitches from all sides: adjutants, bodyguards, drivers, cipher operators, radio operators, cooks, guards, clerks, combat and "combat-training" girlfriends were snitches^[17].

In addition to the secret supervision by the Cheka-GB, there was also public supervision. From the moment the first units of the Red Army were created, the Communist Party placed a supervisor to each commander from the company upwards. The supervisor was called a commissar.

Commissars are sung by all Soviet literature and cinema. "Chapaev", "Red Square", "Kotovskiy", "An Optimistic Tragedy" - everywhere and always the commissar guided the commander to the right path with wise advice.

It was different in life. First of all, because the commissar was completely illiterate in military matters. How could an illiterate man control a literate man? The commander gave an order, but without the signature of the commissar supervisor, the order was invalid. An attempt to control the troops without asking the commissars' permission was regarded as treason and mutiny - with all its consequences. The commissar had unlimited power. He could remove

the commander from his post and arrest him. Commissars were not subordinate to commanders. They were subordinate only to higher commissars.

There has never been anything like this in any country in the world. If a commander fights for his Motherland, for his people, why should a dumbass commissar with a revolver be placed behind him?

But that is the point, the Red Army was fighting not for its homeland and not for its people, but for the World Revolution against its people. The name of this army - "Red" - did not reflect its national or territorial affiliation, but only indicated the adherence of the state that gave birth to this army to certain ideological principles.

The Red Army was created to subdue the people of its own country and the people of other countries, so it was permeated from bottom to top with commissar control.

The higher the commander, the stricter the control over him. At the level of armies and fronts, not one but two or three supervisors stood behind the back of each commander. At this level, leadership was exercised by bodies called Military Councils. The Military Council of an army or front consisted of the commander and several so-called PSCs - members of the Military Council.

These members were party bosses of very high rank. In the Civil War, for example, Comrade Stalin, being one of the ten most influential leaders of the country, among other things served as a member of the Military Council of the Western, Southern and South-Western Fronts.

In World War II, members of the Military Councils of armies, flotillas, fronts, and fleets, i.e., supervisors, were First Secretaries of Obkoms (e.g., Brezhnev), members of the Central Committee (Bulganin and Mekhlis), and even members of the Politburo (Khrushchev and Zhdanov).

3

After the Civil War, unity of command was gradually introduced in the army up to the level of divisions and corps. The commander was given the right to issue orders without the signature of a supervising commissar, but this did not mean that there was no control. The commissars turned into pompolites

- political assistants. The pompolit was always

next to the commander and reported all his actions up through his chain of command.

In 1937, Stalin uncovered a conspiracy in the Red Army, and its command staff had to be purged of enemies of the people - a variety of Tukhachevsky and Yakir, Dybenok and Blucher. And so that the commanders did not revolt, May 10, 1937, all pompolity at one point again turned into commissars with all the draconian powers. In 1940, Stalin, having cleansed the Red Army, the dual power was canceled. Now commissars turned not into pompolites, but into deputy police officers.

War broke out. For the Red Army it had, to put it mildly, unfavorable beginning, and therefore in 1941 deputy police officers became commissars again. Commanders had no right to issue any orders without their approval by these personal supervisors. As soon as the Red Army went on the offensive, the commissars were again changed into deputy police officers.

But at the level of armies, flotillas, fleets, fronts, military districts, groups of troops and in peacetime and wartime, the leadership was still in the hands of the Military Councils, each of which included a commander and his caretaker PMCs.

After taking the post of Minister of Defense, Zhukov decided to crush this whole system. Why should the Soviet Army be under anyone's control if there was a Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov! The Central Committee of the CPSU received Zhukov's proposals to transform the Military Councils, to turn them from controlling bodies into advisory ones, and to approve their composition not by decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, but by orders of the Minister of Defense (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 445).

There were many proposals, but the essence was the same: to remove the party collar from the throat of the Soviet Army. It would have been fine, but then the undivided control over the Soviet Army would have passed into the hands of Zhukov.

4

Zhukov did not wait for a positive response to his requests. He began to reduce the positions of party overseers by his own orders.

The Minister of Defense single-handedly abolished the nomenclature positions of the Central Committee of the Deputy Commander for Political Part of the Submarine Forces and the Fleet Squadron (ibid. P. 328).

That is, Zhukov abolished the positions of deputy commander of the submarine forces on political part and deputy commander of the fleet squadron on political part, and both of these positions were included in the nomenclature of the Central Committee, that is, were under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the Party.

In order for us to penetrate into the depths of what happened, we need to remember that the Communist Party seized power in the vast Russian Empire in October 1917. And it did not share that power with anyone. All those who encroached on that power, the Communists exterminated mercilessly on a mass scale, in millions. They exterminated the nobility, the merchants, the officers, the kulaks, the intelligentsia, the clergy, the Cossacks, and then the peasantry.

Power was exercised through the appointment and removal of chiefs of all and sundry ranks. Personnel decide everything - this is how Comrade Stalin once expressed the essence of this system.

Here is an example of the most run-down district center. In the great and mighty, true and free Russian language there is a wide range of toponyms, names of geographical objects. And if there is Serebryany Bor, there will certainly be the village of Khokhotui in the Transbaikalian Territory, and the town of Propoyisk in the Mogilev region, and the village of Kholui (Ivanovo region), and the village of Musorka (Kuibyshev/Samara region).

So, there sits in that very Trash - let's assume that it was lucky enough to become a district center - the district party committee, the district committee. At the head of the district committee is the first secretary. And that secretary has a list of positions that can be occupied only by decision of the committee: director of a bathhouse, chairman of a collective farm, shop manager of a small factory. All these positions are the nomenclature of the district committee. First, the committee, or rather its first secretary, secretly decides who will be the chairman of the collective farm "Krasny Svinopas", and who will be the chairman of the artel "Vain Labor", and then the committee secretly decides who will be the chairman of the collective farm "Krasny Svinopas" and who will be the chairman of the artel "Vain Labor".

and in this collective farm and in this artel they organize elections. But they organize them in such a way that the people's choice coincides exactly with the preliminary secret choice of the Communist Party. The collective farmers, by their free will, can choose their own chairman, but only one who pleases the committee, who has already been secretly chosen by the committee, planned and approved by it.

The nomenklatura is also a list of proven persons who have proved their loyalty to the great ideas of the Communist Party through their behavior, work and life. Neither the district committee nor its first secretary has the right to appoint to positions those who they like. There is a list of faithful people approved at the top, there are personal records of those who have been included in it, so choose your leaders - directors, chiefs and chairmen - only from that circle.

But only the lowest-ranking leaders. The district committee has no power to appoint the editor of the district newspaper, the head of the district police department or the chairman of the district council of trade unions. These guys are the nomenclature of the higher regional party committee. Only there can decide who can be promoted to these positions, and who among the leaders who held these positions should be urgently dropped.

And a district prosecutor, a judge, the very first secretary of the district committee - this is not the nomenclature of the regional party committee, but of a higher - republican or even higher - Central. Only there, at the very top, they decide the delicate issue of selection and placement of personnel. They determine who should be the first secretary of the regional committee in Sakhalin, who should represent the interests of the Soviet Union in Honduras, who should deceive the people with religious opium, who should command an aviation division near Budapest, and who should command a rifle corps in the Khasansky district of Primorsky Krai.

The Central Committee decides who will manage ideology and politics, who will command the army, navy, science, industry, agriculture, culture and religion, who will judge, who will imprison, who will exterminate the unwanted.

Here, for example, a creative union of artists or composers, journalists, architects or writers, purely voluntary

an association of free creative individuals. And they themselves choose the head of their union at a stormy congress. But they choose, without realizing it, only the one who has already been secretly chosen and approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

All the intelligence officers working abroad, all the directors of large factories, all the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church, all the generals are the nomenclature of the Central Committee of the Party. Only the Central Committee of the Communist Party has the right to decide the fate of each of them. Without a decision of the Central Committee, none of them can be demoted, promoted, or transferred from one position to another, even if of equal value.

By abolishing the positions of party supervisors, even if not of the highest rank, who, however, were part of the nomenclature of the Central Committee, Zhukov encroached on the undivided power of the Communist Party and went out from under its control.

I recently heard two experts arguing about whether Zhukov was or was not preparing a seizure of power. There is absolutely no point in arguing about it: Zhukov was not just preparing a seizure of power - he was already actually carrying out a creeping coup in the country. The leading force of the Soviet Union was the Communist Party, and Zhukov was taking the Soviet Army out from under the control of the ruling party, openly ignoring its decisions, breaking the control structures created by it, breaking the orders established by it.

5

In October 1952, the XIX Congress of the CPSU adopted a new statute, according to which every communist had the right to appeal to any party instances, up to the Central Committee. Many officers were communists (otherwise they were not allowed to go upstairs). Generals were communists almost all of them. But Zhukov introduced his own orders in the Soviet Army. Contrary to the CPSU charter, he forbade army and navy communists to apply to the CPSU Central Committee. From that moment on, the rights guaranteed by the CPSU statute did not apply to army and navy communists (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 446).

Not only that, Zhukov forbade the head of the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army, Colonel-General A. S. Zheltov, to inform the Central Committee of everything that was happening in the Armed Forces (ibid. P. 244). S. Zheltov to inform the Central Committee about everything that was happening in the Armed Forces (ibid. P. 244).

The Main Political Department of the Soviet Army is the supreme political supervisor controlling the armed forces of the country. The Main Political Directorate is at the same time one of the departments of the Central Committee of the Party. It turns out that Zhukov forbade one of the departments of the Central Committee to perform its supervisory functions. Thus Zhukov took one of the departments of the Central Committee out of the subordination of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Khrushchev.

6

Zhukov was clearing places for his men. For this purpose it was necessary to drive out of the Soviet Army those who were not ready to follow Zhukov's orders blindly, without reasoning.

On March 15, 1956, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, resigned. It is enough to look at the dates of Vasilevsky's appointments to new posts and the dates of his military ranks to draw important conclusions.

As of June 22, 1941, Vasilevsky is a major general and deputy chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. July 1941 was a month of monstrous defeats for the Red Army, but on August 1, 1941, Stalin places Vasilevsky in the key position of Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff.

In mid-October 1941, German troops suddenly broke through to the outskirts of Moscow. They were held back by military school cadets and untrained, unfit for military service militiamen hastily thrown into battle. Moscow could fall at any moment. On October 16, 1941, a monstrous panic began in Moscow, accompanied by the flight of chiefs of all levels and suits. The panic was suppressed, Moscow was defended, and on October 28, 1941 Stalin promoted Vasilevsky to the rank of lieutenant general.

May 1942 became a month of even more terrible defeats for the Red Army. Attempts to break through the blockade of Leningrad ended in

a catastrophe. The grandiose offensive of the Red Army on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front resulted in the encirclement of Red Army troops near Kharkov. The Crimean Front was preparing an offensive, but Manstein crushed, crushed and threw into the sea with a sudden preemptive strike. But despite everything on May 21, 1942, Stalin awarded Vasilevsky the rank of Colonel-General.

In June 1942, German troops, rapidly developing the offensive, rushing to Stalingrad, that is, to the Volga - the largest transportation artery of the Soviet Union, and the North Caucasus - to the oil fields. Now not only Moscow, but the entire Soviet Union is on the verge of falling. At this point, Stalin puts Colonel-General Vasilevsky to the post of Chief of the General Staff.

A strange situation: terrible disasters, Stalin resolutely dismisses and mercilessly punishes his generals and marshals, but Vasilevsky at the same time unstoppable rise to the top. What does this mean?

These are Stalin's belated admissions after each defeat: we acted as we thought necessary, and we should have done as Vasilevsky suggested.

During the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, Colonel-General Vasilevsky coordinated the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On January 18, 1943, Stalin promoted him to the rank of General of the Army, 29 days later - Marshal of the Soviet Union. After the war, in 1949, Stalin appointed Vasilevsky Minister of the Armed Forces (the Ministry of Defense changed its name several times, remaining the same Ministry of Defense).

Vasilevsky was clearly not involved in the conspiracy against Stalin. This is evident from the fact that immediately after Stalin's death in the distribution of positions, he was removed to the position of First Deputy Minister of Defense. And Zhukov, on the contrary, was returned from exile, raised to the position of First Deputy Minister of Defense (the Minister of Defense at that time had two first deputies), and then to the post of Minister.

Zhukov and Vasilevsky were not only the two first deputy defense ministers, he was also related:

Vasilevsky's son Yuri was married to Zhukov's daughter Era. But even so, their relationship looks strange. Vasilevsky told the writer Konstantin Simonov how once (apparently it happened in March 1956, before Vasilevsky's forced resignation) between him and Zhukov had the following conversation:

Zhukov: Don't you think, Sasha, that you should get into the history of war?

Vasilevsky: How to understand it? Is that how to understand that it is time to leave?

Zhukov: Yes. There was a discussion of this issue, and Khrushchev insists on your resignation (Simonov K. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on Stalin. MOSCOW: APN, 1989. Chapter "Conversations with Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky", chapter "April - May 2, 1976").

Let's pay attention to Zhukov's despicable behavior. No one had any complaints about Marshal Vasilevsky. There is nothing to criticize - this is one of the most talented commanders of the XX century. Zhukov rudely hints Vasilevsky to voluntarily leave his post. Zhukov blames everything on Khrushchev: not my initiative - Khrushchev insists.

But if Khrushchev insists, why does Zhukov play the role of Khrushchev's lackey? Why does he pass on the whims of the boss to his comrade-in-arms? If Khrushchev insists, then let him tell Vasilevsky about it himself. And Soviet Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov should stand up for the old battle buddy: why on earth, Nikita Sergeyich, Vasilevsky to leave? Do we have commanders equal to Vasilevsky in talent and experience?

But for some reason Khrushchev insists on the removal, and in fact Vasilevsky is forced out of the Soviet Army by Zhukov.

Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky did not argue, wrote a report and left. He didn't even slam the door.

CHAPTER 26

1

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was sinking deeper and deeper into the mire of permanent economic crisis - because we had socialism. Private ownership of the means of production was abolished and all means of production became the property of the people. But the people cannot manage industry, transportation, agriculture, science, and therefore the economy was managed by the state.

In order to manage properly, it is necessary to know what each ministry, each main department, design bureau, each factory, mine, collective farm should do. In order to manage the economy on a scientific basis, the Central Statistical Office (CSO) was created. Its task is to collect all the information about what we have and what we lack.

Based on the collected data, the State Planning Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers (Gosplan) gave instructions on what, when, to whom and in what quantities should be produced. Gosplan was at all times headed by party officials of very high rank - members of the Central Committee, candidates to the Central Committee Politburo, and even members of the Central Committee Politburo. Kuibyshev, Voznesensky, Saburov and Kosygin were in charge of the Gosplan.

A monumental building was built for Gosplan, which now houses the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Gosplan had not only planning, but also control functions, not only gave instructions, but also checked their fulfillment. Many state committees and planning institutes were subordinate to Gosplan.

The capitalists have anarchy of production.

We have a scientific approach.

But for some reason they had everything and we everything.

2

Let us consider the difference in the organization of production on the simplest example. A capitalist, let's say, produces wooden crates. A buyer comes to the store and decides whether or not to take them. There is a direct connection between the producer and the consumer. The consumer daily, hourly and minute by minute controls the assortment, quality and sets prices: this box is made badly, this one is too expensive, this one does not fit the size. The manufacturer has to react instantly to please the consumer. The producer who made a mistake, who did not catch the whim of the consumer, who did not please him with assortment, price or quality, goes down the drain. Only the one who managed to guess the consumer's desire and to satisfy this desire in time, in quality and at the lowest price survives.

It's called the pursuit of profit, capitalist competition, anarchy of production. It's disgusting.

But in the Soviet Union, everything was organized according to science. Take the same wooden boxes. The Central Statistical Office collected all the necessary data for the country and passed it to Gosplan. Gosplan decided to produce so many millions of boxes. The relevant ministry received the order, distributed it among the main departments and factories. The industry fulfills the order and produces the ordered number of boxes of minimum size

- This is the fastest way to comply with the instructions of the planning and supervisory authorities and saves material and labor.

The problem is that nobody needs such small boxes. And then Gosplan gives an order to produce not just so many millions of boxes, but to produce boxes with a total volume of so many millions of cubic meters. Wonderful! The industry starts to produce huge-sized crates - this is the fastest way to fulfill the orders of the planning and controlling bodies.

But no one needs such huge boxes. And then Gosplan gives an order to produce boxes with a total cost of so many million rubles. Splendid! The industry begins to produce polished boxes made of mahogany and black wood with artistic painting and silver locks - only a few were produced and the plan was fulfilled.

But no one wants those boxes either.

We can put the problem in many other ways, but the result will be the same: the industry will produce not what the consumer needs, but what is convenient for it to fulfill the plan. Simply because the natural connection between producer and consumer has been artificially severed. Simply because in a socialist state the producer reports not to the consumer, but to the Gosplan.

In a normal human society, prices, assortment and quality of products are regulated by the consumer. In socialist society, all this is regulated by bureaucrats, and they regulate badly - not because they are bad people, but because no one is able to control and regulate the assortment, price, quantity and quality of products better than the consumer.

3

Comrades from the Gosplan have to give instructions to industry about how many boxes to produce, of what size, of what material, at what price, how many nails to put in that box, when, where and how many of these boxes to send. But how could Gosplan know how many and what kind of crates would be needed in the next five-year period? It couldn't know that, and it didn't.

That's why he made the plan from the lantern. Therefore, the industry produced what was profitable for it to report. They planned to produce a thousand tons of mustard - the industry produced it in five-liter jars and reported on early fulfillment. One five-liter jar is much easier to produce than fifty hundred gram jars.

Mustard and crate are the simplest examples. But Gosplan to determine for five years ahead HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS of indicators for millions of industrial products, from cruisers to horse horseshoes, from nuclear reactors to dog collars, from spaceships to handkerchiefs, from unique hydro turbines to thimbles, from machine gun cartridges to fifth grade history textbooks in Georgian, from spinning machines to soldiers' blankets, from window glass to Antarctic rovers, from condoms to polonium-beryllium neutron sources for RDS-6c thermonuclear charges.

The military industry was under special control of the state and punitive bodies. People were imprisoned or even shot for defects. But this was the reason for inefficient production: the labor of workers was controlled by thousands of military representatives and Chekists, who did not produce anything themselves. But it was impossible to put controllers and security officers in every shop, and it was profitable for industry to produce goods on the verge of defects.

Gosplan controlled industry on the basis of quantitative indicators of production. It was unable to control the quality of bicycles and rakes, cameras and alarm clocks, fishing nets and files, milk and buns, furniture and combs.

4

Bismarck once uttered a phrase that became prophetic: "If you want to build socialism, choose a country that is not miserable." The socialist mode of production has inborn vices that no amount of restructuring can change.

If private business is banned, then the state becomes the only employer, and then there comes a monstrous arbitrariness of state representatives, i.e. bureaucrats. And then people flee from such a state, and the state is forced to close its borders and kill the fugitives.

Man can be free only if he is economically independent. But the socialist state, raking all means of production under its control, makes all citizens dependent, that is, deprives them of their freedom.

If the right to decide what, when and in what quantities to produce is taken away from millions of people, these issues will have to be solved at the state level. In this case, there is a monstrous concentration of power in the hands of those who run the state.

In order to make decisions on a scientific basis, it is necessary to gather as much information as possible and to determine as precisely as possible who should do what. Like in a chess game: you need to calculate not only one move, but also the subsequent ones. You should plan for a day or two, but look into the future - at least for five years. The more detailed and precise the plan, the better.

However, any initiative, useful or useless, breaks government plans. The better and more precise the plan, the worse the initiative of the executors affects it. If even ten million directors, designers, engineers, workers show initiative, they will destroy the whole planned economy. For the sake of preserving the socialist mode of production, the state has to crush any initiative.

5

Here is another generic vice of socialism: the very best experts who create plans can only plan the production of what already exists. But how do you plan the production of something that hasn't been invented yet? You planned to flood the country with gramophones, and the capitalists got a gramophone. You set up the production of radio-lamps of the widest assortment, spent huge funds and labor of thousands of specialists of the highest class, built factories, and the capitalists got transistors.

The introduction of anything new comes with the risk of failure. The capitalist takes risks. He has to take risks to beat the competition. If he loses, he's out of the game. And it is more convenient for a Gosplan official to plan the production of something that has already proved itself. He has no need to take risks. That is why the Soviet Union spent 70 years chasing the capitalists, but it was impossible in principle for a socialist state to catch up with them.

6

In 1971, Anatoly Pavlovich Fedoseyev, designer of Soviet over-the-horizon radars, Lenin Prize winner, and Hero of Socialist Labor, sought political asylum in Paris. He wrote a striking book on socialist economics:

None of the socialist states has produced anything like the expected fruits. All of them, without exception (without a single exception!), are dictatorships whose most characteristic fruit is violence against man. Moreover, they are all strikingly uniform in their economic inefficiency.

It can be considered experimentally proven that the socialist tree yields not at all the fruit expected of it, but quite the opposite.

This experiment has been conducted on such a huge scale and under such different conditions that only uninformed people, of whom, of course, there are still a great many for well-known reasons, can have doubts.

What accounts for this uniformity of results (dictatorship)?

The socialist structure creates a colossal concentration of power and inevitably leads to dictatorship, to a totalitarian state with all its anti-human consequences. Socialism dramatically disrupts the already very unfavorable balance between the individual and the state.

Were it not for the inherent economic inefficiency of socialism, socialism would be an irresistible means of military conquest of the entire world.

Socialism is a colossal danger for humanity and a trap from which it is extremely difficult to escape (Fedoseev A. P. Zapadnya. London: OPI, 1979. P. 370-371).

7

Socialism is a dead-end way of humanity's development. But why don't the leaders of the socialist state abandon centralized planning? Why not liberalize the economy? Yes, because no producer will voluntarily do what is necessary not for him specifically, but for the whole country.

And if you make him interested? You can only interest him by giving him the profit from the sale of the product. Are you going back to capitalism? Why did you start a vegetable garden? Why all these revolutions and wars? Why the millions of casualties?

But a way out had to be found. And the leaders increasingly asked: why not abolish the Gosplan? Why not give factory directors the right to produce wooden crates of the size, quality and prices that meet consumer demands?

It is clear that this could not be done, otherwise total plundering of property would have begun. It makes no sense for a capitalist to steal from himself, and a factory director in a socialist state is not an owner. Imagine that the heads of enterprises, in whose hands there are colossal material values, are out of the control of the Central Statistical Service, the State Planning Committee, the State Control Committee, the State Committee on Prices, the State Committee on Labor and Wages. What will come out of this?

Hero of Socialist Labor Anatoly Pavlovich Fedoseyev predicted what would happen if liberalization of the economy of a socialist state was implemented:

Another Khrushchev or Brezhnev, in exchange for the support of the people, will cut the throats of his comrades and inexperiencedly introduce such "liberalism", which will destroy the main foundations, and with it the whole system (ibid. P. 372).

These words were published in 1979, six years before Gorbachev's perestroika and liberalization began. Fedoseyev, who created over-the-horizon radars, was himself able to look beyond the horizon, into the unknown, a time when Comrade Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the KGB, was just clearing the way to the highest Kremlin post for his protégé, Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

Key point

After several decades of rule, the leaders of the Soviet Union had only two options for action. Or rather, there was one option of action and one option of inaction.

It was possible to do nothing. That is exactly what Comrade Brezhnev did, and the country began to sink slowly into the mire of economic crisis.

It was possible to rush out. Comrades Andropov and Gorbachev, who continued his work, did so. And because of such a leap, the plunge into the mire of the crisis was rapid.

CHAPTER 27

1

From February 14 to 25, 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU was held in Moscow. The central event of the Congress was the approval of the 6th Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy for 1956-1960.

The 6th Five Year Plan is interesting in that it was derailed. The unsustainable economy, managed by bureaucrats, was failing. The 6th Five-Year Plan, like all previous and subsequent plans, was developed by the Gosplan. The chairman of Gosplan at that time was Comrade Nikolai Konstantinovich Baibakov, a member of the CPSU Central Committee. Baibakov was promoted to the key position of Gosplan head by Khrushchev because of his persistent support and promotion of two grandiose Khrushchev projects that were supposed to help the Soviet Union break the economic deadlock.

The first project is to raise virgin lands. The second is the construction of the world's most powerful pipeline system, pumping out oil and selling it to European neighbors.

Huge teams of economists under Baibakov's leadership drew up the 6th Five-Year Plan in the expectation that the plowed virgin lands would yield so much grain that it would have to be exported abroad. The harsh reality made adjustments: huge expenditures, ecological disaster and again shortage of bread.

The oil pipeline also turned out to be an unpleasant thing. The Soviet industry was not capable of producing large diameter pipes. Our younger socialist brothers, including East Germany, were not capable of doing so either. But West Germany, with its anarchy of production and pursuit of profit, could produce such pipes, but its government imposed an embargo on the sale of large-diameter pipes to the Soviet Union, and the oil pipeline project stalled.

Not a single five-year plan has ever been fulfilled. The 6th Five-Year Plan stands apart in this series because all the previous and subsequent Five-Year Plans were somehow managed to be declared successful. But in 1956 and 1957, the Party's bold predetermination

were so inconsistent with the real capabilities of the economy, and the planning distortions were so blatant, that in 1958 the 6th Five-Year Plan had to be abandoned.

Khrushchev removed Baibakov from his position as chairman of the Gosplan and sent him with a demotion to the provinces.

2

In 1959, an extraordinary XXI Congress was assembled, which adopted a seven-year plan for 1959-1965. The last two years of the previous, thwarted 6th Five-Year Plan were "bolted on" to the next five-year plan - that's how the seven-year plan came to be.

The seven-year plan was as unsuccessful as all previous and subsequent five-year plans. During the seven-year plan, the Soviet Union began massive purchases of food abroad and soon became the world's main food importer. But during these years, Khrushchev's long-held dream of piping to the West was finally realized

- to build the world's most powerful oil pipeline system to siphon off irreplaceable reserves of valuable natural resources. The West Germans were sweet-talked. They charged terrible prices for the pipes. We had to pay. Otherwise, we would not have an oil pipeline with the good name of Druzhba.

"To fuel with oil is to fuel with appropriations" - so said the great Russian scientist Dmitry Ivanovich Mendeleev.

"To trade in resources is to trade in the Motherland" - that's what Comrade Stalin used to say.

Khrushchev began peddling the Motherland and drowning it in appropriations.

3

grimace of fate: the Druzhba oil pipeline, built by order of Khrushchev, was ceremonially put into operation on October 15, 1964, while two days before, on October 13, 1964, as a result of a conspiracy, Khrushchev was thrown out of office as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. On October 14, 1964, this was officially announced, and Brezhnev took over as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on the same day.

On October 15, 1964, oil flowed through the pipe, and this event miraculously coincided with the beginning of a new period in the history of the USSR during the rule of Brezhnev. What luck! Now the crash.

The Soviet Union was pushed back for at least another couple of decades. During these years, the capitalist environment had to be undermined or destroyed. Otherwise, the Soviet Union, having lost the economic competition, was to turn into a raw materials appendage of countries with normal economies.

Brezhnev returned Baibakov to the post of chairman of Gosplan, where he was still exactly twenty years, from October 2, 1965 to October 14, 1985, his plans paved the way for the country to a bright future, until he brought the economy of the Soviet Union to a complete collapse. Baibakov became deputy head of government and was awarded six orders of Lenin. Brezhnev awarded Baibakov the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

Baibakov perfectly understood that the planning of all economic activity on the scale of a huge state is impossible, and therefore he is personally responsible for the creation of a system of socialist eyewash, which under his leadership turned into the Gosplan. Under Baibakov's leadership, the country gradually moved away from five-year plans. Five-year plans remained, but there were no more five-year plans. Instead of plans, Baibakov and his team published a document called "Basic Directions for the Development of the National Economy" every five years.

The economy remained as if planned, but instead of real plans, the USSR Gosplan under Baibakov composed fantastic novels: it would be nice to reach such heights in five years. These were not plans, but five-year forecasts of a happy life that never came true.

Baibakov lived to the age of 97. New Russia appreciated the exploits of the outstanding captain of the socialist economy and awarded him the Order of Merit for the Fatherland.

4

We are somewhat distracted. While we are still in February 1956, at the infamous 20th Congress of the CPSU, which adopted the unfeasible 6th Five-Year Plan developed under Baibakov's leadership.

The 20th Congress ended with the usual ritual for such an occasion - the choral singing of the Communist anthem:

*The whole world of violence we
will destroy To the ground, and
then ...*

Delegations from 55 communist and workers' parties from all over the world, from New Zealand to Canada and Uruguay, attended the congress. All of them were given a farewell dinner, drunk with Russian folk drink and sent away, wishing them new successes in the struggle for a bright future for all mankind.

And the Soviet delegates were whispered not to disperse. This was followed by a closed session of the congress, attended only by members of the CPSU. At this session, Khrushchev read his famous report on Stalin's personality cult. The official agenda did not provide for any secret report, but this report overshadowed all other events of the congress.

The culprit of what happened at the 20th Congress is usually considered to be Khrushchev. However, Khrushchev held this Congress with the full support of Zhukov and in alliance with him. Without Zhukov's support, there would never have been any XX Congress - or rather, it would have been, but just like all the others.

5

The Khrushchev Report's version of our history was quite simple and uncomplicated.

1. Lenin was a great leader, he made the revolution and pointed the way to a bright future. Everything was good and right. If Lenin were alive...

2. Bolshevik-Leninists Dzerzhinsky, Kirov, Kuibyshev, Eikhe, Rudzutak, Raskolnikov were kind, wise, brave, selfless fighters for the people's happiness, they won the Civil War, they built a bright future.

3. Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Blucher, Dybenko were not enemies of the people, they were great military leaders.

4. And suddenly there was a bad Stalin. He violated the Leninist norms of collective leadership. In 1937, Stalin unleashed terror against Bolshevik-Leninists and great military leaders.

5. Stalin decapitated the army. He completely failed to prepare the country for war. Airplanes were coffins, tanks were obsolete, for three

was one rifle. Our scouts warned Stalin, but he didn't listen. Hitler attacked, and Stalin hid in his dacha and then led the war by globe.

6. After the war, Stalin was preparing a new extermination of honest Communists.

7. We all knew nothing about it.

"What should be done, comrades?" - Khrushchev asked. And he answered: we must debunk the cult of personality of Stalin and return to Leninist norms of party life. The hall listened with bated breath, and from time to time responded with noisy indignation at the speaker's words about Stalin's iniquities.

6

Contrary to the established traditions and rules, the report was not discussed at the congress. Khrushchev read the report, and the congress finished its work again. For some reason the report was considered secret, but it was published in exactly one million copies. Discussion of the report was relegated to closed party conferences and meetings. Communists stigmatized Stalin.

Khrushchev said a lot of interesting things. But he forgot to say that it was not Stalin who unleashed terror in the country, but Lenin, Sverdlov, Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky and all their brethren. Stalin was among them, but by no means the most important. Khrushchev forgot to inform that the terror began not in 1937, but exactly 20 years earlier - in 1917.

Khrushchev forgot to mention that not only loyal communists-Leninists were exterminated during the terror, but communists-Leninists themselves exterminated tens of millions of people during 20 years of their power, and only then some of them also got into the meat grinder, which they themselves had fiercely unwound before.

Khrushchev also said nothing about his role in all these events.

7

Khrushchev continued to denounce Stalin even after the Congress. Here is a fragment from Khrushchev's speech at the June (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, a year after the 20th Congress:

I will name the terrible figures: in two years alone - 1937 and 1938 - more than one and a half million people were arrested, of whom 681,692 were shot (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 479).

To those who do not know our history, these figures will indeed seem terrible. But even before 1937 and 1938, the extermination of the Russian people - as well as all other peoples of our country - was put on the stream.

But neither Khrushchev nor his associates and party comrades would remember this - nor what each of them did in 1937-1938.

CHAPTER 28

1

So, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, criticizing the personality cult of Stalin, Khrushchev called for a return to Leninist norms of party life and collective leadership. Let us remember what these norms were.

To Penza. 11/VIII-1918.

To Comrades Kuraev, Bosch, Minkin and other Penza Communists.

*Comrades! The uprising of the five kulachie volosts must be ruthlessly suppressed. The interest of the **whole** revolution demands this, for now the "last battle" with the kulachi **has been taken**. A model must be given.*

*1) Hang it up (hang it up where people can see it)
at least 100 known kulaks, wealthy, bloodsuckers.*

2) Publish their names.

3) Take away all their bread.

4) Assign hostages, according to yesterday's telegram.

To make it so that for hundreds of versts around the people saw, trembled, knew, shouted: the bloodsucking kulaks will be strangled and strangled.

*Telegraph receipt and **execution**. Your
Lenin.*

*P.S. Find some **tougher** people.*

(TsPA IML. Fond 2. Opisy 1. Case 6898. Underlined by Lenin).

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a very brief period when the doors of the Central Party Archive (CPA) were slightly ajar. A. G. Latyshev, a brave scout of our past, took advantage of this opportunity, collected in this archive some documents written by Lenin's hand on Sovnarkom letterheads and published not only their texts, but also photocopies in the "Democratic Party Archives".

gazeta" (November 1991, No. 21), and later in the book "Rassekreshenniy Lenin" (Moscow: March, 1996). Latyshev's book cites many such documents.

The leaders of the new Russia quickly came to their senses and locked the doors of the archives firmly again. But even this one document, not to mention all those collected and published in the book, is enough to appreciate the kindness of Grandpa Lenin. He orders the public hanging of the rich - no matter what kind. If a rich man is rich, it means to take away all the bread and hang him.

Comrade Lenin himself lived in the Kremlin and traveled only in automobiles

"Rolls-Royce." Comrade Sverdlov in the same Kremlin filled his personal safe with tsarist gold coins, rings, brooches, bracelets with diamonds, rubies, emeralds and sapphires. Comrade Trotsky rode around the country in a tsarist train. Comrade Dzerzhinsky lived in a mansion.

Lenin and Trotsky, Sverdlov and Dzerzhinsky hated the rich and during the Civil War and the Red Terror killed millions of people in order to make everyone equal, so that there would be no more rich and bloodsuckers on earth. All these fighters for universal equality took innocent civilians as hostages and shot them by the thousands for the sake of universal happiness.

And so Khrushchev called on the Communist Party, which had committed incalculable atrocities against our people and the peoples of neighboring countries, to debunk Stalin's personality cult and return to Leninist norms.

And there are people who consider Khrushchev to be a fighter for freedom and justice.

2

With one report, Khrushchev killed not two bunnies, but killed a whole herd of wild boars.

First, he was taking the Communist Party out of harm's way. The country was about to explode, and Khrushchev was transferring the people's anger from the entire criminal system of socialism to a single individual.

Second, with his speech, Khrushchev made it clear to the nomenklatura that from now on there would be no purges of the leadership. The socialist system - is a single monopoly in all areas of life and

It does not and cannot have a system of personnel rotation. Stalin renewed the leadership of the country's elite by partially shooting the fat ones - Khrushchev actually abolished the rotation system altogether. Thus, he doomed the country to decay and ruin, but bought himself the support of the entire CPSU leadership, from members of district committees and regional committees to members of the Central Committee.

Third, by buying the support of the nomenklatura, Khrushchev was returning the Communist Party to the leading heights. Stalin was General Secretary of the Party; he also took over the government in May 1941. Under Stalin, control of the country gradually shifted from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the government of the USSR: government decrees formalized the most important decisions, and the Party increasingly became the ideological shepherd and propagandist. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev became head of the Communist Party only because this post was considered secondary in comparison to the post of head of government. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev returned the Communist Party to its leading role in the country.

Fourth, Khrushchev got in his hands a weapon against all his rivals and enemies. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev did everything to destroy in the archives traces of his own crimes and to collect materials on his opponents. By speaking out against Stalin, he thus announced: but I am not like that. After that, anyone who would dare to oppose, Khrushchev could call Stalinist and drive from the top of power.

Fifth, Khrushchev looked too pale as a politician against Stalin. By trashing the late Stalin, Khrushchev was trying to exalt himself: Stalin was a villain, and I am a fighter for truth.

It must be said that among the intelligentsia there were some comrades who liked Khrushchev's speech terribly. They declared: we are the children of the XX Congress. These Arbat "children" praised the wisdom and directness of Khrushchev just as yesterday they praised the wisdom of Stalin. "Children of the XX Congress" fiercely crushed Stalinism. Let us ask: why did not these brave comrades also destroy Leninism?

The answer is simple: there was no command to do so.

Meanwhile, there never was any Stalinism. What Stalin did was just the mildest version of Leninism possible.

Stalinism is Leninism with a human face.

3

According to the statute of the Communist Party, the highest governing body of the CPSU was the Party Congress. The congress supposedly determined the party's tasks for the immediate period and for the distant future. The congress supposedly elected the Central Committee, which exercised leadership until the new congress, implementing the planned program. After a certain period of time, a new congress would meet, hear the report of the Central Committee on the work done, set new goals and elect a new set of leaders.

The practice differed considerably from the provisions of the party charter - or rather, it was their complete opposite. But everyone pretended not to notice it. In reality, the supreme leaders, i.e., the members of the Central Committee Politburo (from 1952 to 1966 - the Central Committee Presidium), were pulling up their people, clearing places for them, crushing and throwing down their rivals and their own nominees who failed to live up to their expectations. The composition of the Central Committee was formed in the process of terrible behind-the-scenes battles and at every moment was a temporary compromise between the leaders: you have so many people, so give me more! Otherwise, the work of your guys Ivanov and Petrov will reveal such things!

In the entire history of the Communist Party it has never been possible to include all the applicants in the Central Committee. The first congress of the Party elected a Central Committee of three persons; then their number was constantly increasing, and in October 1917 there were so many people in the Central Committee that it was impossible to agree on anything. Therefore, the Politburo was formed from the members of the Central Committee, which directed the seizure of power in the country. After accomplishing this task, the Politburo was dissolved, but in 1919 it was organized again, now on a permanent basis.

And the Central Committee grew larger and larger after each Party Congress. In October 1952, the XIX Congress elected (if so

can be expressed) 125 members of the Central Committee and 110 candidates to the Central Committee. In February 1956, at the 20th Congress - already 133 members of the Central Committee and 122 candidates. The rate of expansion of the Central Committee grew rapidly. Under Gorbachev in 1990, at the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in 1990, the Central Committee was elected with 412 full members - that is, since the first Party Congress, the quantitative composition of the Central Committee has increased 137 times!

How could 412 people come together to solve any problems? They didn't.

M. I. Egorov, a war invalid, wrote four months before the collapse of Soviet Union to the Military History Journal (1991.

№4. C. 2) a letter about how on May 9, 1990 he met with his battle friends. To drink frontline "a hundred grams with a trailer" is sacred, but *"the store was empty, but near it young people were selling vodka at twice the price"*.

This is the result of a planned - that is, bureaucrat-run - economy. The victorious country could provide its defenders with neither apartments, nor medical care, nor decent pensions, nor clothes and shoes. The country was chronically short of medicines and spare parts for cars, gloves and socks, sausage and cheese. Under Comrade Gorbachev it came to the point that the beggar liberators of Europe could not even buy vodka with their pittance to drink to the Victory. All stores in the country were state-owned, but the state was unable to provide its citizens with even the lowest-grade potion in unsightly bottles with faded labels. When did such a thing ever happen in Russia?

And the 412 members of the Central Committee were in session. For example, they were deciding how to build socialism in Ethiopia and Angola. It is clear: in our image and likeness it was necessary to put the deceased leader of Angola in a mausoleum built with our money, to provide illiterate Africans with the most modern weapons and to establish collective farms. And a happy life would immediately follow.

The result of the construction of socialism in these countries was a monstrous famine, civil war, terrorism and banditry.

Let's go back to February 1956 to the XX Congress of the CPSU. At the last XIX Congress of the Party, Beria, among his other guys, held in the candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the Army General Shtemenko. Six months later Beria was arrested and killed, Shtemenko was demoted to lieutenant general and exiled to Siberia to command the district headquarters, but for some reason he was not kicked out of the list of candidates to the CPSU Central Committee.

And here comes the XX Congress of the CPSU. Lieutenant General Shtemenko must attend the Congress as a candidate for membership in the Central Committee, because the Central Committee must report on the work done to the Kuban Cossacks, pig farmers and shepherds. Shtemenko sat out his days and hours at the congress, clapped his hands together with everyone, approving the general line of the party. On the last day - the election of the new Central Committee. The floor is given to Comrade Khrushchev.

Comrade Khrushchev read out the list of new members of the Central Committee. The list had been agreed upon in advance with all interested parties. Now, during the secret ballot, each delegate to the Congress is free to cross out anyone from this list and insert anyone. However, this will not change or solve anything - everything has been decided long ago.

In the list of the new composition of the Central Committee not Shtemenko's name.

And in the list of candidates for membership in the Central Committee, too. There is no one to stand up for the lieutenant-general, and no one to pull him into the Central Committee, no one to even put in a good word to keep the general among the candidates.

5

The Congress voted in favor of the new composition of the Central Committee. After that, the delegates had a break for two hours. You can refresh yourself, because everything here is free of charge: balikochka, sandwiches with sturgeon caviar and everything that goes with those sandwiches to keep your throat dry. Everything here is in a wide assortment and of the highest quality. It's like communism.

At this time, behind a tightly closed door, the new Central Committee is assembled for its first plenum to select even higher superiors. Although even here everything has been decided in advance. The new, but very little different from the old staff.

Comrade Khrushchev read out the list: these comrades will be members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, these will be candidates.

It's an open vote. By show of hands. All those opposed? All those abstaining? Passed unanimously.

In the Presidium of the Central Committee - Comrades Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kirichenko, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev.

Candidates: Zhukov, Brezhnev, Mukhitdinov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Shvernik.

The personal composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee is almost the same as it was in the last years of Stalin's life. After Stalin's death, Comrade Khrushchev had the greatest achievements in the struggle for power, and that is why, last year, in 1955, he pushed his former subordinate from his work in Kiev, Comrade Kirichenko, into the Presidium. Now, in February 1956, Khrushchev has elevated his longtime allies - Zhukov, Brezhnev, Furtseva - to the Presidium.

In the list of chiefs, the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee go alphabetically, because we have democracy and collective leadership. All leaders are equal among themselves. At least theoretically. And the candidates to the Presidium of the Central Committee are listed in the order corresponding to their political influence. If necessary, one of them will replace a retired member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, because the current order according to which they will rise to the top of power is indicated.

The first in line is the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich.

6

At the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev spoke of some of the unsightly deeds of Comrade Stalin and thereby stained with mud both the watchful organs and the Party, which Comrade Stalin had led for thirty years. Therefore, by taking Stalin's place and declaring him a villain, a cannibal, a murderer and an executioner, Khrushchev won tactically, but strategically both he and the Party lost.

Therefore, the only one who, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, gained strategic advantages and remained in , was the Minister of

Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union. And here's why.

Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress showed that the Communist Party had been in power for 38 years, 30 of which had been headed by a criminal and an ogre. And Khrushchev himself - this did not escape people's attention - was the ogre's assistant.

It turned out that in all our history there was essentially only one bright moment - the war, in which we defeated fascism, which threatened the entire world. But even in the war Stalin, according to Khrushchev, did everything wrong.

But despite this, the Red Army reached Berlin. Who brought it there, in defiance of Stalin?

That's right! The only Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union.

Zhukov felt his victory at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. And immediately went on the offensive against his benefactor Khrushchev.

Before the XX Congress Zhukov demanded the transfer of the Frontier Troops and Internal Troops to the Soviet Army. Having failed to achieve this, Zhukov immediately after the XX Congress approached the problem from the other end. He proposed to Khrushchev to remove his old friend, Army General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, from the post of Chairman of the KGB and replace him with a general of the Soviet Army (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 244). He proposed to do the same in the Ministry of Internal Affairs: to remove Minister N. P. Dudorov and replace him with an army general or marshal.

Khrushchev gritted his teeth, but Serov and Dudorov to change to Zhukovsky guys did not hurry.

Once upon a time, back in 1940, a powerful triumvirate was formed in Kiev

- Khrushchev, Zhukov, Serov. In our country there was a triumvirate of power: party - army - KGB. In essence, Zhukov's proposal to remove Serov and replace him with a general from Zhukov's entourage meant the creation of a new power structure: the duumvirate "party - army". In this case, the party was deprived of any control over the army, and this was not only a consequence of Zhukov's proposals - it was a consequence of the actions he had already taken.

I don't know how Khrushchev reacted to Zhukov's proposal to remove Serov. In my opinion, before the predatory grin of the coming dictatorship.

Khrushchev should have flinched at Zhukov. Trembling, but not to show it.

7

In October 1952, at the previous XIX Congress, Shtemenko and Zhukov became candidates for membership in the CPSU Central Committee. In July 1953 Zhukov became a member of the Central Committee and now, in February 1956 - a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. And Shtemenko dropped out of the ranks of party leaders.

Three years ago, Khrushchev demoted Army General Shtemenko to lieutenant general. Now Lieutenant General Shtemenko, who had served as Marshal of the Soviet Union for four years under Stalin, was not fit not only to be a member of the Central Committee, but even a candidate.

That's what Khrushchev decided. Therefore, Shtemenko could not be Khrushchev's friend. That is why Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov came to Lieutenant General Shtemenko immediately after the XX Congress of the CPSU:

— You're coming hunting with me.

— Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, my business trip is over, I must return to my place of permanent service.

— And I order," Zhukov said in a deliberately harsh tone. He smiled and winked.

8

The hunt was good. It was a success. We killed a boar, a fat little one. Then another one. We didn't even bother to find out who did it. What's the difference!

It gets dark early in February. It's frosty by evening. The forest is covered with nugget silver. Who says the moon casts a sad light on sad meadows? It's not true! It casts a joyful light on the glade! And into the silver stacks, too. There's a fire crackling in that clearing, as if it's shooting off enemies, sparks spewing into the sky by Vesuvius.

The table is set. Jokes, laughter, anecdotes. We poured something frosty and fiery. We drank it. It goes very well in the bitter cold. We drank some more. At the table there were five marshals alone: Zhukov, Konev, Chuikov, Biryuzov, Moskalenko, and ten generals. All more three or four stars on each. There's only one general with two stars. Shtemenko.

Zhukov and Shtemenko a little to the side, as if to throw dudes into the fire:

— I'm not in charge of the Party, Sergei Matveyich, not me. It's not my fault you weren't appointed to the Central Committee. Where I have power, I'll do what I can. Do you remember our conversation at the Totsk test site?

— I remember.

— You recommended Lieutenant General Mamsurov to me. You said it was time to put him in charge of the army. I did. He's now in charge of the 38th Army in the Pre-Carpathian District. Did you tell me, Sergei Matveyich, that Mamsurov would do something serious if necessary?

— Saying.

— You haven't changed your mind since then?

— No.

— If I make you chief of the GRU, will you go for the big job?

9

The joy is not only from a successful hunt. Joy is not only from crisp snow, not only from invigorating frost. Joy not only from the water of fire. Suddenly, somehow the meaning of the 20th Congress began to reach everyone. In 1953, Beria, an enemy of the people - a foreign spy, a saboteur, a sexual maniac - was exposed, arrested and shot. Together with him his closest friends were exposed and shot. The Chekists were dealt a blow of unheard-of force. The Chekists are disgraced. The Chekists are silent and, apparently, will never recover from the wounds inflicted.

Now, at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev punched them again: they were creating terror and bloody lawlessness in the country! They exterminated our best leaders and commanders!

But Khrushchev also struck a blow at the Communist Party. The Party has ruled the country for almost 39 years. Of these 30 years at the head of the Party stood Stalin, a criminal who violated the Leninist principles of collective leadership, violated the norms of socialist legality, exterminated the color of our people, decapitated the army, did not prepare the country for war!

At the 20th Congress, the Communist Party exposed itself through the mouth of its First Secretary. The Communist Party stabbed itself in the fat belly with a bullock knife.

So what's the result?

It turns out that only the army, our native Soviet Army is pure before history and the people. Yes, marshals and generals are members of the Party and its governing structures. But this is part-time. If tomorrow there is no party, party leaders will become unemployed, and marshals and generals will remain military leaders. So why do we need it, the party?

All over the world, those who win the war rule. Who is America's greatest war hero? Eisenhower. What's his job now? He's taken a job as America's chief of staff.

Who did the French have in charge of the war? De Gaulle. He France after the war. He's retired now, but he'll be back soon. There's no one else.

Who in Yugoslavia's war was first and in charge? Marshal Tito. Now he's their leader and teacher.

Don't we have marshals for this kind of ? Who won the war? The army!

Who established the greatness of the country by throwing a nuclear bomb at the Totsk test site? The army! What would the party leaders be doing now if the army had not proved to them that victory in World War III was possible?

Who can bring order to the country? The army!

Who else? Who else but us?

It's good in the forest among fluffy fir trees on a frosty blue evening, if your coat is warm. If you put a long-sleeved tulup on your shoulders. If the vodka is clear and transparent. If pickled mushrooms and pickled cucumbers are not forgotten. If pink salts are cut in thin . If the field kitchen is laying the glade with tearful, native and sweet smoke. If the cook knows his job well.

It's good to have loyal friends here with you, a noisy company. Marshal Chuikov, a leering bear, grabbed Zhukov with an oblique grip - let's fight!

You attacked the wrong man! Zhukov deftly hit him with his left, and both of them, clutching each other, fell laughingly into the snow.

They're getting up. They shake off the snow. Chuikov quietly, looking away, no longer joking:

— Georgy Konstantinich, why don't you take the power?

CONCLUSION

At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a mortal wound was inflicted on the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp. In the countries liberated from the "brown plague" Comrade Stalin established a just social order and thus ensured a happy life for the workers of Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania.

But suddenly the main communist of the planet Earth, Comrade Khrushchev officially announced to the whole world that Comrade Stalin was a villain on a global scale, which the world has not seen since biblical times.

Khrushchev's speech split society into two irreconcilable camps. One demanded that Stalin should not be criticized. Others received official confirmation that Stalin was a villain. But if so, then the order established by this urka and murderer, must be changed. February 25, 1956 in Moscow closed the XX Congress, and already after the two weeks later, on the night of March 9-10 of the same year, on Zhukov's orders, troops shot a demonstration in Tbilisi. The demonstrators demanded that criticism of Stalin be stopped. The most radical ones put forward the slogan of Georgia's secession from the Soviet Union.

No one doubts that Zhukov personally ordered the bloody suppression of the demonstration in Tbilisi. The crowd in Tbilisi was shot with machine guns, dispersed with tanks and armored personnel carriers, none of which would have moved without an order from the Minister of Defense. Zhukov himself would state this a year later at the June (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

From that time on, in such situations, Zhukov adhered to one principle: to crush people with tanks until they realize the benefits of socialism. Zhukov terribly wanted to expose the crimes of the previous leader: Stalin had a bad socialism, I will have a good one! I will continue the socialist experiment at any cost, I will not let anyone out of the cage!

It was not long before the workers' uprising in Poznan broke out on June 28, 1956. What should the power of the proletariat do,

if the proletarians demand freedom?

Correct: shoot. In Poznan, according to various reports, about a hundred workers were killed and several hundred injured. The exact figures are unknown. In response to this shooting, a wave of strikes, spontaneous rallies and demonstrations swept across the whole of P o l a n d , w h i c h w a s fading and w h i c h w e r e rekindled with renewed vigor.

The countries of Western Europe were a tantalizing example of a different life. By their existence, they forced all those who could think to ask questions: Why don't we have it the same way? Why don't we have a life like theirs? What is preventing us? What needs to be changed?

Comrades Khrushchev, Bulganin and Zhukov spoke beautiful words about the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, but they clearly understood that this coexistence could not last long: the socialist, i.e. bureaucratic system of economic management would lead to the Soviet Union falling behind and turning into a raw material appendage of states with a normal economic system. This could only be prevented if the rest of the world was turned our way.

That's why on September 10, 1956, by order of Zhukov, new troop exercises were held at the Semipalatinsk test site. The theme of the exercise: "The use of tactical airborne following the atomic strike in order to hold the affected area until the approach of the advancing troops from the front". This again practiced the scenario of an offensive operation involving the breaching of enemy defenses with a nuclear strike.

At first, Zhukov planned to repeat the exercises at the Totsk test site, only this time with a helicopter . Khrushchev did not allow him to do so: the Samara River is close to the training ground, downstream it flows into the Volga River where the reserve capital of the Soviet Union is located.

Zhukov planned to launch not one, but two corps into the breakthrough. But even here Khrushchev objected: enough, we have already proved to doubters that victory in World War III is possible. We do not conduct exercises to prove anything to anyone, but to gain experience and refine theoretical calculations.

Therefore, only two regiments actually took part in the new exercises - the 345th Parachute Airborne Regiment of the Airborne Forces and the 413th Helicopter Regiment of the Air Force. As at the Totsk range, the conditional enemy erected a powerful defense. The "Eastern" troops launched a nuclear strike against the notional enemy. The carrier of nuclear weapons this time was a Tu-16A bomber; the bomb power was 38 kilotons.

The task of the paratroopers was to land in the area of the epicenter, gain a foothold and not allow the enemy to close the breach in the defense. Two reinforced rifle corps had the task to strike with adjacent flanks and through the epicenter temporarily held by the paratroopers to break out into the operational space. However, the participation of the two reinforced corps was notional.

In reality, 1,500 soldiers and officers took part in the exercise. After the shock wave and dust berm had passed, 27 Mi-4 helicopters landed in the area of the epicenter and landed the second battalion of the paratrooper regiment. The battalion had two 57-mm anti-tank guns, six B-10 recoilless guns and four 82-mm mortars in addition to the standard weapons.

Only those who have seen a helicopter landing in the desert up close can appreciate such a spectacle. A nuclear explosion over a huge area instantly dries the soil, turns it into dust, which is blown off the surface of the ground in huge masses and lifted into the air. And at this time, 27 helicopters land in the area of the explosion!

The helicopters landed the paratroopers and took off. It's beautiful! But there's a lot of dust. Radioactive. Scientists have come to the conclusion that in the coming wars, when breaking through enemy defenses, helicopter landing troops should be landed in the epicenter 15-20 minutes after the explosion.

The exercise was a success. The whole picture was spoiled by one insignificant episode, which they tried not to notice: the bomb exploded exactly at the calculated height of 270 meters, but, as recorded in the report, "with a significant deviation from the target". That is, in a real war, the defense of the real enemy could not break through. And they could have hit their own.

And one more thing: in the historical form of the 345th Parachute Airborne Regiment participation in the exercises at the Semipalatinsk firing range in September 1956 is not recorded.

And in Poland mass unrest was brewing. The Soviet leaders decided that it was time to put an end to the dastardly counter-revolution and extended a hand of friendship to the Polish people. On October 19, 1956, the tank and motorized rifle regiments and divisions of the Soviet Army stationed in Poland were put on the alert. They were in full readiness to render fraternal assistance to the proletarian regime.

On the same day, October 19, 1956, comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan arrived in Warsaw for the plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZUR). The Polish comrades were not expecting the Soviet comrades, so they were not allowed into the meeting hall. The Soviet comrades had to wipe themselves clean and order the tank and motorized rifle units to return to their places of permanent deployment.

The Polish comrades elected a new leadership of the PZUR, asking Marshal Rokossovsky of Poland and other Soviet comrades to pack their bags, leave Poland and render no more fraternal assistance.

But the villain Beria suggested three years ago: it was better to leave on our own, without waiting to be driven away.

Four days later, October 23, 1956, it went up in flames in Hungary ...

*Bristol,
March 21, 2013.*

List of references

Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 2001.

State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus. History of the Border Guard Service of Belarus. Minsk: data-processing center of the Ministry of Finance, 2011.

Dossier on the Marshal. Moscow: Andreevsky Flag, 1996.

Drogovoz I. Big Fleet of the Country of Soviets. Minsk: Harvest, 2003.

Zhukovs Era and Ella. Marshal of Victory. Memories and reflections. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1996.

Zalesky K. A. Stalin's Empire. Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow: Veche, 2000.

Zenkovich N. A. Marshals and Genseki. Smolensk: Rusich, 1997.

Historical Materialism. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1954.

Lavrentiy Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 1999.

Latyshev A. G. Declassified Lenin. Moscow: March Publishing House, 1996.

Liddell Garth B. The Second World War. Per s Engl. M.: Voenizdat, 1976.

Malenkov A.G. About my father Georgy Malenkov. Moscow: NTC Tekhnoekos, 1992.

Marx K., Engels F. Works in 39 volumes. In 42 books. Second edition. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1955-1966.

Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy," 1998.

Simonov K. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on Stalin. MOSCOW: APN, 1989.

Soviet Military Encyclopedia. In 8 vol. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980.

Fedoseev A. P. Zapadnya. London: OPI, 1979.

Chuev F. I. Molotov. Semi-powerful ruler. Moscow: OLMA Press, 2000.

Encyclopedic Dictionary. M.: Bolshaya Soviet Encyclopedia, 1955.

Liddel Hart B. History of the Second World War. London: Cassell, 1970.

notes

Notes

Technically, this is
author

content of the book
(from electronic version)

In contrast to the common Russian spelling of this surname (Churchill), the author uses its spelling with the letter "ë" (Churchill), corresponding to the correct pronunciation of this surname in English. - *Editor's note.*

After the repressions of 1937-1938, vacancies in the state apparatus were plentiful. Vrids ruled everywhere. There was already talk: Vreedeism is harm. That is, sabotage. Therefore, we had to introduce a new term - vrio, temporarily acting. - *Author's note.*

The Union of Communists was the first international communist organization in history, founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1847 in London. The Union ceased to exist in 1852. - *Ed.*

Main caliber was a class of ship guns whose main task was to destroy surface targets (which was the main purpose of cruisers). This class of guns lost its relevance with the development of missile weapons. - *Editor's note.*

Monitors - a class of low-sided armored ships with powerful artillery armament, whose mission was to suppress the enemy's coastal batteries and destroy his coastal facilities. - *Editor's note*.

The XIX Congress was the only party congress whose materials have never been published in a separate edition. The most complete collection of materials from this Congress as of 2013 appears to be an electronic collection of documents prepared by Alexander Hansky, which includes publications that appeared in the Soviet press in 1952 and materials from the collection of

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", concerning the XIX Congress. The collection can be found at the web address **http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/K/KPSS/_KPSS.html** - *Ed. note* (link checked as of December 2014 - *author of the electronic version*).

In contrast to the common Russian spelling of this surname (Churchill), I use its spelling with the letter "ë" (Churchill), corresponding to the correct pronunciation of this surname in English. - *Author's note*.

For the first time such an assessment of the results of modernization in the USSR was used by Isaac Deutscher, a British historian and publicist of Polish origin, who wrote in an article on Stalin's death (Manchester Guardian. March 6, 1953) that Stalin

"took Russia with a plow and leaves it with nuclear reactors." Those who later used this quote replaced the word "reactors" with "bomb" for dramatic effect and attributed the phrase to Churchill. The Russian historian Igor Kurtukov traced the sources and origin of this falsification in a brilliant article "Taken with a plow and left with a bomb: the true story of the speech that Churchill never made", to which we refer anyone who wants to understand the history of this issue (see, for example, the text of the article on the website of the "Actual History" project: http://actualhistory.ru/soha_i_bomba). - *Editor's note* (link checked as of December 2014 - *author of the electronic version*)

Peas. - *Editor's note.*

Dekanozov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR in April 1953. - *Editor's note.*

The defense was usually built in several echelons. Behind the leading edge, in the depth of the defense (at a distance of 5-8 km from the front line) second positions were usually equipped - a second line of trenches and fortifications was built, which was occupied by the troops of the second echelon. Behind the second position there were sometimes third, fourth and other deeper positions. - *Ed.*

Yes, and such a slant Comrade Stalin managed to find in the party! "Right-leftist" Stalin called the bloc headed by members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) S. I. Syrtsov and V. V. Lominadze. V. Lominadze, whose members in 1930 wanted to raise the question of Stalin's removal. The latter was given these plans by Lominadze, after which Syrtsov and Lominadze were expelled from the Central Committee and removed from their posts (later the group of Lominadze, Shatskin and Stan). The bloc was so named because it included representatives of the left and right opposition. - *Editor's note.*

1 ton (metric) = 2,204.6 Pounds (lb) is the *author of the electronic version*.

A rounded-shaped attachment at the top of a mast or flagpole.

The expression "from keel to keel" - the
nautical analog of the phrase "from the bottom to the top". - *Ed.*

Currently - the Independent Order of Lenin and October Revolution Red Banner Operational Division of the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. - *Editor's note.*

Read more about "training and combat" girlfriends Victor Suvorov tells us more about the "training and combat" girlfriends of Soviet military commanders in the new edition of his book "I take back my words" (Moscow: Dobryaya kniga, 2013). - *Editor's note*.